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Johnson: Cause-in-Fact After Burrage v. United States
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,Q %XUUDJH, the Supreme Court relied on “ordinary meaning” and
“traditional understanding” in concluding that causation elements in
IHGHUDO FULPLQDO VWDWXWHV QHDUO\ DOZD\V UHTXLUH VRcalled “butfor”
FDXVDWLRQ 6WDWH FRXUWV E\ FRQWUDVW WUDGLWLRQDOO\ KDYH DSSOLHG WZR
LPSRUWDQWPRGLILFDWLRQVWRWKHEXWIRUWHVW  DQDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHZKLFK
assigns liability to defendants who hasten “even by a moment” the
FRPLQJ WR IUXLWLRQ RI WKH SURVFULEHG KDUP DQG   D FRQWULEXWLRQ UXOH
ZKich assigns liability to defendants who “contribute” incrementally to
WKHXQGHUO\LQJFDXVDOPHFKDQLVP7KLV$UWLFOHdefends the state courts’
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& &RQWULEXWLRQDQG2YHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ

&21&/86,21
,1752'8&7,21
6WDWHFRXUWVDOUHDG\KDYHEHJXQ ZUHVWOLQJ ZLWK WKHLPSOLFDWLRQVIRU
state criminal law of the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in %XUUDJHY
8QLWHG 6WDWHV ,Q %XUUDJH WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW KHOG WKDW FDXVDWLRQ
HOHPHQWVLQIHGHUDOFULPLQDOVWDWXWHVJHQHUDOO\DUHVDWLVILHGRQO\E\SURRI
WKDW“WKHKDUPZRXOGQRWKDYHRFFXUUHGLQWKHDEVHQFHRI—WKDWLVEXW
IRU—the defendant’s conduct.”The Court acknowledged that the “text[]
or context[]” of a particular federal criminal statute might, on rare
occasions, require a departure from this “butfor” test.7KH&RXUWDOVR
DSSHDUHGWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDPRUHJHQHUDOH[FHSWLRQIRU
cases where the defendant’s conduct is “independently sufficient” to
EULQJDERXWWKHKDUP1HLWKHURIWKHVHQDUURZH[FHSWLRQVZDVLPSOLFDWHG


  6 &W    )RU VWDWH FDVHV DGGUHVVLQJ %XUUDJH’s implications, VHH IRU
H[DPSOH5ROOIY6WDWH6:G– $UN&W$SS  UHDIILUPLQJLQVSLWHRI
%XUUDJH Arkansas’s 6XSUHPH &RXUW rule that “where there are concurrent causes of GHDWK
conduct which hastens or contributes to a person’s death is a cause of death” TXRWLQJ&R[Y
6WDWH$UN  3HRSOHY$OTXLFLUD1R%:/DW 
(Cal. Ct. App. June 16, 2014) (“We find %XUUDJH GLVWLQJXLVKDEOe.”); People v. Wright, 854
1:G   (Mich. 2014) (denying defendant’s PRWLRQ for reconsideration “without
SUHMXGLFH WR WKH GHIHQGDQW VHHNLQJ >SRVWFRQYLFWLRQ@ UHOLHI    EDVHG RQ %XUUDJH Y 8QLWHG
6WDWHV”); State v. Bennett, 466 S.W.3d 561, 563 Q (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (“We decline
'HIHQGDQW’VLQYLWDWLRQWRUHLQWHUSUHW0LVVRXUL’VIHORQ\PXUGHUVWDWXWHLQOLJKWRI%XUUDJHY86”
FLWDWLRQRPLWWHG &RPPRQZHDOWKY.DNKDQNKDP1R0'$:/DW
 Q 3D6XSHU&W2FW  UHO\LQJRQ%XUUDJHin concluding that Pennsylvania’s
VWDWXWRU\GHILQLWLRQRIFDXVDWLRQ ‘“establishes the “EXWIRU”test of causation”’ (quoting 18 3$
&21667$7FPW  :DJRQHUY&RPPRQZHDOWK6(G 9D&W$SS
2014) (“We are persuaded by %XUUDJHWKDWZKHUHWKHOHJLVODWXUHKDVQRWFODULILHGRWKHUZLVHWKLV
Court should give the phrase ‘results in’ its ordinary meaning, which imports ‘but for’
causation.”), DII’G6(G 9D 

 %XUUDJH6&WDW– TXRWLQJ8QLYRI7H[6Z0HG&WUY1DVVDU6
&W  

 ,Gat 888 (“Where there is no textual or contextual indication to the contrary, courts
regularly read phrases like ‘resultsfrom’ to require butfor causality.”). Just a few months after
%XUUDJH WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW found just such a “‘WH[WXDO RU FRQWH[WXDO’ reason to conclude
otherwise” LQWKHIHGHUDOVWDWXWHVJRYHUQLQJUHVWLWXWLRQIRUYLFWLPVRIFKLOGSRUQRJUDSK\RIIHQVHV
3DUROLQHY8QLWHG6WDWHV6&W   TXRWLQJ%XUUDJH6&WDW 7KH
&RXUWLQ3DUROLQHGLGQRWKRZHYHUEDFNRIIRQ%XUUDJH’s holdingWKDWWKHEXWIRUWHVWH[KDXVWV
the ordinary meaning of words like “cause” and “result.” To the contrary, it characterized the
“alternative causal tests” required under the restitution statutes as making use of “a kind of legal
fiction or construct.” ,GDW

 %XUUDJH6Ct. at 892 (holding that the statute in Burrage’s case required butIRU
causation “at least where use of the drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently
VXIILFLHQWFDXVHRIWKHYLFWLP’VGHDWKRUVHULRXVERGLO\LQMXUy”).
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in Burrage’s own case, however. So the Court DSSOLHGWKHEXWIRUWHVWWR
Burrage and rejected the lower courts’ “contribution” analysis.
%XUUDJHREYLRXVO\isn’t binding on state courts. State courts decide
for themselves what their own state’s statutes mean. %XW %XUUDJH
QHYHUWKHOHVVLVOLNHO\WRUHFHLYHFRQVLGHUDEOHDWWHQWLRQIURPVWDWHFRXUWV
/LNH WKH IHGHUDO FULPLQDO FRGH PRVW VWDWH FRGHV LQFOXGH QR JHQHUDO
provision defining the required causal relationship between a defendant’s
FRQGXFW DQG WKH SURVFULEHG UHVXOW $FFRUGLQJO\ LQ JLYLQJ FRQWHQW WR
VWDWXWRU\ FDXVDWLRQ UHTXLUHPHQWV VWDWH FRXUWV JHQHUDOO\ KDYH GUDZQ RQ
WKHVDPHERG\RIMXGJHPDGHFULPLQDOODZGRFWULQHDVWKHIHGHUDOFRXUWV
The state courts can hardly be expected, then, to ignore the Court’s
DVVHUWLRQLQ%XUUDJHthat the “butIRUUHTXLUHPHQWLVSDUWRIWKHFRPPRQ
understanding of cause.”Nor can they be expected to ignore the Court’s
DVVHUWLRQ WKDW WKH EXWfor requirement “is one of the traditional
background principles ‘against which Congress legislate>V@.’”
6WLOOWKHTXHVWLRQRI%XUUDJH’sLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUVWDWHODZZRXOGEHRI
OLWWOH LQWHUHVW LI %XUUDJH’s holding were consistent with H[LVWLQJ VWDWH
ODZ—LIDV-XVWLFH$QWRQLQ6FDOLDDVVHUWHGLQKLVRSLQLRQIRUWKH&RXUW
state courts “usually” interpret similarly worded criminal statutes to
UHTXLUH EXWIRU FDXVDWLRQ But Justice Scalia’s assertion is mistaken.
7KRXJK D IHZ VWDWH FRXUWV DSSHDU WR UHTXLUH EXWIRU FDXVDWLRQ
H[FOXVLYHO\PDQ\PRUHVWDWHFRXUWVKDYHUHFRJQL]HGRQHRUERWKRIWZR


 ,GDW–

 6HH8QLWHG6WDWHVY7KLUW\Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (“[W]e
lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation.”).

 6HH02'(/3(1$/&2'(FPW $0/$:,1673URSRVHG2IILFLDO'UDIW 
(“In the majority of jurisdictions that have adopted or considered revised codes, no explicit
SURYLVLRQRQFDXVDWLRQKDVEHHQLQFOXGHG. . . .”).

 6HH HJ 6WDWH Y 'DYLG  3G   :DVK &W $SS   KROGLQJ WKDW
Washington’s legislature, when it adopted the state’s vehicular manslaughter statute, “implied
that the judiciary should continue to define “proximate causation” according to common law
principles”); (ULF $ -RKQVRQ Dynamic Incorporation of the General Part: Criminal Law’s
0LVVLQJ +\SHU /LQN8& '$9,6 / 5(9   DUJXLQJWKDWZKHQWKHVWDWXWHV
defining an offense “fail adequately to articulate critical offenserequirements,” like thHFDXVDWLRQ
requirement, courts generally should “construe the statutes as ‘hyperlinked’ to the stillHYROYLQJ
MXGJHmade law of the General Part”).

 %XUUDJH6&WDW

 ,GDW DOWHUDWLRQLQRULJLQDO  TXRWLQJ8QLYRI7H[6Z0HG&WUY1DVVDU6
&W     7KHSRWHQWLDO LPSOLFDWLRQV RI %XUUDJH IRU VWDWH FULPLQDO ODZ ZHUH WKH
IRFXVRIDQDPLFXVEULHIILOHGLQ%XUUDJHRQEHKDOIRIQLQHVWDWHDWWRUQH\VJHQHUDO6HH%ULHIRI
Amici Curiae States of Alaska, Colorado, Hawai’i, Kansas, New Mexico, South Dakota,
7HQQHVVHH:LVFRQVLQDQG:\RPLQJLQ6XSSRUWRI5HVSRQGHQW %XUUDJH6&W 1R
 :/

 %XUUDJH6&WDW

 (J6WDWHY%RZHQ3G 0RQW  “A party’s conduct is a cause
LQIDFW RI DQ HYHQW LI WKH HYHQW ZRXOG QRW KDYH RFFXUUHG EXW IRU WKDW FRQGXFW )XUWKHU WKH
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EURDG H[FHSWLRQV WR WKH EXWIRU WHVW 7KH ILUVW H[FHSWLRQ DVVLJQV
responsibility to any defendant who, though not a “butfor cause” of the
UHVXOWnevertheless accelerates “even by a moment or instant of time”
WKH FRPLQJ WR IUXLWLRQ RI WKH SURVFULEHG KDUP 7KH VHFRQG H[FHSWLRQ
assigns responsibility to any defendant who “contributes” to the causal
PHFKDQLVPXQGHUO\LQJWKHSURVFULEHGKDUP:KHQVWDWHFRXUWVFRQIURQW
FDVHVOLNH%XUUDJHIRUH[DPSOHZKHUHDGHIHQGDQWGUXJdealer’s conduct
contributes incrementally to a purchaser’s death but isn’t a butIRUFDXVH
WKH\URXWLQHO\LPSRVHOLDELOLW\XQGHUDFRQWULEXWLRQWKHRU\

GHIHQGDQW’V FRQGXFW LVQRW D FDXVH RI WKH HYHQW LI WKH HYHQW ZRXOGKDYHRFFXUUHG ZLWKRXW WKH
conduct.” FLWDWLRQ RPLWWHG  6WDWH Y 0XUR  1:G   1HE   KROGLQJ WKDW
“conduct is not a proximate cause of an event if that event would have occurred without such
conduct”); ComPRQZHDOWKY6SRWWL$G 3D6XSHU&W2014) (“[T]he defendant’V
conduct must be an antecedent, but for which the result in question would not have occurred.”),
DSSHDOGLVPLVVHG1R:$3:/ 3D 

 6WDWHY+DQDKDQ6( 6&  DSSURYLQJWULDOMXGJH’s instruction to
WKHMXU\ZKLFKVDLGLQSDUWWKDWDQLQMXU\LQIOLFWHGE\WKHGHIHQGDQWZLOOFRXQWDVDFDXVHRIWKH
victim’s death if it “even by a moment or instant of time hastens the death”); VHHDOVR+ / $
+$57  721< +2125e &$86$7,21,17+( /$:352 (2d ed. 1985) (“The slightest shortening of
life, for example, is homicide.”).

 :$<1(5/$)$9(68%67$17,9(&5,0,1$//$: E DW GHG 

 6HHHJ3HRSOHY-HQQLQJV3G &DO  ‘“When the conduct of
WZRRUPRUHSHUVRQVFRQWULEXWHVFRQFXUUHQWO\DVWKHSUR[LPDWHFDXVHRIWKHGHDWKWKHFRQGXFWRI
HDFKLVDSUR[LPDWHFDXVHRIWKHGHDWKLIWKDWFRQGXFWZDVDOVRDVXEVWDQWLDOIDFWRUFRQWULEXWLQJWR
the result.”’ HPSKDVLV RPLWWHG  6WDWH Y %ORFN  $  169 (Conn. 1913) (“[I]t is not
QHFHVVDU\WKDWWKHDFWRURPLVVLRQZDVWKHGLUHFWFDXVHRIWKHGHDWKLWLVVXIILFLHQWLILWZDVD
contributory cause.”); People v. Brown, 661 N.E.2d 287, 296 (Ill. 1996) (“[T]he defendant’s act
QHHGRQO\FRQWULEXWHWRWKHYLctim’s death to prove the defendant guilty of murder.”); Miller v.
State, 335 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ind. 1975) (“An individual who inflicts injury upon another is deemed
E\ODZWREHJXLOW\RIKRPLFLGHLIWKHLQMXU\FRQWULEXWHVPHGLDWHO\RULPPHGLDWHO\WRWKHGHDWKRI
that other person.”); Commonwealth v. Osachuk, 681 N.E.2d 292, 294 (Mass. App.&W 
(“When the conduct of two or more persons contributes concurrently to the death, the conduct of
HDFK LV WKH SUR[LPDWH FDXVH UHJDUGOHVV RI WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK each contributes.”); People v.
Bailey, 549 N.W.2d 325, 334 (Mich. 1996) (“In assessing criminal liability for some harm, it is
QRWQHFHVVDU\WKDWWKHSDUW\FRQYLFWHGRIDFULPHEHWKHVROHFDXVHRIWKDWKDUPRQO\WKDWKHEHD
FRQWULEXWRU\ FDXVH WKDW ZDV D substantial factor in producing the harm.”); State v. Smith, 119
N.W.2d 838, 848 (Minn. 1962) (“Responsibility attaches for an injury which causes or contributes
WR GHDWK DOWKRXJK WKH FRQGLWLRQ IURP ZKLFK WKH YLFWLP ZDV VXIIHULQJ PLJKW LWVHOI KDYH FDXVHG
death in time.”); State v. Woods, No. W2003&&$5&':/DW  7HQQ
&ULP$SS)HE2005) (“It is only necessary that the defendant unlawfully contributed to the
death of the deceased.” TXRWLQJ6WDWHY5LFKDUGVRQ6:G  :LOVRQY
6WDWH6: 7H[&ULP$SS  ZKHUHGHIHQGDQWVWUXFNWKHYLFWLPRQWKHKHDG
with a rock and someone else “stabb[ed] him with a knife, inflicting a mortal wound,” the
defendant’s liability for homicide depends on whether “the blow with the rock contributed
materially to the death”); State v. Rounds, 160 A. 249, 252 (Vt. 1932) (“The respondent’s
XQODZIXO DFWV QHHG QRW EH WKH VROH FDXVH RI GHDWK LW LV VXIILFLHQW LI WKH\ ZHUH D FRQWULEXWRU\
cause.”); State v. ChristmDQ3G :DVK&WApp. 2011) (“Under the substantial
factor test, all parties whose actions contributed to the outcome are held liable.”).

 2VDFKXN1(GDW– DSSO\LQJWKHFRQWULEXWLRQWHVWWRDGHIHQGDQWZKRE\
VXSSO\LQJ WKH YLFWLP ZLWK GUXJV RQ PXOWLSOH RFFDVLRQV KDG FRQWULEXWHG WR KLV GHDWK IURP
combined “cocaine, heroinand methadone intoxication”);VHHDOVR3HRSOHY:ULJKW1R
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6KRXOGVWDWHFRXUWVDEDQGRQWKHLURZQFDXVDWLRQUXOHVIRUWKH6XSUHPH
Court’s?7KHDQVZHULVQRDVWKLV$UWLFOHH[SODLQV7he Supreme Court’s
%XUUDJHRSLQLRQIDLOVRQLWVRZQWHUPV—as an analysis of the “ordinary
meaning” of terms like “causes” and “results from.” ScholarVKDYHORQJ
UHFRJQL]HG WKDW WKH EXWIRU WHVW IDLOV LQ WZR YHU\ LPSRUWDQW UHVSHFWV WR
FDSWXUHRUGLQDU\XVDJH,WIDLOVILUVWWRFDSWXUHRUGLQDU\XVDJHLQFDVHV
where the defendant’s conduct preempts, or cuts off, another causal
SURFHVVWKDWZRXOGLQWLPHKDYHFDXVHGWKHVDPHUHVXOW$QGLWIDLOVWRR
to capture ordinary usage in cases of “causal overdetermination,” where
the defendant’s conduct, though it plays a role in the causal mechanism
XQGHUO\LQJWKHKDUPLVSRWHQWLDOO\VXSHUIOXRXV
,W LV WR WKHVH WZR FDWHJRULHV RI FDVHV—SUHHPSWLRQ FDVHV DQG
RYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ FDVHV—that the state courts’ acceleration and
contribution rules are addressed. This isn’t to say, however, that one of
WKHVHWZRUXOHVLVDGGUHVVHGWRWKHSUHHPSWLRQSUREOHPDQGWKHRWKHUWR
WKHRYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQSUREOHP5DWKHUHDFKRIWKHWZRUXOHVLVDGGUHVVHG
WRERWKSUREOHPV7KHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHUHVROYHVVRPHRIWKHSUHHPSWLRQ
FDVHV DQG VRPH RI WKH RYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ FDVHV ZKLOH WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ
UXOH UHVROYHV FDVHV IURP ERWK FDWHJRUies that aren’t resolved by the
DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH 7KH WZR UXOHV FRPSOHPHQW RQH DQRWKHU WKHQ DV WKH
FRXUWV DSSHDU WR KDYH DFNQRZOHGJHG E\ UHIHUULQJ WR WKHP IUHTXHQWO\
WRJHWKHU ,Q KRPLFLGH FDVHV IRU H[DPSOH FRXUWV RIWHQ VD\ WKDW D
defendant’s conduct will qualify as a cause of the victim’s death if his
conduct “contributed to or accelerated the death.”

:/DW  0LFK&W$SS'HF2013) (approving trial court’s jury iQVWUXFWLRQV
WRWKHHIIHFWWKDWWKHKHURLQVXSSOLHGE\WKHGHIHQGDQW“RQO\QHHGVWREHDFRQWULEXWLQJFDXVHWKDW
ZDVDVXEVWDQWLDOIDFWRULQWKHGHDWKRI>WKHSXUFKDVHU@” &KULVWPDQ3GDW– DSSO\LQJ
WKHFRQWULEXWLRQWHVWWRDGUXJGHDOHUZKRKDGVXSSOLHGWKHYLFWLPZLWKRQHRIVHYHUDOFRQWUROOHG
VXEVWDQFHVWKDWKDGFRQWULEXWHGWRKLVGHDWKIURPLQWR[LFDWLRQ 

 6HH5(67$7(0(17 7+,5' 2)72576FPWDDW $0/$:,1672010) (“There
LVQHDUXQLYHUVDOUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHLQDSSURSULDWHQHVVRIWKHEXWIRUVWDQGDUGIRUIDFWXDOFDXVDWLRQ
when multiple sufficient causes exist.”).

 6HH5LFKDUG::ULJKW&DXVDWLRQLQ7RUW/DZ&$/,) / 5(9  
H[SODLQLQJEXWfor test’s shortcomings in cases of “preemptive causation”).

 6HH (ULF $ -RKQVRQ :URQJIXO$VSHFW 2YHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ 7KH 6FRSHRIWKH5LVN
5HTXLUHPHQWLQ'UXQN'ULYLQJ+RPLFLGH&211/5(9–   H[SODLQLQJEXW
for test’s shortcomings in cases of “causaloverdetermination”). 

 Turner v. State, 409 So. 2d 922, 923 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (“All that is required is
WKDW WKH MXU\ EH FRQYLQFHG IURP WKH HYLGHQFH WKDW WKH ZRXQGV LQIOLFWHG E\ WKH DFFXVHG ZHUH
dangerous and contributed to or accelerated the death of the deceased . . . .”)VHHDOVR5ROOIY
6WDWH6:G–96 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015) (“[W]here there are concurrent causes of
death, conduct which hastens or contributes to a person’s death is a cause of death” TXRWLQJ&R[
Y6WDWH6:G $UN 3HRSOHY%URZQ3 &DO&W$SS
1923) (“If appellant did not fire the last shot in selfGHIHQVH DQG LI WKH ZRXQG LQIOLFWHG E\ LW
FRQWULEXWHGWRRUKDVWHQHG$QWLRU’VGHDWKWKHMXU\FRXOGSURSHUO\ILQGDSSHOODQWJXLOW\RIKRPLFLGH
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In defending the state courts’ acceleration and contribution rules, WKLV
$UWLFOH ZLOO QRW TXDUUHO ZLWK WKH ZD\ WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW IUDPHG WKH
UHOHYDQWTXHVWLRQ5DWKHUWKH$UWLFOHZLOODVVXPHDVWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW
GLGLQ%XUUDJHWKDWWKHYDULRXVWHVWVRIFDXVHLQIDFWVKRXOGEHMXGJHG
according to how well they capture “the plain man’s notions of
causation.”7KH$UWLFOHDOVRZLOODVVXPHDVWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWGLGLQ
%XUUDJH, that our efforts to capture this “common understanding of
cause” in a test or rule necessarily are constrained by “the need for clarity
and certainty,” and for relative simplicity, in the criminal law.
$FFRUGLQJO\WKH$UWLFOHZLOOQRWWU\WRFRQVWUXFWDQH[KDXVWLYHDFFRXQW
RIWKHDVWRQLVKLQJO\FRPSOH[XQVSRNHQUXOHVWKDWXQGHUOLHWKLVFRPPRQ
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ,QVWHDGWKH$UWLFOHZLOOVKRZWKDWWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQDQG
FRQWULEXWLRQWHVWVOLNHWKHEXWIRUWHVWWKH\VXSSOHPHQWDUHGHIHQVLEOHDV
KHXULVWLFV—DVVKRUWKDQGWRROVIRUDUULYLQJDWDQVZHUVWKDWDUHURXJKO\LQ
keeping with the ordinary person’s understanding of causation. 
7KLV$UWLFOHZLOOEHJLQLQ3DUW,ZLWKDYHU\VKRUWLQWURGXFWLRQWRWKH
%XUUDJH GHFLVLRQ ,W WKHQ ZLOO GLVFXVV LQ VHTXHQFH WKH WKUHH FDXVDO
KHXULVWLFVWKDWVWDWHFRXUWVDSSO\LQUHVROYLQJTXHVWLRQVRIFDXVHLQIDFW
3DUW,,ZLOOGLVFXVVWKHEXWIRUWHVWZKLFKSURYLGHVWKHULJKWDQVZHUWRWKH
FDXVHLQIDFWTXHVWLRQLQRUGLQDU\FDXVDOVLWXDWLRQV3DUWV,,,DQG,9ZLOO
GLVFXVVWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQDQGFRQWULEXWLRQWHVWVZKLFKWRJHWKHUSURYLGHWKH
ULJKWDQVZHULQFDVHVRISUHHPSWHGRURYHUGHWHUPLQHGFDXVDWLRQ

E\UHDVon of that shot . . . .”); People v. Cox, 228 P.2d 163, 165 (Colo. 1951) (“I may not wantonly
DWWDFNDG\LQJPDQDQGLIWKHUHE\,KDVWHQRUFRQWULEXWHWRKLVGHDWKLWLVQRGHIHQVHWKDWKHZRXOG
have died in any event.”); Lawson v. State, 561 S.E.2d 72, 73 (Ga. 2002) (“[W]e conclude that
WKHMXU\ZDVDXWKRUL]HGWRILQGIURPWKHH[WHQVLYHPHGLFDOHYLGHQFHSUHVHQWHGDWWULDOWKDWHYHQLI
DSSHOODQW’V EHDWLQJ GLG QRW GLUHFWO\ FDXVH WKH YLFWLP’V GHDWK WKH EHDWLQJ HLWKHU PDWHULDOO\
FRQWULEXWHGWRWKHGHDWKRUmaterially accelerated it.”); State v. Wood, 84 N.W. 520, 521 (Iowa
1900) (“No principle is better settled than that he who, by his wrongful act, accelerates or hastens
death, or contributes to its cause, is guilty of homicide . . . .”); State v. Jones, 596RG
(La. Ct. App. 1992) (“If the act hastened the termination of life, or contributed directly or
LQGLUHFWO\ WR WKH YLFWLP’V GHDWK LQ D GHJUHH VXIILFLHQW WR EH D FOHDUO\ FRQWULEXWLQJ FDXVH WKH
GHIHQGDQW’VDFWFRQVWLWXWHGWKH‘OHJDOFDXVH’Rf death.”); State v. McDonald, 953 P.2d 470, 474
(Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a defendant qualifies as a cause of the victim’s death if ‘“the
act of the accused contributed to or accelerated his death”’ (quoting United States v. Kinder, 14
&05 $%)5 DII’G3G :DVK 6WDWHY5HHG\6(
29 (W. Va. 1923) (“[I]f the jury believed that the defendant contributed to, hastened, or
DFFHOHUDWHGWKHGHDWKRIWKHGHFHDVHGWKHQWKH\ZRXOGKDYHEHHQMXVWLILHGLQILQGLQJKLPJXLOW\
RIWKHKRPLFLGH.”); State v. Rice, 156 N.W.2d 409, 417 (Wis. 1968) (“[P]rior injury and even
RQH ZKLFK ZLOO RU PLJKW OHDG WRGHDWKGRHV QRW DIIHFW WKH OLDELOLW\ IRU KRPLFLGH RI DQ DFFXVHG
ZKRVHDFWFRQWULEXWHGWRRUDFFHOHUDWHGWKHGHDWK.”). 

 +$57 +2125eVXSUDQRWH, at 1 (“[I]t is the plain man’s notions of causation (and
not the philosopher’s or the scientist’s) with which the law is concerned”). 

 %XUUDJHY8QLWHG6WDWHV6&W  

 6HH+$57  +2125eVXSUDQRWH, at xxxiii (“[T]he concept of causation, as we use
it in ordinary life, is not a unitary one.”)
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,%855$*(981,7('67$7(6
7KH SHWLWLRQHU LQ %XUUDJH 0DUFXV %XUUDJH VROG KHURLQ WR -RVKXD
Banka, who died of “mixeddrug intoxication” shortly after injecting it.
Several different drugs (or their metabolites) were present in Banka’s
V\VWHP ZKHQ KH GLHG LQFOXGLQJ KHURLQ R[\FRGRQH FORQD]HSDP DQG
DOSUD]RODP7KRXJKDOORIWKHVHGUXJVEXWWKHKHURLQZHUHSUHVHQWRQO\
DW WKHUDSHXWLF OHYHOV DOO RI WKHP FRQWULEXWHG—by depressing Banka’s
FHQWUDO QHUYRXV V\VWHP—to the causal mechanism behind Banka’s
GHDWK$VDUHVXOWQHLWKHUWKHSDWKRORJLVWZKRSHUIRUPHGWKHDXWRSV\
nor the toxicologist who tested Banka’s blood could say that Banka
would not have died “but for” his use of the heroin supplied by Burrage.
,QVWHDGWKH\FRXOGVD\RQO\WKDWWKHKHURLQZDVa “contributing factor.”
For his role in Banka’s death, the government charged Burrage under
 86&   E  &  ZKLFK PDNHV KHURLQ GHDOHUV VXEMHFW WR
HQKDQFHGVHQWHQFHVLI“GHDWKRUVHULRXVERGLO\LQMXU\UHVXOWVIURPWKHXVH
of such substance.”At Burrage’s trial, defense counsel proposed a jury
LQVWUXFWLRQ WKDW ZRXOG KDYH UHTXLUHG WKH JRYHUQPHQW WR SURYH DPRQJ
RWKHUWKLQJVWKDWWKHKHURLQVXSSOLHGE\%XUUDJHZDVDEXWIRUFDXVHRI
Banka’s death. 6SHFLILFDOO\ WKH LQVWUXFWLRQ ZRXOG KDYH UHTXLUHG WKH
JRYHUQPHQW WR SURYH WKDW ‘“except for [Burrage’s conduct] the death
would not have occurred.”’7KHGLVWULFWFRXUWGHFOLQHGVRWRLQVWUXFWWKH
MXU\,QVWHDGWKHFRXUWLQVWUXFWHGWKHMXU\—LQNHHSLQJZLWKWKH
GHFLVLRQRIWKH 86 &RXUWRI$SSHDOV IRUWKH (LJKWK&LUFXLWLQ 8QLWHG
6WDWHVY0RQQLHU—WKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWZDVUHTXLUHGPHUHO\WRSURYH
that the heroin supplied by Burrage “was a contributing cause.” 7KH
MXU\FRQYLFWHG%XUUDJHDQGWKH(LJKWK&LUFXLWDIILUPHGWKHFRQYLFWLRQ
RQDSSHDO7KH(LJKWK&LUFXLWSDQHOFRQFOXGHGILUVWWKDWDQHYHQWQHHG
merely be a “contributing cause” to satisfy the causation requirement in
 86&  E  &  DQG VHFRQG WKDW WKH WHVWLPRQLHV RI WKH































%XUUDJH6&WDW–
,GDW
,G
,GDW–
,G
,GDW TXRWLQJ86& D   E  $ – &   
,GDW
,G
,G
)G WK&LU 
%XUUDJH6&WDW
,G
,G
8QLWHG6WDWHVY%XUUDJH)G WK&LU 
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SDWKRORJLVWDQGWKHWR[LFRORJLVWZHUHVXIILFLHQWWRVXVWDLQWKHYHUGLFW
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWUHYHUVHG-XVWLFH6FDOLDZULWLQJIRUWKH&RXUWVDLG
WKDWWKHVWDWXWHUHTXLUHGEXWIRUFDXVDWLRQ
>$@WOHDVWZKHUHXVHRIWKHGUXJGLVWULEXWHGE\WKHGHIHQGDQW
LVQRWDQLQGHSHQGHQWO\VXIILFLHQWcause of the victim’s death
RUVHULRXVERGLO\LQMXU\DGHIHQGDQWFDQQRWEHOLDEOHXQGHU
WKH SHQDOW\ HQKDQFHPHQW SURYLVLRQ RI  86&
 E  & XQOHVVVXFKXVHLVDEXWIRUFDXVHRIWKHGHDWK
RULQMXU\
-XVWLFH6FDOLDLPSOLHGPRUHRYHUWKDWWKHVDPHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQZRXOG
EHUHTXLUHGRIDQ\IHGHUDOFULPLQDOVWDWXWHWKDWLQFOXGHVFDXVDWLRQDVDQ
element, at least in the absence of some “textual or contextual indication
to the contrary.”The bases for the Court’s adoption of the butIRUWHVW
DV WKH H[FOXVLYH—RU QHDUO\ H[FOXVLYH—WHVW RI IDFWXDO FDXVDWLRQ XQGHU
IHGHUDO FULPLQDO ODZ ZHUH WZRIROG )LUVW WKH &RXUW UHOLHG RQ RUGLQDU\
XVDJH‘“>,@n common talk,”’said the Court, phrases like “results from,”
“because of,” and “by reason of” are used to ‘“indicate[] a butIRUFDXVDO
relationship.”’ Second, the Court relied on the legal “background”
DJDLQVW ZKLFK &RQJUHVV KDG DGRSWHG  86&   E  &  ,Q
SDUWLFXODUWKH&RXUWUHOLHGRQWKH0RGHO3HQDO&RGHDQGRQGHFLVLRQVE\
“[s]tate courts, which hear and decide the bulk of the Nation’s criminal
matters.”
7KLV$UWLFOHZLOOVKRZLQWKHVHFWLRQVWKDWIROORZERWKWKDWWKHEXW
IRUWHVWRIWHQIDLOVWRFDSWXUHRUGLQDU\XVDJHDQGWKDWWKHVWDWHFRXUWVUDUHO\
KDYHWUHDWHGWKHEXWIRUWHVWDVWKHH[FOXVLYHPHDVXUHRIFDXVHLQfact. It’s
ZRUWKSDXVLQJEULHIO\WKRXJKWRFRQVLGHUMXVWKRZWKH&RXUWDUULYHGDW
WKHRSSRVLWHYLHZ
First, for the proposition that state courts “usually” have required but
IRUFDXVDWLRQ—as opposed to, say, “contribution”—WKH&RXUWUHOLHGRQ
MXVW WZR VWDWHFRXUW FULPLQDO FDVHV RQH IURP ,RZD DQG WKH RWKHU IURP
0LFKLJDQ,QQHLWKHURIWKHVHWZRMXULVGLFWLRQVWKRXJKKDYHWKHFRXUWV


 ,GDW

 %XUUDJH6&WDW

 ,G

 ,GDW

 ,GDW TXRWLQJ6DIHFR,QV&RRI$PY%XUU86  

 ,GDW

 ,GDW–

 ,G DW  FLWLQJ 3HRSOH Y :RRG  1:G  – 0LFK   6WDWH Y
+HQQLQJV1:G–35 (Iowa 2010)). In support of its claim that state courts “usually
interpret similarly worded criminal statutes” to require butIRUFDXVDWLRQWKH&RXUWDOVRFLWHGD
FDVHZKHUHWKHVWDWXWHDWLVVXHFRGLILHGFULPLnal procedure’s fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
,G FLWLQJ6WDWHY5LFKDUGVRQ6(G 1& The Court’s reliance on this
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FRQVLVWHQWO\WUHDWHGWKHEXWIRUWHVWDVWKHH[FOXVLYHWHVWRIFDXVHLQIDFW
7R WKH FRQWUDU\ ERWK WKH ,RZD DQG 0LFKLJDQ FRXUWV VRPHWLPHV KDYH
applied a “contribution” test. The Michigan Supreme Court has said, for
H[DPSOHWKDWDFULPLQDOGHIHQGDQWZKRFRQWULEXWHVWRWKHKDUPTXDOLILHV
DVDFDXVHRIWKHKDUPeven if “another contributory cause woulGKDYH
[caused the harm] without the aid of this act.” /LNHZLVH WKH ,RZD
6XSUHPH &RXUW KDV VDLG WKDW LQ KRPLFLGH FDVHV D GHIHQGDQW LV
responsible for the victim’s death if his acts “hasten or contribute to or
FDXVHGHDWKVRRQHUWKDQLWZRXOGRWKHUZLVHoccur.”
6HFRQGIRUWKHSURSRVLWLRQWKDWWKHEXWfor test reflects the “traditional
understanding” of causation in criminal law,WKH&RXUWUHOLHGLQSDUWRQ
VHFWLRQRIWKH0RGHO3HQDO&RGHZKLFKDSSHDUVWRDGRSWWKHEXWIRU
test as the Code’s exclXVLYHWHVWRIFDXVHLQIDFW7KH&RXUWDOVRUHOLHG
LQ SDUWRQWKHKLVWRU\RI VHFWLRQ,W SRLQWHGRXW WKDWWKH $PHULFDQ
/DZ,QVWLWXWH $/, LQDGRSWLQJVHFWLRQVSHFLILFDOO\KDGUHMHFWHGDQ
DPHQGPHQW WKDW ZRXOG KDYH FUHDWHG D EURDG H[FHSWLRQ WR WKH EXWIRU
WHVW 7KH DPHQGPHQW ZKLFK 3URIHVVRU -HURPH +DOO SURSRVHG GXULQJ
GHEDWHRQVHFWLRQZRXOGKDYHDGGHGWRVHFWLRQ2.03 the words: “or


FDVH ZDV VHULRXVO\ PLVSODFHG &DXVDWLRQ SOD\V D IXQGDPHQWDOO\ GLIIHUHQW UROH LQ FULPLQDO
SURFHGXUHWKDQLWGRHVLQVXEVWDQWLYHFULPLQDOODZ6HH(ULF$-RKQVRQ&DXVDO5HOHYDQFHLQWKH
/DZRI6HDUFKDQG6HL]XUH%8/5(9–  

 3HRSOHY%DLOH\1:G 0LFK 7KH0LFKLJDQFDVHUHOLHGRQE\
WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWLQ%XUUDJHDQG3HRSOHY:RRGGLGQRWUDLVHTXHVWLRQVRIFRQFXUUHQWFDXVDWLRQ
:RRG1:GDW2QWKHFRQWUDU\WKHGHIendant’s conduct in :RRGHDVLO\VDWLVILHGWKH
EXWfor test: “Because the officer’s death would not have occurred absent defendant’s fleeing and
HOXGLQJLHWKHSROLFHRIILFHUZRXOGQRWKDYHORVWFRQWURORIKLVYHKLFOHGXULQJWKHSXUVXLWRIWKH
IOHHLQJGefendant, factual causation exists.” ,G

 %DLOH\  1:G DW  TXRWLQJ 52//,1 0 3(5.,16  521$/' 1 %2<&(
&5,0,1$//$: GHG 

 State v. Smith, 34 N.W. 597, 601 (Iowa 1887) (“It surely ought not to be the law that
EHFDXVHDSHUVRQLVDIIOLFWHGZLWKDPRUWDOPDODG\IURP ZKLFKKHPXVWVRRQGLHZKHWKHUKLV
DLOPHQW EH FDXVHG E\ QDWXUDO RUDUWLILFLDO FDXVHV DQRWKHU PD\ EH H[FXVHG IRU DFWV RI YLROHQFH
which hasten or contribute to or cause death sooner than it would otherwise occur.”)2WKHUVWDWH
FRXUWVIUHTXHQWO\KDYHTXRWHGWKLVVWDWHPHQWIURP6PLWK6HHHJ5XWOHGJHY6WDWH3G
 $UL]   3HRSOH Y &R[  3G   &ROR   6WDWH Y /RFNH  :/
DW  1-6XSHU&W$SS'LY0DU 6WDWHY0F'RQDOG3G
Q :DVK &W $SS  &XUUHQW ,RZD ODZ RQ WKLV VXEMHFWLV VRPHZKDW XQFOHDU ,Q 6WDWH Y
7ULEEOHWKH,RZD6XSUHPH&RXUWVDLGWKDWWKHEXWfor test “requires further assistance” in cases of
FRQFXUUHQWFDXVDWLRQ1:G– ,RZD %XWWKHFRXUWJDYHPL[HGVLJQDOVDV
to exactly what sort of “further assistance” was required. On one hand, the court implied that the
H[FHSWLRQWRWKHEXWIRUWHVWZRXOGEHOLPLWHGWRFRQWULEXWLRQVWKDWZHUHVXIILFLHQW“alone” to cause
WKHUHVXOW,GDW2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHFRXUWDSSHDUHGWRHQGRUVHRIWKH5HVWDWHPHQW
(Third) of Torts, which does not require that the defendant’s contribution be independently
VXIILFLHQW ,G DW   Q )RU D GLVFXVVLRQ RI the Restatement’s position, VHH LQIUD WH[W
DFFRPSDQ\LQJQRWHV–

 %XUUDJH6&WDW

 6HH02'(/ 3(1$/ &2'(  D  $0 /$: ,1673URSRVHG2IILFLDO'UDIW 
(providing that a defendant’s conduct will qualify as a FDXVHLQfact only if “it is an antecedent
but for which the result in question would not have occurred”).

 %XUUDJH6&WDW
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which was a substantial factor in producing that result.” 7KH $/,
UHMHFWHGWKHDPHQGPHQWE\DYRWHRIWR
The Court’s reliance on the Model Penal Code and on the ALI debates
LV PLVSODFHG KRZHYHU 7KRXJK 0RGHO 3HQDO &RGH VHFWLRQ  GRHV
LQGHHGDGRSWDYHUVLRQRIWKHEXWIRUWHVWWKHFRPPHQWDU\WRVHFWLRQ
H[SODLQV WKDW WKH GUDIWHUV WKRXJKW WKH WHVW FRXOG EH DGMXVWHG WR
DFFRPPRGDWH FDVHV RI FRQFXUUHQW FDXVDWLRQ ,Q FDVHV RI FRQFXUUHQW
causation, says the commentary, “the result    VKRXOG EH YLHZHG DV
including the precise way in which the forbidden consequence occurs.”
The Code’s reporter, +HUEHUW:HFKVOHULOOXVWUDWHGWKLVUHILQHPHQWLQKLV
verbal response to Hall’s proposed amendment. Under VHFWLRQKH
VDLG LI WKH YLFWLP KDG GLHG IURP WZR VLPXOWDQHRXV EXOOHW ZRXQGV WKH
result would be described as death “from two bullet wounds,” QRW
merely as “death.” In resolving this case, then, the IDFWILQGHUZRXOGQRW
decide simply whether the victim “would not have died” but for the
defendant’s conduct. Rather, the IDFW ILQGHU ZRXOG GHFLGH ZKHWKHU WKH
YLFWLP ZRXOG QRW KDYH GLHG IURP WZR EXOOHW ZRXQGV EXW IRU WKH
defendant’s conduct. 7KLV UHILQHG YHUVLRQ RI WKH EXWIRU WHVW ZRXOG
:HFKVOHU VDLG SURGXFH WKH ULJKW UHVXOW LQ FDVHV LQYROYLQJ FRQFXUUHQW
causation. It would make “each of [the two bullet wounds] an antecedent
EXWIRUZKLFKWKHUHVult in question would not have occurred.”
Wechsler’s proposed refinement of the butIRU WHVW WKRXJK LW KDV
SURYHQSRSXODUDPRQJVFKRODUVQHYHUUHDOO\FDXJKWRQZLWKMXGJHV—


 7KXUVGD\0RUQLQJ6HVVLRQ0D\$/,352&  >KHUHLQDIWHU
$/,352&((',1*6@

 ,GDW

 02'(/3(1$/&2'(FPWDW

 ,G

 $/,352&((',1*6VXSUDQRWHDWVHHDOVR02'(/3(1$/&2'(FPWDW
259 (explaining that, in a case where the victim dies from two simultaneous mortal blows, “the
result should be characterized as ‘death from two mortal blows’”).

 6HH$/,352&((',1*6VXSUDQRWHDWVHHDOVR02'(/3(1$/&2'(FPW
2 at 259 (“So described, the victim’s demise has as butfor causes each assailant’s blow.”).

 $/,352&((',1*6VXSUDQRWHDW

 6HHHJ-26+8$ '5(66/(5 81'(567$1',1* &5,0,1$/ /$:– WKHG 
(“A preferable method of UHVROYLQJWKHFDXVDOTXDQGDU\>LQFDVHVRIFRQFXUUHQWFDXVDWLRQ@LVWR
UHWDLQWKHEXWIRUWHVWLQWKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHVEXWWRHODERUDWHRQLW7ZRH[WUDZRUGVDUHDGGHG
so that the test becomes: ‘But for '’s voluntary act would the social harm have occurrHGZKHQ
DQG DV it did?’ In essence, this technique refines the description of the result for which the
defendants are prosecuted.” IRRWQRWHRPLWWHG -/0$&.,(7+(&(0(172)7+(81,9(56(–
   DUJXLQJ WKDW WKH EXWIRU WHVW GHOLYHUV WKH ULJKW UHVXOW LQ WKH SRLVRQHGFDQWHHQ
hypothetical if the result is described not as the victim’s “death” but as her “death from thirst”)
3(5.,16 %2<&(VXSUDQRWHDW(“Whenever that would not have happened when and as
it did happen, had it not been for this, this is an actual cause of that.” HPSKDVLVRPLWWHG 

 5LFKDUG::ULJKW7KH1(66$FFRXQWRI1DWXUDO&DXVDWLRQ$5HVSRQVHWR&ULWLFLVPV
LQ 3(563(&7,9(6 21 &$86$7,21   5LFKDUG *ROGEHUJ HG 2011) (“The courts and the
VHFRQGDU\OLWHUDWXUHJHQHUDOO\GRQRWTXDOLI\WKHFRQVHTXHQFHE\VSHFLI\LQJLWVQRQVDOLHQWGHWDLOV
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SHUKDSV ZLWK JRRG UHDVRQ DV WKLV $UWLFOH ZLOO H[SODLQ ODWHU :KDW
PDWWHUVIRUSUHVHQWSXUSRVHVWKRXJKLVWKDWWKLVUHILQHGYHUVLRQRIWKH
EXWfor test is at least as broad as the “contribution” test that the Court
GHULGHGLQ%XUUDJH,Q%XUUDJHitself, for example, Wechsler’s test would
KDYHSHUPLWWHGWKHIDFWILQGHUWRDVVLJQUHVSRQVLELOLW\WR%XUUDJHLIEXW
for Burrage’s conduct, victim Joshua Banka would not have died IURP
WKHFRPELQHGHIIHFWVRIKHURLQR[\FRGRQHFORQD]HSDPDQGDOSUD]RODP
7KH&RXUWZDVZURQJWKHQZKHQLWUHOLHGRQWKH0RGHO3HQDO&RGHDQG
on the ALI’s rejection of Hall’s proposed amendment, in support of LWV
claim that “the traditional understanding” of causation would require
DSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHXQUHILQHGEXWIRUWHVWLQ%XUUDJH
7KHUHDOWURXEOHZLWK%XUUDJHRIFRXUVHLVQRWWKDWWKH&RXUWUHOLHG
RQWKHZURQJDXWKRULWLHV7KHUHDOWURXEOHZLWK%XUUDJHDVWKLV$UWLFOH
ZLOOH[SODLQLVWKDWWKHEXWIRUWHVWZKHQDSSOLHGDVDQH[FOXVLYHWHVWRI
FDXVHLQIDFWGHOLYHUVUHVXOWVWKDWDUHVWDUNO\DWRGGVZLWKWKHFRPPRQ
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIFDXVDWLRQ
,,7+(%87)257(67
7KHEXWIRUWHVWKDVUHDOYLUWXHV)LUVWLWDVVLJQVOLDELOLW\HYHQLQFDVHV
where the defendant’s conduct is not the “immediate cause” of the
UHVXOW7DNHIRUH[DPSOH%UDFNHWWY3HWHUVZKHUHGHIHQGDQW5DQG\
%UDFNHWWDUJXHGWKDWKLVHOGerly victim’s death from asphyxiation had not
been “caused” by his brutal assault on her of one month before.%UDFNHWW
FRPSODLQHGWKDWWKHYLFWLPKDGGLHGIURPFKRNLQJRQIRRGDWDQXUVLQJ
KRPHQRW IURPDQ\RIWKHLQMXULHV KHKDGLQIOLFWHGRQKHU 7KH86
&RXUWRI$SSHDOVIRUWKH6HYHQWK&LUFXLWLQDQRSLQLRQE\-XGJH5LFKDUG
3RVQHU UHOLHG RQ WKH EXWfor test in rejecting Brackett’s argument.
Brackett’s assault, said Judge Posner, had set in motion his elderly
victim’s physical decline, which ultimatHO\KDGOHIWKHUWRRZHDNWRH[SHO
WKHIRRGWKDWKDGEHFRPHORGJHGLQKHUWUDFKHDThus, “had she not been
assaulted,” she would not have “entered the hospital the next day and died
a month later.” ,QFDVHV OLNH %UDFNHWWWKHEXWIRUWHVW SURGXFHV ZKDW

RUWKHWLPHORFDWLRQRUPDQQHURILWVRFFXUUHQFHZKHQGHVFULELQJRUDSSO\LQJWKHVLQHTXDQRQ
analysis.”). 

 6HHLQIUDWH[WDFFRPSDQ\LQJQRWHV–

 %XUUDJHY8QLWHG6WDWHV6&W–  

 6HH*ODQYLOOH:LOOLDPV&DXVDWLRQLQWKH/DZ&$0%5,'*(/-

 )G WK&LU 

 ,GDW

 ,GDW

 ,GDW H[SODLQLQJWKDWFDXVHLQfact requires proof that “the event would not have
occurred without the act”).

 ,GDW

 ,G
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HYHU\RQH DJUHHV LV WKH ULJKW UHVXOW WKH DVFULSWLRQ RI UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR
defendants whose conduct, though perhaps not strictly the “cause” of the
KDUPwas a “cause of the cause.”
$VHFRQGYLUWXHRIWKHEXWfor test is that a defendant’s responsibility
XQGHU WKH WHVW GRHV QRW GHSHQG RQ WKH PDJQLWXGH RI the defendant’s
FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH FDXVDO PHFKDQLVP XQGHUO\LQJ WKH UHVXOW 8QGHU WKH
EXWfor test, the defendant’s conduct need not be sufficient “in itself,” or
VXIILFLHQW LQ LVRODWLRQ IURP RWKHU QRQEDFNJURXQG FDXVDO IDFWRUV WR
EULQJ DERXW WKH UHVXOW 5DWKHU DV WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW DFNQRZOHGJHG LQ
%XUUDJH, a defendant’s conduct will qualify as a butIRUFDXVHHYHQLILW
“combines with other factors to produce the result, so long as the other
IDFWRUVDORQHZRXOGQRWKDYHGRQHVR—LIVRWRVSHDNLWZDVWKHVWUDZ
that broke the camel’s back.”In the Court’s illustration: “>,@ISRLVRQLV
DGPLQLVWHUHG WR D PDQ GHELOLWDWHG E\ PXOWLSOH GLVHDVHV LW LV D EXWIRU
FDXVHRIKLVGHDWKHYHQLIWKRVHGLVHDVHVSOD\HGDSDUWLQKLVGHPLVHVR
ORQJ DV ZLWKRXW WKH LQFUHPHQWDO HIIHFW RI WKH SRLVRQ KH ZRXOG KDYH
lived.”,QWKLVUHVSHFWWRRWKHQWKHEXWIRUWHVWSURGXFHVWKHULJKWUHVXOW
QDPHO\ WKH DVFULSWLRQ RI UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR GHIHQGDQWV ZKRVH FRQGXFW
WKRXJKQRWVXfficient “in itself” to cause the result, still makes a critical
FRQWULEXWLRQ
7R WKH GHJUHH WKDW WKH EXWIRU WHVW LGHQWLILHV WKHVH VRUWV RI
FRQWULEXWLRQV—LQGLUHFW FRQWULEXWLRQV DQG PLQRU EXW FULWLFDO
FRQWULEXWLRQV—DV VXIILFLHQW WR WULJJHU UHVSRQVLELOLW\ LW LV XVHIXO DQG



 6HH+$57 +2125eVXSUDQRWHDW– DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDWDQRUGLQDU\XVHURI
(QJOLVKwould not describe actor A as having “caused” a broken window“where $KLWV%ZKR
staggers against a glass window and breaks it”).

 &DXVD&DXVDH(VW&DXVD&DXVDWL%/$&.’6/$:',&7,21$5< WKHG  GHILQLQJ
“FDXVDFDXVDHHVWFDXVDcausati” as “[t]KHSULQFLSOHWKDWWKHFDXVHRIWKHFDXVH UDWKHUWKDQRQO\
the immediate cause) should also be considered as the cause of the effect”); VHHDOVR0$77+(:
+$/( 7+( +,6725< 2) 7+( 3/($6 2) 7+( &52:1    explaining that if “fever or
JDQJUHQH ZDV the immediate cause of [the victim’s] death, yet the wound >LQIOLFWHG E\ WKH
defendant] was the cause of the gangrene or fever,” the defendant’s conduct—as the “causa
causati,” or “cause of the cause”—QHYHUWKHOHVVTXDOLILHVDVDFDXVHRIGHDWK 

 7KH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ EDFNJURXQG DQGQRQEDFNJURXQG FDXVDOIDFWRUV LV GLVFXVVHG
EULHIO\ODWHULQWKHWH[WDFFRPSDQ\LQJQRWHV–

 Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 888 (2014) (“Thus, if poison is administered
WRDPDQGHELOLWDWHGE\PXOWLSOHGLVHDVHVLWLVDEXWIRUFDXVHRIKLVGHDWKHYHQLIWKRVHGLVHDVHV
SOD\HGDSDUWLQKLVGHPLVHVRORQJDVZLWKRXWWKHLQFUHPHQWDOHIIHFWRIWKHSRLVRQKHZRXOG
have lived.”); VHHDOVR+$/(VXSUDQRWHDW(“If a man give another a stroke, which it
PD\EHLVQRWLQLWVHOIVRPRUWDOEXWWKDWZLWKJRRGFDUHKHPLJKWEHFXUHG\HWLIKHGLHRIWKLV
ZRXQGZLWKLQWKH\HDUDQGGD\LWLVKRPLFLGHRUPXUGHUDVWKHFDVHLVDQGVRLWKDWKEHHQDOZD\V
ruled.”).

 %XUUDJH6&WDW
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XQFRQWURYHUVLDO 7KHKDUGTXHVWLRQLV ZKHWKHU DVWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW
KHOG LQ %XUUDJH WKH EXWIRU WHVW DOVR GHILQHV D QHFHVVDU\ FRQGLWLRQ RI
FULPLQDOOLDELOLW\,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHKDUGTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHUWKHEXWIRU
WHVWRSHUDWHVQRWRQO\DVDUXOHRILQFOXVLRQEXWDOVRDVDUXOHRIH[FOXVLRQ
,IWKHEXWIRUWHVWRSHUDWHVDVDUXOHRIH[FOXVLRQ—if a defendant’s conduct
PXVW VDWLVI\ WKH EXWIRU WHVW WR FRXQW DV D FDXVHLQIDFW—WKHQ WKH WHVW
FUHDWHVWZRDQRPDOLHVRQHDULVLQJIURPVSXULRXVFDXVDOVXIILFLHQF\DQG
WKHRWKHUDULVLQJIURPFDXVDORYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
$7KH%XWFor Test’s Spurious6XIILFLHQF\3UREOHP
7KH EXWIRU WHVW SURYHV XQZRUNDEOH ILUVW LQ FDVHV ZKHUH WKH
defendant’s conduct cuts offor “preempts” a separate causal mechanLVP
that would have caused the same result if the defendant’s conduct KDG
QRW7RLOOXVWUDWH6XSSRVHWKDW%REZLWKWKHLQWHQWWRNLOO0DU\SXWVD
deadly poison into Mary’s tea. After Mary drinks the poisoned tea, but
EHIRUHWKHWHDWDNHVHIIHFWDQRWKHUZRXOGEHNLOOHU'DYHVKRRWV0DU\
IURP RXWVLGH KHU ZLQGRZ 7KH VKRW LV LQVWDQWO\ IDWDO ,Q WKLV
hypothetical, Dave’s conduct rather than Bob’s is the causeLQIDFW RI
Mary’s death, as everyone agrees.But Dave’s conduct isn’t a butIRU


 6HH6WDWHY7ULEEOH1:G– ,RZD  KROGLQJWKDWWKHEXWIRUWHVW
produces the right result in most cases but “requires further assistance” in cases of concurrent
FDXVDWLRQ '$1%'2%%67+(/$:2)72576DW   REVHUYLQJWKDWWKHEXWIRU
WHVWSURYLGHVWKHULJKWDQVZHUWRWKHFDXVHLQfact question in “the great mass of cases”); Richard
)XPHUWRQ  .HQ .UHVV &DXVDWLRQDQG WKH /DZ 3UHHPSWLRQ/DZIXO 6XIILFLHQF\DQG &DXVDO
6XIILFLHQF\/$:  &217(03 352%6$XWXPQDW(“The ‘but for’ test seems to
ZRUNZHOOZLWKJDUGHQvariety examples of causation.”). 

 +$57 +2125eVXSUDQRWHDW GLVFXVVLQJWKHVDPHH[DPSOH VHHDOVR:ULJKW
VXSUDQRWHDW VDPH 5LFKDUG: :ULJKW 2QFH 0RUHLQWRWKH%UDPEOH%XVK
'XW\ &DXVDO &RQWULEXWLRQ DQG WKH ([WHQW RI /HJDO 5HVSRQVLELOLW\  9$1' / 5(9 
   VDPH 

 6HH:ULJKWVXSUDQRWH, at 1795 (“[E]ven if 3DFWXDOO\KDGGUXQNWKHSRLVRQHGWHD
&’V SRLVRQLQJ RI WKH WHD VWLOO ZRXOG QRW EH D FDXVH RI 3’V GHDWK LI WKH SRLVRQ GLG QRW ZRUN
instantaneously but the shot did.”); VHHDOVR+<0$1*5266$7+(25<2)&5,0,1$/-867,&(–
44 (1979) (“[N]either the responsibility principle nor anything else bearing on liability requires
WKDWZHQRWKROGWKHDFFXVHGOLDEOHZKHQZKDWVRPHRQHHOVHGLGZRXOGKDYHFDXVHGWKHGHDWKLQ
any case (though it didn’t). We determine liability not accordiQJWRZKDWIDWHKDGLQVWRUHIRUWKH
victim, but according to the conduct of the accused and the harm that it produced.”); +$57 
+2125e VXSUD QRWH  DW – REVHUYLQJ WKDW WKH EXWIRU WHVW SURGXFHV DQRPDORXV DQG
“absurd” results in cases like these) 3(5.,16  %2<&( VXSUD QRWH , at 773 (“Suppose, for
H[DPSOHDQXQDUPHGPDQLVVRFRPSOHWHO\VXUURXQGHGE\HQHPLHVEHQWRQKLVGHVWUXFWLRQDQG
DUPHGZLWKNQLYHVWKDWKHKDVQRSRVVLEOHFKDQFHWRHVFDSHEXWRQO\RQHEORZLVVWUXFNEHFDXVH
LWLVLQVWDQWO\IDWDO,WPD\EHYHU\WUXHWKDWZLWKRXWWKLVEORZKHZRXOGKDYHEHHQNLOOHGDWDOPRVW
WKHVDPHLQVWDQWE\VRPHRWKHUNQLIHEXWQRDPRXQWRIUHSHWLWLRQFDQFRQFHDOWKHIDFWWKDWWKH
actual cause of death was the blow struck.”); Fumerton & Kress, VXSUD QRWH  DW 
(“[I]ntuitively, we want the gunshot to be the cause (or at least a causally relevant factor) of
[Dave’s] death.”); J. / 0DFNLH &DXVHV DQG &RQGLWLRQV  $0 3+,/ 4    


Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 6 [2016], Art. 5



FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

>9RO



FDXVH7KDWLVVLQFH0DU\ZRXOGKDYHGLHGIURPWKHSRLVRQHGWHDLI'DYH
had not shot her, Dave’s conduct is not “an antecedent but IRUZKLFKWKH
result in question would not have occurred.” (YHQ LQ WKLV
VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGK\SRWKHWLFDOWKHQWKHEXWIRUWHVWSURGXFHVDUHVXOWWKDW
LVVWDUNO\DWRGGVZLWKFRPPRQVHQVH
,WLVWHPSWLQJDWILUVWWRWKLQNWKDWWKHDQVZHUWRWKLVGLIILFXOW\OLHVLQ
the “independently sufficient” exception to the buWIRUWHVWDVWHQWDWLYHO\
DUWLFXODWHG E\ WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW LQ %XUUDJH After all, Dave’s
FRQGXFW—ILULQJ WKH IDWDO VKRW DW 0DU\—GRHV DSSHDU WR KDYH EHHQ
independently sufficient to bring about Mary’s death. But this resort to
WKHLQGHSHQGHQWO\VXIILFLHQWexception doesn’t work. The trouble with the
exception is that Bob’s earlier conduct—SXWWLQJ GHDGO\ SRLVRQ LQWR
Mary’s tea—DOVRDSSHDUVWRKDYHEHHQLQGHSHQGHQWO\VXIILFLHQWWRFDXVH
Mary’s death. This isn’t the answerZHZDQWHG, of course; Bob’s conduct
FDQQRWUHDOO\EHDFDXVHLQfact of Mary’s death, since 'DYHHQWLUHO\FXW
RIIWKHFDXVDOSURFHVVHVVHWLQPRWLRQE\%RE7KXVWKHH[FHSWLRQIRU
LQGHSHQGHQWO\VXIILFLHQWFRQGXFWOLNHWKHEXWIRUWHVWLWVHOISURYLGHVWKH
ZURQJDQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKo caused Mary’s death. The butIRU
WHVWVD\VZURQJO\WKDWQHLWKHUBob nor Dave caused Mary’s death. The
LQGHSHQGHQWO\VXIILFLHQWFDXVHVWHVWVD\VZURQJO\WKDWERWKPHQFDXVHG
LW
7KHfailures of both tests to provide the right answer in Mary’s case
DUH WUDFHDEOH WR WKH VDPH EDVLF GLIILFXOW\ QDPHO\ WKH GLIILFXOW\ ZH

(concluding that “we can say that A was a necessar\FRQGLWLRQSRVWIDFWXP” where “$FRPELQHV
ZLWKRQHVHWRIWKHVWDQGLQJFRQGLWLRQVE\RQHURXWHEXWWKHDEVHQFHRI$ZRXOGKDYHFRPELQHG
ZLWKDQRWKHUVHWRIFRQGLWLRQVWR>FDXVH@the same result by another route”); Williams, VXSUD
QRWHDW72 (“Suppose that D and E independently entrust loaded guns to a boy of eight. Such
FRQGXFWLVQHJOLJHQW7KHER\KDYLQJERWKJXQVLQKLVSRVVHVVLRQXVHV'’VJXQWRVKRRW3'LV
OLDEOHWR3VLQFHKLVQHJOLJHQWDFWZDVDIDFWXDOFDXVH DQGDOVRDOHJDO FDXVH RIWKHLQMXU\'
FDQQRWGHIHQGKLPVHOIE\VD\LQJWKDWHYHQLIKHKDGQRWOHQWWKHJXQWKHER\ZRXOGKDYHVKRW3
ZLWK(’s gun.”).

 6HH02'(/3(1$/&2'(  D  $0/$:,1673URSRVHG2IILFLDO'UDIW 

 %XUUDJH6&WDW GHFOLQLQJWRGHFLGHZKHWKHUWKHEXWIRUWHVWLVVXEMHFWWRDQ
exception for “independently sufficient” concurrent causes, “since there ZDV QR HYLGHQFHKHUH
that Banka’s heroin use was an independently sufficient cause of his death”).

 6HH 3HRSOH Y %RQLOOD  1<6G   1< $SS 'LY 1983) (“[I]f the
GHIHQGDQWKDVLQIOLFWHGDZRXQGZKLFKZRXOGSURYHIDWDODQGDWKLUGSDUW\FRPHVDORQJZKLOHWKH
YLFWLPKDVEXWKRXUVWROLYHDQGNLOOVKLPLQVWDQWO\WKHWKLUGSDUW\’VDFWVXEVWDQWLDOO\KDVWHQLQJ
death constitutes the cause of death and the defendant cannot be convicted of homicide.”), aff’d
VXEQRPPeople v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 1984); State v. Wood, 53 Vt. 560, 566 (1881) (“If
RQH LQIOLFWV D PRUWDO ZRXQG EXW EHIRUH GHDWK HQVXHV DQRWKHU NLOOV WKH VDPH SHUVRQ E\ DQ
LQGHSHQGHQWDFWZLWKRXWFRQFHUWZLWKRUSURFXUHPHQWRIWKHILUVWPDQKRZFDQKHEHVDLGWR
have done the killing?”) :ULJKW VXSUD QRWH, at 1795 (“[E]ven if 3 DFWXDOO\ KDGGUXQN WKH
SRLVRQHGWHD&’s poisoning of theWHDVWLOOZRXOGQRWEHDFDXVHRI3’s death if the poison did not
ZRUNLQVWantaneously but the shot did.”).
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HQFRXQWHU LQ WU\LQJ WR GLVWLQJXLVK VSXULRXV RU SUHHPSWHG FDXVDO
VXIILFLHQF\—OLNH WKH VXIILFLHQF\ RI WKH SRLVRQHG WHD LQ RXU
K\SRWKHWLFDO—IURPJHQXLQHFDXVDOVXIILFLHQF\,WLVWKHDSSDUHQWFDXVDO
VXIILFLHQF\ RI WKH SRLVRQHG WHD WKDW PDNHV WKH VKRRWLQJ E\ 'DYH
XQQHFHVVDU\WRWKHUHVXOWDQGWKHUHE\GHIHDWVWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHEXW
IRU WHVW /LNHZLVH LI PRUH REYLRXVO\ LW LV WKH DSSDUHQW FDXVDO
VXIILFLHQF\RIWKHSRLVRQHGWHDWKDWPDNHVWKHSRLVRQLQJLWVHOIVDWLVI\RU
DSSHDUWRVDWLVI\WKHH[FHSWLRQIRULQGHSHQGHQWO\VXIILFLHQWFDXVHV
$WILUVWJODQFHLWVHHPVDVWKRXJKWKLVXQGHUO\LQJGLIILFXOW\ZRXOGEH
HDV\WRUHVROYH:KDWDSSHDUVWREHUHTXLUHGLVMXVWDFOHDUDUWLFXODWLRQRI
WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ VSXULRXV DQG JHQXLQH FDXVDO VXIILFLHQF\
8QIRUWXQDWHO\DUWLFXODWLQJWKLVGLVWLQFWLRQLVKDUGHUWKDQLWZRXOGDSSHDU
WREH
Efforts to articulate a rigorous definition of causal “sufficiency” date
EDFNDWOHDVWWRWKHVDQGVZKHQ+/$+DUWDQG7RQ\+RQRUp
DQGVHSDUDWHO\-/0DFNLHDGYDQFHGWKHRULHVRIFDXVDWLRQWKDWDVVLJQHG
a central role to the causal “sufficiency” of sets of conditions.7KRXJK
+DUWDQG+RQRUp’s DQGMackie’s accounts differed in some particulars,
both accounts shared the recognition (1) that causation isn’t just about
FDXVDOQHFHVVLW\ DVWKHEXWIRUWHVWDSSHDUVWREH EXWLVIXQGDPHQWDOO\
DERXWFDXVDOVXIILFLHQF\DVZHOODQG  WKDWZKDWDUHVXIILFLHQWWRSURGXFH
SDUWLFXODUUHVXOWVDUHQRWLQGLvidual conditions or events but rather “sets”
RI FRQGLWLRQV DQG HYHQWV 7KH LQIOXHQFH RI WKHVH DFFRXQWV—ZKLFK
3URIHVVRU 5LFKDUG :ULJKW ODWHU UHILQHG DQG GHIHQGHG—LV HYLGHQW LQ
DPRQJ PDQ\ RWKHU WKLQJV WKH 5HVWDWHPHQW 7KLUG  RI 7RUWV ZKLFK
DVVLJQVUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRDQ\GHIHQGDQWZKRVHFRQGXFWLVQHFHVVDU\WRWKH
sufficiency of at least one “sufficient causal set.”


 6HH +$57  +2125e VXSUD QRWH , at 124 (“[B]ecause of the presence of the first
>VSXULRXVO\ VXIILFLHQW VHW RI FRQGLWLRQV@ ZH FDQQRW VD\ WKH ‘KDUP’ ZRXOG QRW KDYH KDSSHQHG
without [the real cause].”); 0,&+$(/ 6 0225( &$86$7,21$1' 5(63216,%,/,7<  
(referring to this phenomenon as “preemptive overdetermination”). 

 +$57 +2125eVXSUDQRWHDW

 ,Gat 111 (asserting that a defendant’s conduct will qualify as a causeLQIDFWRQO\LILW
“is necessary to complete [a sufficient causal] set . . . linked by regular sequence to the
consequent”); Mackie, VXSUDQRWHDW DUJXLQJWKDWSDUWRIZKDWZHPHDQZKHQZHLGHQWLI\
a particular event as a cause is that “there is a set of conditions . . . which combined with the
[event] constituted a complex condition that was sufficient for the [result]”).

 +$57  +2125e VXSUD QRWH  DW – DVFULELQJ WR -RKQ 6WXDUW 0LOO DQG
endorsing, the idea that “the cause of an event is a special member of a complex set of conditions
which [together] are sufficient to produce that event in the sense that the set is ‘invariably and
unconditionally’ followed by it”); Mackie, VXSUDQRWH, at 245 (explaining his “INUS” test for
causation, which requires that the relevant event be “an LQVXIILFLHQW EXW QHFHVVDU\ SDUW RI D
>FRPSOH[@FRQGLWLRQZKLFKLVLWVHOIXQQHFHVVDU\EXWVXIILFLHQWfor the result”). 

 6HH:ULJKWVXSUDQRWHDW–

 5(67$7(0(17 7+,5' 2)72576FPWIDW $0/$:,167 
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'HVSLWHWKHLQIOXHQFHRIWKHVXIILFLHQF\FHQWHUHGDFFRXQWRIFDXVDWLRQ
VFKRODUVKDYHVWUXJJOHGWRDUWLFXODWHWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQVSXULRXVDQG
JHQXLQHFDXVDOVXIILFLHQF\3UREDEO\WKHPRVWIXOO\GHYHORSHGDFFRXQW
RI WKLV GLVWLQFWLRQ is Wright’s :ULJKW DUJXHV WKDW D FDXVDO VHW LV
genuinely sufficient only if the causal set is “fully instantiated”—RQO\
WKDW LV LI DOO WKH FRQGLWLRQV IRU WKH FRPLQJ WR IUXLWLRQ RI WKH UHVXOW
XOWLPDWHO\ DUH VDWLVILHG 7KLV VXIILFLHQW VHW RI FRQGLWLRQV DOZD\V ZLOO
LQFOXGHKRZHYHUDWHPSRUDOFRQGLWLRQ$VHWRIFRQGLWLRQVDV:ULJKW
DUJXHVLVWUXO\VXIILFLHQWRQO\LILWFDQQRWEHSUHHPSWHGE\DQRWKHUFDXVDO
SURFHVV—RQO\LIQRWLPHUHPDLQVGXULQJZKLFKDQRWKHUFDXVDO SURFHVV
PLJKWSUHHPSWLWLQRWKHUZRUGV7KLVPHDQVKRZHYHUWKDWDFDXVDOVHW
is truly “sufficient” only if “the instantiation of all the conditions in the
>FDXVDOVHW@HQWDLOVWKHLPPHGLDWHinstantiation of the [result].”2QWKLV
YLHZWKHQWKHVXIILFLHQWFDXVDOVHWFRQVLVWVH[FOXVLYHO\RIFRQGLWLRQVWKDW
existed, or were “instantiated,” in the moment before the result occurred.
8QIRUWXQDWHO\ WKLV DFFRXQW RI FDXVDO VXIILFLHQF\ OHDYHV RXW ZKDW
really concerns us, namely, the defendant’s conduct. The defendant’s
FRQGXFW ZKLFK ZLOO KDYH RFFXUUHG VHFRQGV KRXUV RU GD\V EHIRUH WKH
UHVXOWREYLRXVO\LVQRWDPHPEHURIWKHVHWRIFRQGLWLRQVWKDWLPPHGLDWHO\
precedes the result. To connect the defendant’s conduct to the result, the
IDFW ILQGHU ZRXOG KDYH WR FRQVWUXFW D VHTXHQFH RI LQWHUPHGLDWH FDXVDO
VHWV—D VHULHV RI WLPH VOLFHV HDFK GHILQHG DV D FRPSOH[ VHW RI


 ,G   UHSRUWHUV’ note cmt. k at 373 (“There are a number of quite puzzling
VLWXDWLRQVLQZKLFKWKHUHLVQRULJRURXVPHWKRGIRUGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUDFDXVHLVDQDFWXDO
one or a preempted one.”); David A. Fischer, ,QVXIILFLHQW&DXVHV.</-–  
(discussing the difficulty of distinguishing “‘[H@PSLULFDOO\’ sufficient conditions”—FRQGLWLRQV
that “‘wouldKDYHEeen sufficient’ if they had not been preempted”—from “‘FDXVDOO\’VXIILFLHQW
conditions”); Fumerton & Kress, VXSUDQRWHDW– H[SORULQJWKHGLIILFXOWLHVWKDW5LFKDUG
:ULJKW KDV HQFRXQWHUHG LQ XVLQJ KLV YDULDQW RI WKH QHFHVVDU\HOHPHQWRIDVXIILFLHQWVHW WR
GLVWLQJXLVKJHQXLQHIURPSUHHPSWHGFDXVDOIDFWRUV 

 6HH )XPHUWRQ  .UHVV VXSUD QRWH  DW  GHVFULELQJ WKH LPSRrtance of Wright’s
ZRUN LQ GHYHORSLQJ DQG UHILQLQJ +DUW DQG +RQRUp’s “QHFHVVDU\ HOHPHQW” RI D VXIILFLHQW VHW
DSSURDFK 

 :ULJKWVXSUDQRWH, at 298 (“For causal sufficiency, the condition at issue must be
SDUWRIWKHLQVWDQWLDWLRQRIDIXOO\LQVWDQWLDWHGFDXVDOODZWKDWLVSDUWRIDVHTXHQFHRIVXFKIXOO\
instantiated causal laws that link the condition at issue with the consequence.”). 

 6HH .HQQHWK - 5RWKPDQ &DXVHV  $0 - (3,'(0,2/2*< 587, 588 (1976) (“The
LQHYLWDELOLW\RIGLVHDVHDIWHUDVXIILFLHQWFDXVHFDOOVIRUTXDOLILFDWLRQGLVHDVHXVXDOO\UHTXLUHVWLPH
WR EHFRPH PDQLIHVW DQG GXULQJWKLV JHVWDWLRQ ZKLOH GLVHDVH PD\ QR ORQJHU EH SUHYHQWDEOH LW
might be fortuitously cured, or death might intervene.”); Wright, VXSUDQRWHDW (“[A]
QHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQIRUWKHVXIILFLHQF\RIDQ\VHWRIDFWXDODQWHFHGHQWFRQGLWLRQVLVWKDWWKHLQMXU\
not have occurred already as a result of other actual conditions outside the set.”).

 6HH :ULJKW VXSUD QRWH , at 1126 (“Although the second fiUH ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ
VXIILFLHQWWREXUQWKHKRXVHGRZQLIWKHILUVWILUHKDGQRWDOUHDG\GHVWUR\HGWKHKRXVHLWZDVQRW
actually sufficient because the first fire had already destroyed the house.” HPSKDVLVRPLWWHG 

 :ULJKWVXSUDQRWHDW HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
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FRQGLWLRQV—connecting the moment of the defendant’s conduct to the
PRPHQW RI WKH UHVXOW ,V WKLV UHDOO\ ZKDW RUGLQDU\ SHRSOH GR
unconsciously, when they identify conduct as the “cause” of a particular
UHVXOW" 0D\EH %XW LI FRXUWV ZHUH WR UHTXLUH IDFW ILQGHUV WR DSSO\
FRQVFLRXVO\ WKH YHU\ FRPSOH[ UXOHV XQGHUO\LQJ WKHVH VRUWV RI
XQFRQVFLRXV DVFULSWLYH SURFHVVHV WKH IDFW finders’ work would be
LPSRVVLEO\FRPSOH[6RPHWKLQJHOVHLVUHTXLUHG
%7KH%XW)Rr Test’s Causal2YHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ3UREOHP
7KH EXWIRU WHVW DOVR SURYHV XQZRUNDEOH LQ FDVHV RI FDXVDO
overdetermination, where the defendant’s conduct contributes to the
FDXVDO PHFKDQLVP XQGHUO\LQJ WKH UHVXOW EXW LV SRWHQWLDOO\ VXSHUIOXRXV
6XSSRVHWKDWWZRDVVDLODQWVZLWKRXWSUHFRQFHUWVLPXOWDQHRXVO\DQGZLWK
LQWHQWWRNLOOVKRRWWKHVDPHYLFWLP%RWKEXOOHWVVWULNHWKHYLFWLPDWWKH
VDPHLQVWDQW DQGERWK SURYHLQVWDQWO\ IDWDO ,QWKLV FDVHVLQFH HLWKHU
assailant’s conduct by itself would have caused the victim’s death, neither
assailant’s conduct is necessary.Neither assailant’s conduct is a butIRU
FDXVHWKHQ$EVROYLQJERWKDVVDLODQWVRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\ZRXOGEHEL]DUUH
KRZHYHU DV HYHU\RQH DFNQRZOHGJHV 6R WKH EXWIRU WHVW UHTXLUHV DQ
H[FHSWLRQ
1RWLFH ILUVW KRZ FDVHV OLNH WKLV RQH GLIIHU IURP WKH VSXULRXV
VXIILFLHQF\ FDVHV ,Q WKH VSXULRXVVXIILFLHQF\ FDVHV RQH RU DQRWKHU RI
PXOWLSOHFDXVDOSURFHVVHVJHWVSUHHPSWHGRUFXWRII—DQGVRLVGHSULYHG


 6HHLGat 291 (“When analysing singular instances of causation, an actual condition F
ZDVDFDXVHRIDQDFWXDOFRQGLWLRQHLIDQGRQO\LIFZDVDSDUWRI UDWKHUWKDQEHLQJQHFHVVDU\IRU 
WKHLQVWDQWLDWLRQRIRQHRIWKHDEVWUDFWFRQGLWLRQVLQWKHFRPSOHWHO\LQVWDQWLDWHGDQWHFHGHQWRID
FDXVDO ODZ WKH FRQVHTXHQW RI ZKLFK ZDV LQVWDQWLDWHG E\ H LPPHGLDWHO\ DIWHU WKH FRPSOHWH
LQVWDQWLDWLRQ RI LWV DQWHFHGHQW RU DV LV PRUH RIWHQ WKH FDVH  LI F LV FRQQHFWHG WR H WKURXJK D
VHTXHQFHRIVXFKLQVWDQWLDWLRQVRIFDXVDOODZV.” HPSKDVLVDGGHG FI)XPHUWRQ .UHVVVXSUD
QRWH, at 103 (“Perhaps for X to be a cause of Y, X must be part of a causal FKDLQUXQQLQJ
through time where each link in the causal chain is just prior to the next link in the causal chain.”).

 &I:ULJKWVXSUDQRWH, at 290 (“[T]he generalisations that we employ usually refer
HOOLSWLFDOO\WRDODUJHQXPEHURIVLPXOWDQHRXVO\RUsuccessively operative causal laws.”).

 &I+$57$1'+2125eVXSUDQRWHDW– H[SODLQLQJWKDWLQRUGLQDU\XVDJHWKH
identification of a particular event as a “cause” usually does not hinge on the identification of
ODWHUPHGLDWLQJVWDWHVRIDIfairs as “causes” as well; indeed, we generally “refus[e] the title of
FDXVHWRHYHQWVZKLFKare later phases in processes initiated by abnormal events or interventions”).
)RUFRPSDULVRQLPDJLQHZKDWZRXOGKDSSHQLIDQRXWILHOGHUWULHGWRFDOFXODWHHYHU\ fly ball’s
WUDMHFWRU\EHIRUHILHOGLQJLW

 02'(/3(1$/&2'(FPWDW $0/$:,1673URSRVHG2IILFLDO'UDIW
 

 ,G

 ,GDW

 ,GVHHDOVR/$)$9(VXSUDQRWH E DW– DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDWLQWKLV
WZRassailant scenario, both assailants must be regarded as having caused the victim’s death).


Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 6 [2016], Art. 5



FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

>9RO



RIDQ\HIIHFW%\FRQWUDVWLQWKHWZRDVVDLODQWK\SRWKHWLFDODQGLQRWKHU
RYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQFDVHVQRQHRIWKHPXOWLSOHFDXVDOSURFHVVHVJHWVFXW
off. Rather, “at the very instant of death,” each continues to operate—DQG
WR FRQWULEXWH WR WKH UHVXOW (DFK RI WKH RSHUDWLYH FDXVDO SURFHVVHV LV
LQGLYLGXDOO\VXSHUIOXRXVKRZHYHUVLQFHHYHQLQ LWVDEVHQFHWKHRWKHUV
ZRXOG RU PLJKW  KDYH EURXJKW DERXW WKH VDPH UHVXOW 1RQH RI WKH
SURFHVVHVVDWLVILHVWKHEXWIRUWHVWWKHQHYHQWKRXJKVRPHRUDOORIWKHP
PXVWORJLFDOO\TXDOLI\DVFDXVHV
(YHU\ERG\ LQFOXGLQJ WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW LQ %XUUDJH DSSHDUV WR
DFNQRZOHGJH WKDW RYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ FDVHV UHTXLUH DQ H[FHSWLRQ WR WKH
EXWIRU WHVW ,Q %XUUDJH WKRXJK WKH &RXUW SURSRVHG D YHU\ QDUURZ
H[FHSWLRQWDUJHWHGH[FOXVLYHO\DWWKHWZRDVVDLODQWK\SRWKHWLFDO$JDLQLW
VXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHEXWIRUWHVWPLJKWUHTXLUHDQH[FHSWLRQIRUFDVHVZKHUH
the conduct of each of several actors is “an independently sufficient cause
RIWKHYLFWLP’s death or serious bodily injury.”7KH&RXUWZDVQRWWKH
ILUVW WR SURSRVH WKLV WHVW 7KH GUDIWHUV RI WKH 5HVWDWHPHQW RI 7RUWV IRU
H[DPSOH DOVR HVSRXVHG WKH “independently sufficient” test. The First
5HVWDWHPHQW DV DGRSWHG LQ  VDLG WKDW EXWIRU FDXVDWLRQ ZDV QRW
required “[i]f two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor’s
QHJOLJHQFHWKHRWKHUQRWEHFDXVHRIDQ\PLVFRQGXFWRQKLVSDUWDQGHDFK
RILWVHOILVVXIILFLHQWWREULQJDERXWKDUPWRDQRWKHU.”
The proposed “independently sufficient” exception is itself
SUREOHPDWLF WKRXJK 3DUW RI WKH WURXEOH ZLWK WKLV IRUPXOD LV WKDW
individual events never really are “independently sufficient” to cause
RWKHUHYHQWV5DWKHUDV-RKQ6WXDUW0LOOVDLGWKHDQWHFHGHQWVLQFDXVDO
UHODWLRQVKLSVFRQVLVWRIVHWVof “conditionsSRVLWLYHDQGQHJDWLYHWDNHQ
WRJHWKHU WKH ZKROH RI WKH FRQWLQJHQFLHV RI HYHU\ GHVFULSWLRQ ZKLFK
being realized, the consequent invariably follows.” )RU H[DPSOH
WKRXJKLWPLJKWEHWHPSWLQJto say that a smoker’s disposal of a cigarette

  6HH3HRSOHY/HZLV3 &DO 
  6HH3ULFH:DWHUKRXVHY+RSNLQV86   DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDWLQ
FDVHVOLNHWKHVHWKHEXWfor test would lead to the absurd conclusion that the result “may not have
any ‘cause’ at all”). 
  %XUUDJHY8QLWHG6WDWHV6&W   LPSOLFLWO\DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDWDQ
H[FHSWLRQWRWKHEXWfor test might be warranted in cases “wheUHXVHRIWKHGUXJGLVWULEXWHGE\WKH
defendant is . . . an independently sufficient cause of the victim’s death or serious bodily injury”).
  ,G
  5(67$7(0(172)72576 $0/$:,167  HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
  +$57 +2125eVXSUDQRWHDWFI5RWKPDQVXSUDQRWH, at 588 (“Most causes
WKDWDUHRILQWHUHVWLQWKHKHDOWKILHOGDUHQRWVXIILFLHQWLQWKHPVHOYHV'ULQNLQJFRQWDPLQDWHG
ZDWHULVQRWVXIILFLHQWWRSURGXFHFKROHUDDQGVPRNLQJLVQRWVXIILFLHQWWRSURGXFHOXQJFDQFHU
but both of these are components of sufficient causes.”).
   -2+1 678$57 0,// 6<67(0 2) /2*,& 5$7,2&,1$7,9( $1' ,1'8&7,9( %(,1* $
&211(&7(' 9,(: 2) 7+( 35,1&,3/(6 2) (9,'(1&( $1' 7+( 0(7+2'6 2) 6&,(17,),&
,19(67,*$7,21 GHG 
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butt was “sufficient by itself” to cause the resulting forest fire, on closer
H[DPLQDWLRQ RQH ILQGV WKDW WKH ILUH DFWXDOO\ GHSHQGHG RQ D QXPEHU RI
FRQGLWLRQVDVZHOOWKHSUHVHQFHRIR[\JHQLQWKHDLUIRUH[DPSOHDQGRI
FRPEXVWLEOHPDWHULDOV RQWKHIRUHVW IORRU:KDW LV VXIILFLHQW WR FDXVHD
result is “not a single conditionbut a set of conditions.”
:KDWWKHQGLGWKH%XUUDJHCourt mean by the phrase “independently
VXIILFLHQW FDXVH"” ,W FRXOG QRW KDYH PHDQW merely that the defendant’s
FRQGXFWPXVWEHVXIILFLHQWLQFRPELQDWLRQZLWKRWKHUFRQGLWLRQV$IWHU
DOOLQ%XUUDJHLWVHOIWKHKHURLQSURYLGHGE\%XUUDJHFOHDUO\ZDVVXIILFLHQW
to cause Banka’s death in combination with other conditionsQDPHO\WKH
R[\FRGRQHWKHFORQD]HSDPDQGWKHDOSUD]RODP:KDWWKH&RXUWDSSHDUV
to have meant by “independently sufficient,” rather, was that the
defendant’s conduct must be sufficient in combination with EDFNJURXQG
FRQGLWLRQV (like the state of Banka’s physical health, fRU H[DPSOH  DV
GLVWLQFW IURP RWKHU QRQEDFNJURXQG FRQGLWLRQV OLNH WKH RWKHU GUXJV LQ
Banka’s system).
(YHQVXSSRVLQJWKDWWKHSURSRVHGGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQEDFNJURXQGDQG
QRQEDFNJURXQG FRQGLWLRQV LV FRKHUHQW KRZHYHU WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ VHHPV
DUELWUDU\7KH5HVWDWHPHQW 7KLUG RI7RUWVXVHVDQLOOXVWUDWLRQWRPDNH
WKLVSRLQW
$EOH %DNHU DQG &KDUOLH DFWLQJ LQGHSHQGHQWO\ EXW
simultaneously, each negligently lean on Paul’s car, which
LV SDUNHG DW D VFHQLF RYHUORRN DW WKH HGJH RI D PRXQWDLQ
7KHLUFRPELQHGIRUFHUHVXOWVLQWKHFDUUROOLQJRYHUWKHHGJH
RI D GLPLQXWLYH FXUEVWRQH DQG SOXPPHWLQJ GRZQ WKH
PRXQWDLQ WR LWV GHVWUXFWLRQ 7KH IRUFH H[HUWHG E\ HDFK RI
$EOH %DNHU DQG &KDUOLH ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ LQVXIILFLHQW WR
propel Paul’s car past the curbstone, but thHFRPELQHGIRUFH
RIDQ\WZRRIWKHPLVVXIILFLHQW
In this hypothetical, each “actor’s conduct requires other conduct to
be sufficient to cause another’s harm.” %XW QR OHVV WKDQ LQ WKH FDVH
ZKHUH WZR DVVDLODQWV LQGHSHQGHQWO\ LQIOLFW PRUWDO ZRXQGV LW VHHPV
absurd to conclude that the harm “may not have any ‘cause’ at all.”
Our intuition, rather, is that “Able, Baker, and Charlie are each a factual
cause of the destruction of Paul’s car.”0RUHEURDGO\RXULQWXLWLRQLV
that “such positive, albeit >SRWHQWLDOO\@XQQHFHVVDU\FRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKH

  +$57 +2125eVXSUDQRWHDW
  6HH:ULJKWVXSUDQRWH, at 1098 (suggesting that “independently sufficient” means
VXIILFLHQWLQWKHDEVHQFHRIRWKHUQRQEDFNJURXQGIDFWRUV 
  5(67$7(0(17 7+,5' 2)72576FPWILOOXV $0/$:,167 
  ,GDWFPWI
  3ULFH:DWHUKRXVHY+RSNLQV86  
  5(67$7(0(17 7+,5' 2)72576FPWILOOXV
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UHOHYDQWPHFKDQLVPE\ZKLFKDQLQMXU\RFFXUUHGVKRXOGEHLGHQWLILHG
E\WKHlaw as factual ‘causes,’”regardless of whether they “require[]
other conduct to be sufficient” or instead require only “background”
FRQGLWLRQV
,Q VXPPDU\ WKHQ WKH EXWIRU WHVW KDV D FDXVDORYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
SUREOHP $QG WKLV FDXVDORYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ SUREOHP OLNH WKH EXWIRU
test’s spuriousVXIILFLHQF\SUREOHPZRXOGQRWDGHTXDWHO\EHUHVROYHGE\
an exception for “independently sufficient” conduct. Again, something
PRUHLVUHTXLUHG
,,,7+($&&(/(5$7,2158/(
3DUWRIWKHDQVZHUERWKWRWKHVSXULRXVVXIILFLHQF\SUREOHPDQGWRWKH
FDXVDORYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ SUREOHP OLHV LQ D VWDWH FRXUW UXOH WKDW RQ LWV
IDFHVHHPVWRKDYHQRWKLQJWRGRZLWKHLWKHUSUREOHPQDPHO\WKHUXOH
WKDWDGHIHQGDQWZKRDFFHOHUDWHVWKHFRPLQJWRIUXLWLRQRIDUHVXOWFRXQWV
DVDFDXVHLQIDFWRIWKHUHVXOW
$:KDWWKH6WDWH&RXUWV'R
$VDSUHOLPLQDU\ H[DPSOHFRQVLGHUWKHIDFWV RI 6WDWHY3KLOOLSV
7KUHH\HDUROG6KHLOD(YDQVGLHGRQ-DQXDU\MXVWDIHZKRXUV

  -DQH 6WDSOHWRQ 8QQHFHVVDU\ &DXVHV  /4 5(9     VHH DOVR  -2(/
35(17,66 %,6+23 &200(17$5,(6217+( &5,0,1$/ /$: GHG  H[SODLQLQJWKDWD
defendant’s contribution to the causal mechanism will qualify as a causeLQIDFW UHJDUGOHVV RI
whether the victim “would have died from other causes, or would not have died from this oQH
KDGQRWRWKHUVRSHUDWHGZLWKLW” HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
  5(67$7(0(17 7+,5' 2)72576§ 27 cmt. f (“The fact that an actor’s conduct requires
other conduct to be sufficient to cause another’s harm does not obviate the applicability of [the
UXOHJRYHUQLng multiple sufficient causes].”); Stapleton, VXSUDQRWH, at 60 (“There is no reason
to think courts would take a different view in cases where the defendant’s tortious contribution
ZDVQRWRQO\XQQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHWKUHVKROGWRKDYHEHHQUHDFKHGEXWZDVDOVRLQVXIILFLHQWIRULWWR
EHUHDFKHG”). The inadequacy of the “independently sufficient” exception is even clearer in
FDVHVZKHUHWKHGHIHQGDQWKLPVHOISHUIRUPVVHYHUDOGLVWLQFWDFWVHDFKRIZKLFKFRQWULEXWHVWRWKH
SURVFULEHGUHVXOWEXWQRQHof which is “independently” sufficient to bring about the result. Take,
IRUH[DPSOH&RPPRQZHDOWKY2VDFKXN, where the victim’s death from drug intoxication was
DWWULEXWDEOHWRWKHFRPELQHGHIIHFWVRIWKUHHVHSDUDWHDFWVE\WKHGHIHQGDQW  KLVDFWRIJLYLQJ
WKHYLFWLPPHWKDGRQHWDEOHWV  KLVODWHUDFWRIJLYLQJWKHYLFWLPPRQH\WRSXUFKDVHFRFDLQHDQG
KHURLQDQG  KLVVWLOOODWHUDFWRILQMHFWLQJWKHYLFWLPZLWKDGGLWLRQDOFRFDLQH6HH1(G
– 0DVV$SS&W ,IWKHODZZHUHWRUHTXLUHWKDWDQRYHUGHWHUPLQLQJFDXVHEH
“independently” sufficient to bring about the harm, the court in 2VDFKXN ZRXOG KDYH KDG WR
conclude, absurdly, that the defendant had not caused the victim’s death. After all, in criminal
ODZDVLQWRUWWKHTXHVWLRQRIFDXVDWLRQLVUHVROYHGLQUHODWLRQWRDSDUWLFXODUDFWQRWLQUHODWLRQWR
DVHULHVRIDFWV6HH0,&+$(/60225($&7$1'&5,0(–   H[SODLQLQJWKDWWKH6WDWH
PXVWSURYHDOOWKHFRQGLWLRQVRIFULPLQDOOLDELOLW\LQFOXGLQJFDXVDWLRQLQUHODWLRQWRDVSHFLILF
“voluntary act”).
  1(G 2KLR 
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DIWHU her mother’s boyfriend, defendant Ronald Philips, VDYDJHO\ EHDW
KHU$VXEVHTXHQWDXWRSV\UHYHDOHGKRZHYHUWKDW6KHLODKDGVXIIHUHG
DVHSDUDWHEHDWLQJ—DSSDUHQWO\DWWKHKDQGVRIKHUPRWKHU—RQ-DQXDU\
16, just two days before Phillips’s assault. 7KLV HDUOLHU EHDWLQJ KDG
UHVXOWHG LQ DQ LQWHVWLQDO LQMXU\ WKDW LI OHIW XQWUHDWHG ZRXOG HYHQWXDOO\
KDYHSURYHQIDWDOE\LWVHOIPhillips’s assault, which ruptured Sheila’s
DOUHDG\JDQgrenous and necrotic intestine, merely had hastened Sheila’s
GHDWK
Phillips’s assault was not a “butfor cause” of Sheila’s death, since
6KHLOD ZRXOG RU PLJKW have died anyway from her mother’s earlier
EHDWLQJ %XW WKH 2KLR 6XSUHPH &RXUW XSKHOG 3KLOOips’s conviction
QHYHUWKHOHVV 7KH FRXUW LQYRNHG WKH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH VD\LQJ RQO\
“The evidence in the instant action clearly demonstrates that appellant
hastened Sheila’s death. Having done so, appellant cannot escape
FULPLQDOOLDELOLW\E\DUJXLQJWKDt Sheila was going to die anyway.”
:KHQ WKH 2KLR 6XSUHPH &RXUW LQYRNHG WKH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH LQ
3KLOOLSV, it didn’t cite any SUHFHGHQW 1RU UHDOO\ GLG LW QHHG WR ,Q
FULPLQDOFDVHV$PHULFDQDQG(QJOLVKFRXUWVORQJKDYHDFFHSWHGWKHUXOH
WKDW—LQ 3URIHVVRU :D\QH LaFave’s words—“one who hastens the
victim’s death is a cause of his death.”,Q(QJODQGWKHUXOHGDWHVEDFN

  ,GDW–
  ,GDWQ
  ,GDW
  ,GDW “'U&R[WHVWLILHGWKDWWKHEHDWLQJ6KHLODVXIIHUHGRQWKHPRUQLQJRIKHU
GHDWKFDXVHGKHULQWHVWLQHWRUXSWXUHZKLFKDORQJZLWKQXPHURXVDVVRFLDWHGFRPSOLFDWLRQVOHG
to her death.”).
  In a criminal case, where the reasonable doubt standard applies, any “real possibility”
WKDWWKHYLFWLPZRXOGKDYHGLHGDQ\ZD\ZRXOGEHVXIILFLHQWWRGefeat the government’s proof of
FDXVDWLRQ XQGHU WKH EXWIRU WHVW 'HILQLWLRQ RI 5HDVRQDEOH 'RXEW 3$77(51 &5,0,1$/ -85<
,16758&7,21  (recommending use of phrase “real possibility” in pattern instruction on
WKHUHDVRQDEOHGRXEWVWDQGDUG VHHDOVR(ULF$-RKQVRQ&ULPLQDO/LDELOLW\IRU/RVVRID&KDQFH
 ,2:$ / 5(9  –69 (2005) (discussing “the interaction of the butIRU WHVW DQG WKH
constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt”).
  3KLOOLSV1(GDW
  ,GDWQ
  ,G
  /$)$9(VXSUDQRWH E DWVHHDOVRHJ%,6+23VXSUDQRWH
653 (“>7@KRXJKWKHSHUVRQZRXOGKDYHGLHGIURP>VRPH@RWKHUFDXVH[]”DOUHDG\RSHUDWLQJ
LWLVHQRXJKWKDWWKHZRXQGKDVWHQHGWKHWHUPLQDWLRQRIOLIHDVIRUH[DPSOHLIDQRWKHUKDGDOUHDG\
PRUWDOO\ ZRXQGHG KLP  :0 / &/$5. -5 +$1'%22. 2) &5,0,1$/ /$:  :LOOLDP (
0LNHOOHGGHG) (“[I]f a person has been PRUWDOO\ZRXQGHGE\DQRWKHUDWKLUGSHUVRQZKR
DIWHUZDUGV NLOOV KLP E\ DQ LQGHSHQGHQW DFW FRPPLWV D KRPLFLGHWKRXJKKH PHUHO\ KDVWHQHG D
death which was bound to happen without his interference.”); '5(66/(5 VXSUDQRWHDW
H[SODLQLQJWKDWDGHIHQdant’s conduct will count as a causeLQIDFWRIKDUPLIEXWIRUWKHFRQGXFW
“the harm would >QRW@ KDYH RFFXUUHG ZKHQ LW GLG”); -(520( +$// *(1(5$/ 35,1&,3/(6 2)
&5,0,1$/ /$:  G HG ) (“[I]f the last blow hastened [the victim’s] death, . . . the
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DWOHDVWWRZKHQMXULVW0DWWKHZ+DOHPHQWLRQHGLWLQKLV+LVWRU\RI
WKH3OHDVRIWKH&URZQ-DPHV)LW]MDPHV6WHSKHQLQKLV+LVWRU\RIWKH
&ULPLQDO /DZ RI (QJODQG FKDUDFWHUL]HG WKH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH DV
“perfectly clear.”,QWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVOLNHZLVHWKHUXOHLVFOHDUDQG
ORQJstanding. Joel Prentiss Bishop’s &RPPHQWDULHVRQWKH&ULPLQDO/DZ
VXPPDUL]HGWKH$PHULFDQUXOHDVRI“[I]f the person would have
GLHGIURPVRPHRWKHUFDXVHDOUHDG\RSHUDWLQJ\HWLIWKHZRXQGKDVWHQHG
WKHWHUPLQDWLRQRIOLIHWKLVLVHQRXJK”
,QVXEVWDQFHWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHRSHUDWHVDVDUHILQHPHQWRIWKHEXW
IRU WHVW 8QGHU WKH RUGLQDU\ EXWIRU WHVW WKH IDFW ILQGHU PXVW GHFLGH
whether, say, the homicide victim “would not have died” but for the
defendant’s conduct. %\ FRQWUDVW XQGHU WKH EXWIRU WHVW DV
VXSSOHPHQWHG E\ WKH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH WKH IDFW ILQGHU PXVW GHFLGH
ZKHWKHUWKHYLFWLPZRuld not have died “when >VKH@did,”or “as soon
as she did.”&RXUWVXVXDOO\GRQRW VD\E\KRZPXFKWLPH—PRQWKV
GD\VRUVHFRQGV—the defendant must accelerate the victim’s death. But
it appears that any acceleration at all, “even by a moment or instant oI
time,” will suffice.

GHIHQGDQWZRXOGEHJXLOW\. . .”); 3 -$0(6),7=-$0(667(3+(1$+,6725<2)7+(&5,0,1$//$:
2)(1*/$1'–7 (1883) (“[I]f by reason of the [defendant’s] assault [the victim] died in the spring
RI D GLVHDVH ZKLFK PXVW KDYH NLOOHG KLP VD\ LQ WKH VXPPHU WKH DVVDXOW ZDV D FDXVH RI KLV
GHDWK.”). 
  +$/(VXSUDQRWHDW428 (“If a man be sick of some such diseaseZKLFKSRVVLEO\
E\FRXUVHRIQDWXUHZRXOGHQGKLVOLIHLQKDOID\HDUDQGDQRWKHUJLYHVKLPDZRXQGRUKXUWZKLFK
KDVWHQVKLVHQGE\LUULWDWLQJDQGSURYRNLQJWKHGLVHDVHWRRSHUDWHPRUHYLROHQWO\RUVSHHGLO\WKLV
KDVWHQLQJRIKLVGHDWKVRRQHUWKDQLWZRXOGKDYHEHHQLVKRPLFLGHRUPXUGHU”)
  67(3+(1VXSUDQRWHDW–
  %,6+23VXSUDQRWH7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWLQ%XUUDJHGLGQRWH[SOLFLWO\UHMHFW
the acceleration rule. Apart from the Court’s seeming satisfaction with the ordinary butIRUWHVW
which does not include a temporal component, the only clue to the Court’s views on acceOHUDWLRQ
is the Court’s reliance on search and seizure cases. 6HH%XUUDJHY8QLWHG6WDWHV6&W
   7KH ODZ RI VHDUFK DQG VHL]XUH GRHV QRW KDYH DQ DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH 6HH 0XUUD\ Y
8QLWHG6WDWHV86–   KROGLQJWKDWHYLGHQFHGLVFRYHUHGGXULQJDQLOOHJDO
VHDUFK WKDW PHUHO\ DFFHOHUDWHV WKH GLVFRYHU\ RI HYLGHQFH WKH SROLFH ZRXOG RWKHUZLVH KDYH
discovered is not subject to suppression as a “fruit” of the illegal search). 
  6HHVXSUD3DUW,,
  -RVKXD'UHVVOHU5HDVVHVVLQJWKH7KHRUHWLFDO8QGHUSLQQLQJVRI$FFRPSOLFH/LDELOLW\
1HZ6ROXWLRQVWRDQ2OG3UREOHP+$67,1*6/-  VHHDOVR%DNHUY6WDWH6R
492, 499 (Fla. 1892) (upholding the defendant’s homicide conviction on the basis of proof thDW
his assault “brought to a close a life which but for it would have lasted longer”); ComPRQZHDOWK
Y)R[0DVV587 (1856) (“[T]he jury, in order to convict the prisoner, must be satisfied
EH\RQG D UHDVRQDEOH GRXEW WKDW WKH GHDWK RI KLV ZLIH DW WKH WLPH LW RFFXUUHG ZRXOG QRW KDYH
happened but for the assault and battery by him as charged in the indictment.”).
  %UDFNHWWY3HWHUV)G WK&LU 
  State v. Hanahan, 96 S.E. 667, 671 (S.C. 1918) (approving trial judge’s instruFWLRQWR
WKH MXU\ ZKLFK VDLG LQ SDUW WKDW DQ LQMXU\ WKH GHIHQGDQW LQIOLFWHG ZLOO FRXQW DV D FDXVH RI WKH
victim’s death if it “even by a moment or instant of time hastens the death”); VHHDOVR &ROOLQVY
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&RXUWV DOVR UDUHO\ ERWKHU WR H[SODLQ WKH EDVLV LQ SROLF\ IRU WKH
DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH :KHQ WKH\ GR KRZHYHU WKH\ XVXDOO\ RIIHU VRPH
YDULDWLRQRQDQH[SODQDWLRQSXWIRUZDUGE\WKH0DVVDFKXVHWWV6XSUHPH
&RXUWLQQDPHO\WKDWVLQFHKXPDQEHLQJVDUHPRUWDODOOKRPLFLGH
merely hastens the victim’s death: 
$VGHDWKLVDSSRLQWHGWRDOOWKHOLYLQJDQGPXVWFRPHWRDOO
VRRQHU RU ODWHU HYHU\ DFW RI KRPLFLGH RQO\ KDVWHQV WKH
LQHYLWDEOHHYHQW7KHODZWKHUHIRUHGRHVQRWSHUPLWDSDUW\
FKDUJHGZLWKPXUGHUWRVSHFXODWHRQWKHFKDQFHVRIWKHOLIH
RIKLVYLFWLPRUWRHQGHDYRUWRDSSRUWLRQKLVRZQZLFNHGDFW
E\GLYLGLQJLWVHIIHFWVZLWKWKHRSHUDWLRQRIQDWXUDOFDXVHVRQ
WKHERG\RIWKHGHFHDVHG
7KHFRQFHUQDUWLFXODWHGE\WKH0DVVDFKXVHWWV6XSUHPH&RXUWFOHDUO\
GHPDQGVVRPHVRUWRIDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOH,IWKHEXWIRUWHVWZHUHDSSOLHG
ZLWKRXWDWHPSRUDOFRPSRQHQWWKHQQRKRPLFLGHGHIHQGDQWZRXOGHYHU
qualify as a cause of the victim’s death, since every victim is bound to
GLHVRRQHURUODWHr. But it is unclear whether the Massachusetts court’s
DOOKXPDQVDUHPRUWDO UDWLRQDOH E\ LWVHOI MXVWLILHV DVVLJQLQJ
responsibility in cases where the defendant’s conduct deprives the victim
QRW RI GHFDGHV RU \HDUV EXW RQO\ RI VHFRQGV PLQXWHV RU KRXUV RI
DGGLWLRQDOOLIH,WLVXQFOHDUIRUH[DPSOHZKHWKHUWKLVUDWLRQDOHZRXOG

+HUWHQVWHLQ6:G 0R&W$SS  “‘[$@QDFWZKLFKDFFHOHUDWHVGHDWKFDXVHV
GHDWK>]’This is true even if the act hastens death by merely a moment.” DOWHUDWLRQVLQRULJLQDO 
FLWDWLRQ RPLWWHG  TXRWLQJ ,Q UH (VWDWH RI (OLDVHQ  3G   ,GDKR   6WDWH Y
0RQWR\D3G 10  KROGLQJWKDW“[G@efendant’s act of isolating the victim
and preventing medical treatment” qualified as a causeLQfact of the victim’s death, since “the
YLFWLPZRXOGKDYHOLYHGORQJHUWKDQKHGLGHYHQLIE\DPDWWHURIKRXUVKDGKHUHFHLYHGPHGLFDO
treatment”); State v. Francis, 149 S.E.348, 364 (S.C. 1929) (“[T]he length of time life would
RWKHUZLVHKDYHFRQWLQXHG>LVDQ@LPPDWHULDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQ>@”)+$57 +2125eVXSUDQRWH
at 352 (“The slightest shortening of life, for example, is homicide.”)%XWVHH-DPHV/)RFKW-U
3UR[LPDWH&DXVHLQWKH/DZRI+RPLFLGH—ZLWK6SHFLDO5HIHUHQFHWR&DOLIRUQLD&DVHV6&$/
/ 5(9. 19, 27 (1938) (“[P]robably most courts would require a more or less substantial
DFFHOHUDWLRQRIdeath to be shown.”). 
  )R[0DVVDW–VHHDOVRHJ=HLJOHU&RDO&RY'LU2ffice of Workers’
&RPS3URJUDPV, 312 F.3d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Even the murder of an infant just hastens
GHDWKJLYHQWKDWGHDWKFRPHVHYHQWXDOO\WRXVDOl.”); People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 358 (Cal.
1966) (“Murder is never more than the shortening of life; if a defendant’s culpable act
KDVGHFUHDVHGWKHVSDQRIDKXPDQOLIHWKHODZZLOOQRWKHDUKLPVD\WKDWKLVYLFWLPZRXOG
WKHUHDIWHUKDYHGLHGin any event.”); State v. Matthews, 38 La. Ann. 795, 797 (1886) (“In a certain
VHQVHHYHU\PDQLVERUQDQGOLYHVPRUWDOO\ZRXQGHGWKDWLVVXEMHFWWRODZVZKLFKLQHYLWDEO\
doom him to death. No murder does more than to hasten the termination of life.”)
  6HH /DUU\ $OH[DQGHU  0LFKDHO 0RRUH 'HRQWRORJLFDO (WKLFV LQ 67$1)25'
(1&<&/23(',$ 2) 3+,/2623+<   KWWSSODWRVWDQIRUGHGXHQWULHVHWKLFVGHRQWRORJLFDO
DUJXLQJ WKDW XQGHU VRPH IRUPV RI DJHQWcentered deontology “our agency is said not to be
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MXVWLI\ DVVLJQLQJ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR DQ HPHUJHQF\URRP SK\VLFLDQ RU DQ
DPEXODQFHGULYHUZKRVHQHJOLJHQFHVKRUWHQHGRQO\E\DIHZPLQXWHVRU
KRXUVWKHOLIHRIDSDWLHQWZKRZDVFHUWDLQWRGLHDQ\ZD\$QGLQGHHG
VRPHVFKRODUVKDYHDUJXHGWKDWJLYHQWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRIWKHDOOKXPDQV
DUHPRUWDO UDWLRQDOH WKH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH UHTXLUHV D GH PLQLPLV
H[FHSWLRQ
7KHFRXUWLQ3KLOOLSVdidn’t mention a GHPLQLPLVH[FHSWLRQKRZHYHU
1RUZRXOGPDQ\RIXVEHLQFOLQHGWRDSSO\DGHPLQLPLVH[FHSWLRQLQD
FDVH OLNH 3KLOOLSV 7KLV GLVLQFOLQDWLRQ LQ UHODWLRQ WR 3KLOOLSV PLJKW EH
FKDONHGXSWRRXUKRVWLOLW\WRZDUGSHRSOHZKRVDYDJHO\EHDWWKUHH\HDU
ROG FKLOGUHQ %XW DQRWKHU SRVVLELOLW\ LV WKDW the acceleration rule isn’t
JURXQGHG H[FOXVLYHO\ LQ WKH DOOKXPDQVDUHPRUWDO UDWLRQDOH ,Q ZKDW
IROORZVWKLV$UWLFOHZLOOH[SORUHWKLVSRVVLELOLW\6SHFLILFDOO\WKH$UWLFOH
ZLOOH[SORUHWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHLVMXVWLILHGDWOHDVW
LQSDUWE\LWVXWLOLW\LQUHVROYLQJSUREOHPVRIVSXULRXVFDXVDOVXIILFLHQF\
DQGFDXVDORYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
%$FFHOHUDWLRQDQG6SXULRXV6XIILFLHQF\
,Q WKH 3KLOOLSV case, Phillips’s assault RQ 6KHLOD DSSHDUHG WR KDYH
FRQWULEXWHGWRRUFRPSOHPHQWHGWKHRSHUDWLRQRIFDXVDOSURFHVVHVWKDW
KDGEHHQVHW LQ PRWLRQ E\DQRWKHUEHDWLQJWZR GD\VEHIRUHBut it’s
HDV\ WR LPDJLQH VOLJKW YDULDWLRQV RQ 3KLOOLSV where Phillips’s assault
LQVWHDGSUHHPSWVWKHVHDOUHDG\RSHUDWLQJFDXVDOSURFHVVHV6XSSRVHIRU
example, that Phillips had caused Sheila’s death not by striking her in the
DEGRPHQEXWE\VWULNLQJKHULQWKHKHDG$QGVXSSRVHWKDWWKHVHEORZV
to Sheila’s head had, without any contribution from tKH SUHH[LVWLQJ
abdominal injuries, brought about injuries to Sheila’s brain that were
LPPHGLDWHO\IDWDO
7KLV K\SRWKHWLFDO YDULDWLRQ RQ 3KLOOLSV VKDUHV WKH EDVLF VWUXFWXUH RI
RXUHDUOLHUSRLVRQHGWHDK\SRWKHWLFDOZKHUH0DU\GLHGIURPDJXQVKRW
ZRXQG VKRUWO\ DIWHU GULQNLQJ D SRLVRQHG FXS RI WHD It’s a “spurious

LQYROYHGLQPHUHDFFHOHUDWLRQVRIHYLOVDERXWWRKDSSHQDQ\ZD\DVRSSRVHGWRFDXVLQJVXFKHYLOV
by doing acts necessary for such evils to occur”). 
  'UHVVOHUVXSUDQRWHDWQ(“If the harm would have occurred a day or even
DQKRXUODWHULWVHHPVIDLUWRVD\WKDWWKLVLVDGLIIHUHQWFULPHHQWLUHO\ZKHQWKHKDUPZRXOGKDYH
RFFXUUHGMXVWDVHFRQGODWHUDVWKHUHVXOWRIDQDOWHUQDWLYHFDXVHWKHQLWZRXOGVHHPUHDVRQDEOHIRU
a jury to say that this is the same crime.”); FI:ULJKWVXSUDQRWHDW– DUJXLQJWKDWRQH
shortcoming of the acceleration rule is that it assigns significance to “minute differences in the
WLPHRIDVSHFLILFHYHnt” 
  3KLOOLSV1(GDW
  These hypothetical facts are not farfetched. Phillips’s beating extended to every part of
Sheila’s body, including her head. ,Gat 651 (“The bruising indicated that Sheila had been severely
EHDWHQDERXWKHUKHDGIace, upper and lower torso, arms, legs, and genitalia.”).
  6HHVXSUD6HFWLRQ,,$
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sufficiency” case, in other words. In both this case and the poisonedWHD
K\SRWKHWLFDOWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKRFDXVHGWKHUHVXOWVHHPVLQWXLWLYHO\WR
KDYH D YHU\ HDV\ DQVZHU DIWHU DOO LQ ERWK FDses, one actor’s conduct
HQWLUHO\SUHHPSWHGWKHRWKHUactor’s conduct6WLOOLQERWKFDVHVWKHEXW
for test produces the wrong answer. Since the defendant’s conduct
SUHHPSWHG DQRWKHU FDXVDO SURFHVV WKDW ZRXOG LI QRW SUHHPSWHG
HYHQWXDOO\KDYHFDXVHGWKHsame result, the defendant’s conduct is not a
EXWIRUFDXVHRIWKHUHVXOW
,Q ERWK FDVHV WKH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH HOHJDQWO\ VROYHV WKH VSXULRXV
VXIILFLHQF\SUREOHP,QRXUK\SRWKHWLFDOYDULDWLRQRQ3KLOOLSV6KHLOD
VWLOOZRXOGKDYHGLHGLI3KLOOLSVKDGQRWDVVDXOWHGKHUEXWVKHZRXOGQRW
KDYHGLHGZKHQVKHGLGRUDVVRRQDVVKHGLGThus, Phillips’s assault
TXDOLILHVDVDFDXVHLQfact of Sheila’s death under the acceleration rule.
/LNHZLVHLQWKHSRLVRQHGWHDK\SRWKHWLFDOWKRXJK0DU\VWLOOZRXOGKDYH
GLHG IURPWKHSRLVRQDGPLQLVWHUHGE\%RE LI'DYHKDGQRWVKRWKHUVKH
ZRXOGQRWKDYHGLHGZKHQVKHGLGThus, though Dave’s conduct does
QRWVDWLVI\WKHEXWIRUWHVWLWGRHVVDWLVI\WKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOH
0RUHRYHU QRW RQO\ GRHV WKH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH ULJKWO\ LGHQWLI\ WKHVH
WZRDFWRUV—'DYHLQWKHSRLVRQHGWHDK\SRWKHWLFDODQG3KLOOLSVLQRXU
K\SRWKHWLFDO YDULDWLRQ RQ WKH 3KLOOLSV FDVH—DV FDXVHVLQIDFW RI WKHLU
victims’ deaths, it also rightly does QRWLGHQWLI\DVFDXVHVLQIDFWWKHWZR
DFWRUVZKRZHUHWKHDXWKRUVRIWKHSUHHPSWHGFDXVDOPHFKDQLVPV,QRXU
K\SRWKHWLFDOYDULDWLRQRQ3KLOOLSV, the earlier assault by Sheila’s mother,
though it would have caused Sheila’s death within a few hours or days,
XOWLPDWHO\KDGQRHIIHFWRQZKHQ6KHLODGLHG6RLt wouldn’t count as a
FDXVHLQIDFWXQGHUWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOH/LNHZLVHLQWKHSRLVRQHGWHD
hypothetical, Bob’s poisoning of Mary’s tea, though it would have caused
Mary’s death within a few hours or days if not preempted by the shooting,
XOWLPDWHO\KDGno effect on when Mary died. So it wouldn’t count as a
FDXVHLQIDFWXQGHUWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOH
+RZGRHVWKLVZRUN"+RZH[DFWO\GRHVWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHZKLFK
RQLWV IDFHKDVQRWKLQJWR GRZLWK FDXVDO VXIILFLHQF\IL[WKHVSXULRXV

  6HH +$57  +2125e VXSUD QRWH , at 124 (“/HJDO V\VWHPV WHQG WR GLVSRVH RI
>VSXULRXVVXIILFLHQF\@FDVHVRQWKHEDVLVWKDWFDXVDOFRQQHFWLRQLVPDGHRXWZKHQWKHVXSSRVHG
FDXVH ERWK GHWHUPLQHV WKH PRGH RI GHDWK RU GHVWUXFWLRQ DQG VKRUWHQV OLIH RU DFFHOHUDWHV WKH
GDPDJH.”); :HGQHVGD\ 0RUQLQJ 6HVVLRQ 0D\    $/, 352&    
SURSRVLQJDQDPHQGPHQWWR5HVWDWHPHQW 7KLUG RI7RUWVWKDWZRXOGKDYHPRGLILHGWKHEXW
for test by adding the phrase “at the time it occurred”; and explaining that this amendment would
enable § 26 to “handle preempted conditions”);FI-DQH6WDSOHWRQ&KRRVLQJ:KDW:H0HDQE\
“&DXVDWLRQ” LQ WKH /DZ  02 / 5(9  452 (2008) (arguing that “the Law” addresses
VSXULRXVsufficiency problems by “individuat[ing]” results on the basis of “the time and place
[they] occurred”).
  6HHVXSUDWH[WDFFRPSDQ\LQJQRWHV–
  '5(66/(5VXSUDQRWHDW
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VXIILFLHQF\SUREOHP"7KHDQVZHULVWKDWLQWKHVSXULRXVVXIILFLHQF\FDVHV
ZKHUH RQH FDXVDO PHFKDQLVP SUHHPSWV DQRWKHU WKH WZR FDXVDO
PHFKDQLVPVRIWHQWKRXJKQRWDOZD\Vwill have different “incubation
periods.” ,Q WKH SRLVRQHGWHD K\SRWKHWLFDO IRU H[DPSOH WKH SRLVRQ
SUREDEO\ZRXOGKDYHNLOOHG0DU\ZLWKLQDIHZPLQXWHVRUKRXUVDIWHUVKH
FRQVXPHGLWE\FRQWUDVWWKHJXQVKRWZRXQGLQIOLFWHGE\'DYHNLOOHGKHU
LQVWDQWO\,QRXUK\SRWKHWLFDOYDULDWLRQRQWKH3KLOOLSVFDVHWRRWKHWZR
FDXVDO PHFKDQLVPV KDG GLIIHUHQW LQFXEDWLRQ SHULRGV 7KH LQWHVWLQDO
injuries inflicted by Sheila’s mother would have killed Sheila in a few
GD\VWKHEHDWLQJE\3KLOOLSVNLOOHGKHULQVWDQWO\
:KHUHWKHWZRFDXVDOPHFKDQLVPVKDYHGLIIHUHQWLQFXEDWLRQSHULRGV
WKH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH HQDEOHV XV WR GLVWLQJXLVK WKH DFWXDO IURP WKH
VSXULRXVFDXVDOPHFKDQLVPWKURXJKWKHVLPSOHH[SHGLHQWRIVSHFLI\LQJ
WKHWLPHZKHQWKHUHVXOWFDPHWRIUXLWLRQ7KHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHDJDLQ
PRGLILHVWKHEXWIRUWHVWWRUHTXLUHSURRIWKDWWKHUHVXOWZRXOGQRWKDYH
RFFurred “when it did” but for the defendant’s conduct. :KHUH WKH
WLPLQJ RI WKH UHVXOW LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH LQFXEDWLRQ SHULRG IRU WKH
defendant’s conduct—RUPRUHDFFXUDWHO\ZLWKWKHLQFXEDWLRQSHULRGIRU
the causal mechanism of which the defendant’s condXFWLVDFRPSRQHQW—
EXW QRW ZLWK WKH LQFXEDWLRQ SHULRG IRU WKH VSXULRXV FDXVDO PHFKDQLVP
then the defendant’s conduct will qualify as an antecedent butIRUZKLFK
WKHUHVXOWZRXOGQRWKDYHRFFXUUHGZKHQLWGLG7KLVLVWUXHPRUHRYHU
HYHQLQFDVHVZKHUHWKHLQFXEDWLRQSHULRGVIRUWKHWZRFDXVDOPHFKDQLVPV
GLIIHUIURPRQHDQRWKHURQO\E\PLQXWHVRUVHFRQGV
,W ZRXOGEHHDV\WRWDNHWKLVNLQGRIUHDVRQLQJWRRIDU,WZRXOGEH
tempting, for example, to use the causal mechanisms’ incubation periods
WR GLVWLQJXLVK WKH DFWXDO IURP WKH VSXULRXV FDXVDO PHFKDQLVP HYHQ LQ
FDVHVRIFDXVDOGHFHOHUDWLRQ7KHSRWHQWLDOXVHIXOQHVVRIDGHFHOHUDWLRQ
UXOH LV LOOXVWUDWHG E\ 3URIHVVRU -DPHV McLaughlin’s classic “poisoned
ZDWHUkeg” hypothetical: “Suppose $LVHQWHULQJDGHVHUW%VHFUHWO\SXWV
DIDWDOGRVHRISRLVRQLQ$’s water keg. $WDNHVWKHNHJLQWRWKHGHVHUW
ZKHUH&VWHDOV LWWKLQNLQJWKDWLW FRQWDLQV SXUH ZDWHU $GLHVRIWKLUVW
Who killed him?” ,Q WKLV K\SRWKHWLFDO DV PRVW VFKRODUV DSSHDU WR
DJUHH&LVWKHH[FOXVLYHFDXVHRI$’s death, since by stealing the water
NHJKHFXWRIIWKHFDXVDOSURFHVVVHWLQPRWLRQE\%’s poisoning of the

  6HHLQIUD6HFWLRQ,9%
  6HH5RWKPDQVXSUDQRWH, at 592 (“The term LQFXEDWLRQSHULRGKDVRIWHQEHHQDSSOLHG
WR WKH SHULRG EHWZHHQ WKH DFFXPXODWLRQ RI D VXIILFLHQW FDXVH DQG WKH WLPH DW ZKLFK GLVHDVH
becomes manifest.”).
  6HHVXSUDQRWH
  '5(66/(5VXSUDQRWHDW
  +$57 +2125eVXSUDQRWHDW TXRWLQJ-DPHV$QJHOO0F/DXJKOLQ3UR[LPDWH
&DXVH+$59/5(9Q  
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ZDWHU$SSOLFDWLRQRIWKHWLPHVHQVLWLYHEXWIRUWHVWWRWKLVK\SRWKHWLFDO
SURGXFHVWKHULJKWUHVXOWLQVSLWHRIWKHIDFWWKDW&’s theft of the canteen
SUHVXPDEO\FDXVHG$WRGLHODWHUQRWVRRQHUWKDQKHRWKHUZLVHZRXOG
KDYH $ would not have died “when he did” but for &’s theft of the
FDQWHHQVR&LVDFDXVHRI$’s death. 
%XW D GHFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH ZRXOG SURYH SUREOHPDWLF LQ ZD\V WKDW WKH
DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH GRHV QRW 6XSSRVH IRU H[DPSOH WKDW DQ LQQRFHQW
E\VWDQGHUSURYLGHGILUVWDLGWRDVKRRWLQJYLFWLPDQGE\GRLQJVRVORZHG
the victim’s bleeding enough to extend his life. 8QGHUDGHFHOHUDWLRQUXOH
WKHE\VWDQGHUZRXOGFRXQWDVDFDXVHLQfact of the victim’s death. This,
QHHGOHVV WR VD\ LV WKH ZURQJ DQVZHU 7KH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH E\
FRPSDULVRQZRXOGFDSWXUHRQO\DFWRUVZKRDWWKHYHU\OHDVWVRPHZKDW
VKRUWHQthe victim’VOLIH*UDQWHGLWLVSRVVLEOHWRLPDJLQHFDVHVZKHUH
we wouldn’t want a brief shortening of the victim’s life to trigger criminal
OLDELOLW\DVZKHUHDULVN\EXWSRWHQWLDOO\OLIHVDYLQJPHGLFDOSURFHGXUH
FDXVHGWKHYLFWLPWRGLHDIHZPLQXWHVVRRQHUWKDQKHRWKHUZLVHZRXOG
KDYH%XWRXULQWXLWLRQVDERXWWKHVHFDVHVSUREDEO\KDYHPRUHWRGRZLWK
the defendant’s nonculpability than with causation.
$VHFRQGSRVVLEOHYDULDWLRQRQWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHZRXOGUHTXLUHWKH
IDFWILQGHULQDSSO\LQJWKHEXWIRUWHVWWRVSHFLI\QRWRQO\ZKHQWKHUHVXOW
FDPHDERXWEXWKRZ8QGHUWKLVDSSURDFKLQRWKHUZRUGVWKHIDFWILQGHU
wouldn’t just decide whether the result would not have occurred “when
it did” but for the defendant’s conduct. Rather, the IDFW ILQGHU ZRXOG
GHcide whether the result would not have happened “ZKHQDQGDVLWGLG
happen” but for the defendant’s conduct. ,Q WKH SRLVRQHGWHD
hypothetical, then, this “when and as it did” test would frame the
FDXVDWLRQ TXHVWLRQ DV ZKHWKHU WKH YLFWLP ZRXOG QRW KDYH GLHd “as he
did”—IURP D JXQVKRW ZRXQG—but for the defendant’s conduct.

  0$&.,(VXSUDQRWH, at 46 (“[I]t is the chain puncturingODFNRIZDWHUWKLUVWGHDWK
WKDWZDVUHDOL]HGZKHUHDVWKHULYDOFKDLQWKDWVWDUWVZLWKSRLVRQLQcan was not completed.”).
  &I+$57 +2125eVXSUDQRWHDW–40 (arguing that “‘causing death’ involves
WKHQRWLRQRIVKRUWHQLQJ>OLIH@” and accordingly that in the poisonedFDQWHHQK\SRWKHWLFDO“it is
QRWSRVVLEOHWRGHVFULEH&’s later action [of stealing the canteen] as causing $’s death”).
  6HH%DUXFK%URG\:LWKGUDZDORI7UHDWPHQW9HUVXV.LOOLQJRI3DWLHQWVLQ,17(1',1*
'($7+– 7RP/%HDXFKDPSHG  DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKHGLIILFXOW\RIGHWHUPLQLQJ
LQFDVHVLQYROYLQJWKHPHGLFDODFFHOHUDWLRQRIGHDWKZKHWKHURXULQWXLWLRQVDUHDERXWFDXVDWLRQRU
DERXWEODPHZRUWKLQHVV 
  3(5.,16 %2<&(VXSUDQRWHDWVHHDOVR02'(/3(1$/&2'(FPWDW
 $0 /$: ,1673URSRVHG2IILFLDO'UDIW  H[SODLQLQJWKDWLQDFDVHZKHUHWKHYLFWLP
dies from two simultaneous mortal blows, “the result should be characterized as ‘death from two
mortal blows’”); '5(66/(5 VXSUD QRWH  DW – DUJXLQJ WKDW WKH EXWIRU WHVW VKRXOG EH
refined to ask: “But for '’s voluntary act would the social harm have occurred when DQGDVLW
GLG”).
  6HH02'(/ 3(1$/ &2'( § 2.03 cmt. 2 at 259 (“So described, the victim’s demise has
DVEXWIRUFDXVHVHDFKDVVDLODnt’s blow.”)$/,352&((',1*6VXSUDQRWHDW
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5HGHVFULELQJWKHUHVXOWWKLV ZD\ ZRXOGVHHP WR HQDEOHXVWR UHDFKWKH
ULJKWUHVXOWHYHQLQWKRVHVSXULRXVVXIILFLHQF\FDVHVZKHUHWKHWZRFDXVDO
PHFKDQLVPVKDYHWKHVDPHLQFXEDWLRQSHULRG
8QIRUWXQDWHO\ DV WKH FRXUWV DSSHDU WR KDYH LQWXLWHG WKLV
UHIRUPXODWLRQ RI WKH EXWfor test is “circular” and “fundamentally
TXHVWLRQbegging.” 7R appropriately “refine[] the description of the
result,”WKHIDFWILQGHUILUVWZRXOGKDYHWRGHFLGHH[DFWO\KRZWKHUHVXOW
FDPHDERXW6SHFLILFDOO\WKHIDFWILQGHUZRXOGKDYHWRGHFLGHZKDWFDXVDO
IDFWRUVWRLQFOXGHLQWKHUHILQHGGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHUHVXOW2QFHWKH IDFW
ILQGHUKDGPDGHWKLVGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIFRXUVHWKHRXWFRPHRIWKHEXWIRU
WHVW XVXDOO\ ZRXOG EH D IRUHJRQH FRQFOXVLRQ 2QFH WKH IDFW ILQGHU KDG
GHFLGHGIRUH[DPSOHWRGHVFULEHWKHUHVXOWas in Burrage’s case as GHDWK
IURP WKH FRPELQHG HIIHFWV RI KHURLQ R[\FRGRQH DOSUD]RODP DQG
FORQD]HSDPWKHTXHVWLRQZKHWKHU%DQNDZRXOGQRWhave died “as he did”
but for Burrage’s heroin would be easy. %XW WKH KDUG TXHVWLRQV
wouldn’t have GLVDSSHDUHG 7KH\ PHUHO\ ZRXOG KDYH UHORFDWHG 7KH\
QRZ ZRXOG DULVH LQ FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK WKH SUHOLPLQDU\ TXHVWLRQ RI ZKDW
FDXVDO IDFWRUV WR LQFOXGH LQ WKH UHILQHG GHVFULSWLRQ RI WKH UHVXOW
1HHGOHVVWRVD\WKHUHIRUPXODWHGEXWfor test wouldn’t help the IDFWILQGHU
UHVROYHWKLVSUHOLPLQDU\TXHVWLRQ
The strategy underlying the acceleration test can’t really be extended,
then. It can’t be extended to cases where the defendant’s conduct
GHFHOHUDWHV WKH UHVXOW 1RU FDQ LW EH H[WHQGHG WR FDVHV ZKHUH WKH
defendant’s conduct, though it doesn’t determine ZKHQWKHUHVXOWFRPHV
DERXWGRHVGHWHUPLQHKRZWKHUHVXOWFRPHVDERXW6WLOOZLWKLQLWVOLPLWHG
VFRSH WKH DFFHOHUDWLRQ WHVW GRHV ZKDW ZH UHTXLUH RI LW ,W HQDEOHV XV
VRPHWLPHV WR GLVWLQJXLVK JHQXLQH FDXVHV IURP VSXULRXVO\ VXIILFLHQW
FDXVHV

  6HH:ULJKWVXSUDQRWH, at 294 (“The courts and the secondary literature generally
GRQRWTXDOLI\WKHFRQVHTXHQFHE\VSHFLI\LQJLWVQRQVDOLHQWGHWDLOVRUWKHWLPHORFDWLRQRUPDQQHU
RILWVRFFXUUHQFHZKHQGHVFULELQJRUDSSO\LQJWKHVLQHTXDQRQanalysis.”). 
  /DZUHQFH&URFNHU$5HWULEXWLYH7KHRU\RI&ULPLQDO&DXVDWLRQ-&217(03/(*$/
,668(6Q  (“[T]he circularity of building the causation into the description of the
death robs the characterization of all analytical force.”); Wright, VXSUD QRWH  DW –
REVHUYLQJWKDWWKLVDSSURDFK—which “qualif[ies] [the result] by WKHmanner of its occurrence, ‘as
and how it came about’”—is “viciously circular”).
  'DYLG-.DUS 1RWH &DXVDWLRQLQWKH0RGHO3HQDO&RGH&2/80 / 5(9
1262 (1978) (“[T]KHSURSRVHG VROXWLRQLQ>VLF@ IXQGDPHQWDOO\ TXHVWLRQEHJJLQJ LW DPRXQWV WR
saying, ‘describe the result so that butIRUFDXVDWLRQZLOOEHIRXQGZKHQHYHUWKHDFWRUVKRXOGEH
held legally responsible for the result.’ This is unsatisfactory, because the poinWRI>0RGHO3HQDO
&RGH@VHFWLRQLVWRSURYLGHDVWDQGDUGIRUGHWHUPLQLQJZKHQDQDFWRUVKRXOGEHKHOGOHJDOO\
responsible for a result.”). 
  '5(66/(5VXSUDQRWHDW–
  %XUUDJHY8QLWHG6WDWHV6&W  
  6HH&URFNHUVXSUDQRWHDWQ
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&$FFHOHUDWLRQDQG&DXVDO2YHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
6RWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHLVSDUWO\H[SODLQHGE\LWVIDFLOLW\LQZHHGLQJ
RXWFDXVDOIDFWRUVZKRVHVXIILFLHQF\LVVSXULRXV$VLWKDSSHQVWKRXJK
WKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHDOVRSURYHVYHU\XVHIXOLQFDXVDORYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
FDVHV,QFDVHVZKHUHWZRRUPRUHFRPSOHPHQWDU\IDFWRUVRYHUGHWHUPLQH
D UHVXOW—as in the Restatement’s “Able, Baker, Charlie”
K\SRWKHWLFDO—LWRIWHQWKRXJKQRWDOZD\VZLOOEHWUXHWKDWHDFKRIWKH
FRPSOHPHQWDU\IDFWRUVDOVRDFFHOHUDWHVWKHUHVXOW
Cases that share the basic structure of the “Able, Baker, Charlie”
K\SRWKHWLFDODUHFRPPRQSODFH7KHFULWLFDOIHDWXUHRIWKHVHFDVHVLVWKDW
RQHRIWKHFRPSRQHQWVRIWKHFDXVDOPHFKDQLVPE\ZKLFKWKHLQMXU\LV
known to have occurred “requires a certain amount of an element.”,Q
RWKHU ZRUGV RQH RI WKH FRPSRQHQWV UHTXLUHV WKH VDWLVIDFWLRQ RI D
TXDQWLWDWLYHWKUHVKROG:KDWHYHUHOVHWKHFDXVDOPHFKDQLVPDWZRUNLQ
the “Able, Baker, Charlie” hypothetical required—D UHODWLYHO\ ORZ
FXUEVWRQHIRUH[DPSOHRUDIODWRUGRZQZDUGVORSLQJSDUNLQJORW—LWDOVR
UHTXLUHG D SDUWLFXODU TXDQWLW\ RI IRUFH (DFK RI WKH WKUHH DFWRUV PDGH
IXQJLEOHFRQWULEXWLRQVWRWKHVDWLVIDFWLRQRIWKLVIRUFHWKUHVKROG0XFK
WKHVDPHWKLQJZDVWUXHLQ%XUUDJH, where the victim’s death appears to
KDYHKLQJHGRQWKHVDWLVIDFWLRQRIDWKUHVKROGDPRXQWRIFHQWUDOQHUYRXV
V\VWHPGHSUHVVLQJVXEVWDQFHV
In these kinds of cases, the defendant’s contribution, even if it doesn’t
GHWHUPLQHZKHWKHU WKHWKUHVKROGLV UHDFKHGRIWHQZLOOGHWHUPLQH ZKHQ
WKH WKUHVKROG LV UHDFKHG 7DNH WKH EORRGloss or “exsanguination”
FDVHV IRUH[DPSOH ,QWKHH[VDQJXLQDWLRQ FDVHV ZKHUHHDFKRIVHYHUDO
assailants contributes incrementally to the defendant’s death from blood
ORVV LW RIWHQ ZLOO EH SRVVLEOH IRU WKH H[SHUW WR VD\ WKDW—ZKDWHYHU WKH
SUHFLVHWKUHVKROGDWZKLFKGHDWKZRXOGKDYHRFFXUUHGDQGZKDWHYHUWKH
magnitude of the defendant’s contribution—the defendant’s contribution
PXVWQHFHVVDULO\KDYHDFFHOHUDWHGWKHVDWLVIDFWLRQRIWKLVWKUHVKROGDQG
therefore “could only have hastened death.” ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV LW RIWHQ

  6HHVXSUDWH[WDFFRPSDQ\LQJQRWHV–
  6WDSOHWRQVXSUDQRWHDW
  5(67$7(0(17 7+,5' 2)72576FPWILOOXV $0/$:,167 
  %XUUDJH6&WDW
  :ULJKWVXSUDQRWH, at 292 (“The VLQHTXDQRQDQDO\VLVLVDEOHWRUHDFKWKHSURSHU
FRQFOXVLRQLQPDQ\RYHUGHWHUPLQHGFDXVDWLRQVLWXDWLRQVLIWKHFRQVHTXHQFHLVTXDOLILHGE\WKH
WLPHDWZKLFKLWRFFXUUHG”)%XWFI:ULJKWVXSUDQRWHDW GHQ\LQJWKHH[LVWHQFHRI
WKH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH LQ ILQGLQJ WKDW “WKH UHOHYDQW OHJDO LQMXU\ LQ WRUW ODZ RU IRU KRPLFLGH LQ
criminal law) is not death at any particular time, but rather death per se”)
  6WDWH Y 0F'RQDOG  3G   (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (“MichDHO %DVVHWW
FRQWLQXHGEUHDWKLQJDIWHUEHLQJVKRWERWKE\%DVVHWWDQG0F'RQDOG$OWKRXJKHLWKHUVKRWDORQH
ZRXOGKDYHEHHQIDWDOERWKVKRWVFRQWULEXWHGWR0LFKDHO’VGHDWK0F'RQDOG’VVKRWRFFXUULQJODVW
FRXOGRQO\KDYHKDVWHQHGGHDWKDV0F'RQDOGLQWHQGHG7KHVKRWILUHGE\0F'RQDOGZDVDFDXVH
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ZLOOEHSRVVLEOHWR FRQFOXGHWhat the defendant’s contribution must “at
least” have “DFFHOHUDWHGWKHGHDWK”
7KHHDVLHVWFDVHVLQWKLVFDWHJRU\ZLOOEHWKRVHZKHUHWKHGHIHQGDQW
and another actor each inflict, say, a knife or a gunshot wound and “[d]rop
E\ GURS WKH OLIH FXUUHQW >JRHV@ out from both wounds.” %XW WKH
DFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHDOVRZLOOSURYHXVHIXOLQRYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQFDVHVZKHUH
the defendant’s and the other contributions to the causal mechanism,
WKRXJKRIGLIIHUHQWNLQGVQHYHUWKHOHVVDUHFRPSOHPHQWDU\,Q3HRSOHY
)ORUHVfor example, the government’s theory was that the defendant’s
EDWWHU\RIWKHYLFWLPDIWHUWKHYLFWLPDOUHDG\KDGVXIIHUHGDIDWDOJXQVKRW
wound, would have accelerated the victim’s breathing and would thereby
KDYHDFFHOHUDWHGKLVEORRGORVVDVZHOO,QDQRWKHUFDVH—WKLVRQHIURP
WKHZRUOGRIWRUWV—DQH[SHUWRSLQHGWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQWSROLFHRIILFHUE\
repeatedly “tasering>@” the plaintiff, who DOUHDG\KDYHEHHQIDWDOO\VKRW
E\ DQRWKHU RIILFHU, accelerated the plaintiff’s death: “Deputy Brown’s
PXOWLSOHWaserings of Joshua after he was shot hastened Joshua’s blood
loss, resulting in his death before paramedics could arrive.”
It won’t always be possible, as it was in these last two cases, to say
which of two injuries was “fatal” and which merely accelerateG WKH
victim’s death. Sometimes the experts will be unable to identify HLWKHURI
WZR LQMXULHV DV D EXWfor cause of the victim’s death. In 2[HQGLQH Y
6WDWHIRUH[DPSOHZKHUHGHIHQGDQW2[HQGLQHDQGKLVJLUOIULHQGKDG

‘in fact’ of Michael Bassett’s death.” IRRWQRWHRPLWWHG DII’G3G :DVK VHH
DOVR6WDWHY:HVWRQ3G 2U  UHFRXQWLQJWHVWLPRQ\E\WKHexpert: “I
FHUWDLQO\ZRXOGWKLQNWKDWWKHEURNHQERQHVLQWKHIRUHDUPDQGWKHKDQGDQGWKHZRXQGVLQWKH
IDFHZRXOGFRQWULEXWHWRKDVWHQGHDWKE\YLUWXHRIVKRFNDQGWKHOLWWOHORVV—RUORFDOORVVRIEORRG
ZKDWHYHULWPLJKWEHLQDGGLWLRQWRWKDWDOUHDG\RFFXUULQJLQWKHFKHVWDQGDEGRPLnal cavity”). 
  8QLWHG6WDWHVY.LQGHU&05–7 (A.F.B.R. 1954) (“A medical expert,
VKRZQWREHDTXDOLILHGSK\VLFLDQWHVWLILHGLQUHVSRQVHWRDK\SRWKHWLFDOTXHVWLRQWKDWDJXQVKRW
ZRXQGVKRZQWRKDYHEHHQVXIIHUHGE\WKHYLFWLPZRXOGKDYHDWOHDVWDFFHOHUDWHGWKHGHDWKRI
WKHYLFWLPUHJDUGOHVVRIZKHWKHURUQRWKHDGLQMXULHVRIWKHQDWXUHVKRZQWRKDYHEHHQLQIOLFWHG
on the victim had fractured the skull.”).
  (J 3HRSOH Y /HZLV  3    &DO   GHVFULELQJ WKH FDXVH RI WKH
victim’s deathDVDJXQVKRWZRXQGLQIOLFWHGE\WKHGHIHQGDQWDQGDNQLIHZRXQGVHOILQIOLFWHGE\
WKHGHFHDVHG 
  1R(:/ &DO&W$SS$SU 
  ,Gat *8 (recounting testimony by the “autopsy surgeon”: “[A]n\WLPHWKHUHZRXOGEH
DQDOWHUFDWLRQDIWHUDVHULRXVLQMXU\WKDWZRXOGSHUKDSVH[DFHUEDWHWKDWLQMXU\DQGDFFHOHUDWHGHDWK
EHFDXVHWKHGHPDQGVRQWKHERG\ZRXOGEHJUHDWHU>7KHYLFWLP@KDGD>UDSLGO\IDWDO@JXQVKRWWKDW
DIIHFWHGKLVULJKWOXQJ+HKDGH[WHQVLYHKHPRUUKDJLQJLQWRKLVULJKWFKHVW6RLIKHZHUHLQVRPH
VRUW RI DOWHUFDWLRQWKDW FRXOG FDXVH DQ DFFHOHUDWHG KHDUW UDWH DFFHOHUDWHG EUHDWKLQJ   >W@KDW
FRXOG FDXVH PRUH EOHHGLQJ PRUH UDSLGO\ LQWR KLV FKHVW 7KDW ZRXOG FHUWDLQO\ DFFHOHUDWH
WKDWVXUYLYDEOHWLPHIUDPH” DOWHUDWLRQVLQRULJLQDO 
  6DOYDWR Y %ODLU 1R FY2F35/  :/  DW  0' )OD
0D\ DII’GVXEQRP6DOYDWRY0LOH\)G WK&LU 
  $G 'HO 
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separately battered Oxendine’s six\HDUROGVRQRQVXFFHVVLYHGD\VRQH
of the government’s experts, Dr. Inguito, said he “could not separate the
effects of the two injuries.” “Dr. Inguito could not place any
TXDQWLWDWLYHYDOXHRQHLWKHURIWKHKHPRUUKDJHVQRUFRXOGKHVWDWHZKHWKHU
WKHIUHsh hemorrhage or the older hemorrhage caused the death.”,WLV
exactly in cases like this, where either of two contributions to the victim’s
GHDWK PLJKW KDYH SURYHQ GHFLVLYH—DQG ZKHUH DV D UHVXOW QHLWKHU
defendant’s conduct qualifies as a butIRUFDXVH—WKDWWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQ
UXOHSURYHVPRVWXVHIXO(YHQZKHQH[SHUWZLWQHVVHVDUHXQDEOHWRVD\
whether a defendant’s contribution was decisive, they often will be able
WR VD\—DV ZDV DQ H[SHUW LQ 2[HQGLQH—that the defendant’s conduct
“certainly would have an impact on shortening this [victim’s] life.”
:LWKRXWWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHRUVRPHDOWHUQDWLYHERWKGHIHQGDQWVZKR
FRQWULEXWHGWRWKHUHVXOWPLJKWHVFDSHUHVSRQVLELOLW\
The acceleration rule won’t resolve every causal overdetermination
FDVHDVWKLV$UWLFOHZLOOH[SODLQODWHU1RUHYHQZLOOWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQ
UXOH UHVROYH HYHU\ FDXVDO RYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ FDVH WKDW LQYROYHV
incremental contributions to a causal “threshold.”,QWKHFDVHVLWFRYHUV
KRZHYHUWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHSURYLGHVDQH[FHSWLRQDOO\XVHIXOWRROIRU
JDXJLQJ FDXVDO FRQWULEXWLRQ 7KH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH REYLDWHV WKH
GLIILFXOWLHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWHVWVWKDWUHTXLUHWKHIDFWILQGHUWRGHFLGHVD\
whether the defendant’s conduct was a necessary element of a “sufficient
causal set.”$QGE\Uequiring that the defendant’s contribution to the
victim’s death measurably affect the time of death, it obviates too the
potential difficulties faced by the “contribution” test in distinguishing
PHUHO\GHPLQLPLVFRQWULEXWLRQVIURPVXEVWDQWLDOFRQWULEXWLRQV


  ,GDW–
  ,GDW
  6HH-RKQVRQVXSUDQRWHDW–69 (discussing “the interaction of the butIRUWHVW
and the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt”).
  2[HQGLQH$GDW
  $VLWWXUQHGRXW2[HQGLQHdid escape manslaughter liability for his son’s death, but
RQO\ EHFDXVH WKH SURVHFXWLRQ IDLOHG GXULQJ LWV FDVHLQFKLHI WR HOLFLW WHVWLPRQ\ DERXW FDXVDO
DFFHOHUDWLRQ,GDW–'XULQJWKHGHIHQVHFDVHDQH[SHUWWHVWLILHGRQEHKDOIRIOxendine’s
JLUOIULHQG DQG FRdefendant) that the injuries inflicted by Oxendine “certainly would have an
impact on shortening this child’s life.”,GDW%XWWKH'HODZDUH6XSUHPH&RXUWKHOGWKLV
testimony came “too late to sustain the State’s caseLQchief for manslaughter” and accordingly
set aside Oxendine’s convictionDQGUHPDQGHGZLWKLQVWUXFWLRQVWRFRQYLFW2[HQGLQHRIWKHOHVVHU
FULPHRIDVVDXOWLQWKHVHFRQGGHJUHH,GDW–
  6HHLQIUD6HFWLRQ,9&
  6HHLQIUD6HFWLRQ,9&
  5(67$7(0(17 7+,5' 2)72576FPWI $0/$:,167 
  6HHLQIUDWH[WDFFRPSDQ\LQJQRWHV–
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,97+(&2175,%87,2158/(
)RU DOO LWV XVHIXOQHVV WKH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH LV WRR GHSHQGHQW RQ
KDSSHQVWDQFH 7KH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH ZLOO UHVROYH VSXULRXVVXIILFLHQF\
problems only if the two “sufficient” causal mechanisms happen to have
different “incubation periods.” And it will resolve overdetermination
SUREOHPVRQO\LIDQH[SHUWLVDEOHWRVD\EH\RQGDUHDVRQDEOHGRXEWWKDW
the defendant’s contribution affected at least slightly the timing of the
result. Responsibility shouldn’t depend on happenstancHRIFRXUVH6R
VWDWH FRXUWV KDYH DSSOLHG DQRWKHU UXOH ZKLFK FRPSOHPHQWV WKH
DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH QDPHO\ WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ UXOH 7KH FRQWULEXWLRQ UXOH
UHVROYHVVSXULRXVsufficiency and overdetermination cases that can’t be
UHVROYHGXQGHUWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOH
$:KDWWKH6WDWH&RXUWV'R
6WDWHFRXUWVRIWHQLQYRNHWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHLQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWKD
FRQWULEXWLRQ UXOH 6WDWH FRXUWV RIWHQ VD\ IRU H[DPSOH WKDW D KRPLFLGH
defendant’s conduct will qualify as a cause of the victim’s death if the
FRQGXFW“contributed to or accelerated >WKH@death.”State courts don’t
DOZD\VLQYRNHWKLVFRQWULEXWLRQUXOHLQFRPELQDWLRQZLWKWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQ
UXOH KRZHYHU 6RPHWLPHV WKH\ LQYRNH WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ UXOH E\ LWVHOI
6RPHWLPHV WKH\ VD\ VLPSO\—DV WKH &DOLIRUQLD 6XSUHPH &RXUW GLG LQ
3HRSOHY/HZLV—that a defendant’s conduct will qualify as a causeLQ
fact of death if “the wound inflicted by the defendant did contribute to
the event.”%XWZKHWKHUWKH\LQYRNHWKHFRQWULEXWLRQUXOHWRJHWKHUZLWK
WKH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH RU LQVWHDG LQYRNH LW LQ LVRODWLRQ VWDWH FRXUWV GR
IUHTXHQWO\LQYRNHWKHFRQWULEXWLRQUXOHLQFDVHVRIFRQFXUUHQWFDXVDWLRQ
FRQWUDU\WRZKDWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWLPSOLHGLQ%XUUDJH



 6WDWH Y 0F'RQDOG  3G   :DVK &W $SS   DII’G  3G 
:DVK 
  3 &DO 
  ,GDW
  6HH%XUUDJHY8QLWHG6WDWHV6&W  0RUHRYHUFDVHVZKHUHFRXUWV
H[SOLFLWO\LQYRNHWKHFRQWULEXWLRQWHVWHLWKHUDORQHRULQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWKWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQWHVWDUH
MXVWWKHWLSRIWKHLFHEHUJ,QDODUJHQXPEHURIRWKHUFULPLQDOFDVHVFRXUWVKDYHUHDFKHGWKHVDPH
results by asking whether a homicide defendant’s conduct deprived the victim of a “chance>@RI
VXUYLYLQJ”VRPHRWKHUFDXVDOIDFWRU—XVXDOO\DQLOOQHVVRULQMXU\-RKQVRQVXSUDQRWHDW
QVHHDOVRHJ*UD\HUY6WDWH6(G *D  ILQGLQJVXIILFLHQWHYLGHQFH
IRUPXUGHUconviction after concluding that but for the defendant’s failure to seek medical care
for the infant victim, “the baby might have survived”); People v. Hoerer, 872 N.E.2d 5
 ,OO $SS &W   VWDWLQJ WKHUH ZDV VXIILFLHQW HYLGHQFH WR FRQYLFW WKH GHIHQGDQW IRU
PDQVODXJKWHU DIWHU FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW but for the defendant’s efforts to prevent his friends from
summoning assistance for the victim, the victim “might have survived” the methadone overdose
that killed her). The effect of this “lostchance” rule is to require the government to prove,
basically, (1) that the defendant contributed to, or “complemented,” the underlying causal
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7KH FRQWULEXWLRQ UXOH LV QRW a recent departure from “traditional
XQGHUVWanding” either.7KHUXOHDSSHDUVWRKDYHEHHQZHOOHVWDEOLVKHG
HYHQ LQ WKH QLQHWHHQWK FHQWXU\ -RHO 3UHQWLVV %LVKRS ZKRVH 
&RPPHQWDULHVRQWKH&ULPLQDO/DZwas as influential in Bishop’s day as
LaFave’s treatise is in ours, formulated the basic causaWLRQUHTXLUHPHQW
in the law of homicide as a “contribution” requirement: “The general rule,
ERWK RI ODZ DQG RI UHDVRQ LV WKDW ZKHQHYHU D PDQ FRQWULEXWHV WR D
SDUWLFXODUUHVXOWKHLVKROGHQIRUWKHUHVXOWWKHVDPHDVLIKLVVROH>DFW@
produced it.”Bishop wasn’t just being careless in his choice of words,
moreover. He wasn’t just using “contribution” as shorthand for butIRU
causation. Under the contribution rule, said Bishop, it doesn’t matter
whether the victim “would have died from other causes, RU ZRXOG QRW
have died from this one, had not others operated with it.”:KDWPDWWHUV
rather, is whether the defendant’s conduct “really contributed mediately
RULPPHGLDWHO\WRWKHGHDWKDVLWDFWXDOO\WRRNSODFHLQDGHJUHHVXIILFLHQW
for the law’s notice.”
1RUKDYHWKHVWDWHFRXUWVIDLOHGWRDSSUHFLDWHWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKH
FRQWULEXWLRQ UXOH IRU FDVHV OLNH %XUUDJH 2Q WKH FRQWUDU\ VWDWH FRXUWV
KDYHDSSOLHGWKHFRQWULEXWLRQUXOHWRIDFWVWKDWDUHVWULNLQJO\VLPLODUWR
WKRVHLQ%XUUDJH,Q6WDWHY&KULVWPDQIRUH[DPSOHWKH:DVKLQJWRQ
&RXUWRI$SSHDOVDSSOLHGWKHFRQWULEXWLRQWHVWWRDGUXJGHDOHUZKRKDG
VXSSOLHG WKH YLFWLP ZLWK RQH RI VHYHUDO FRQWUROOHG VXEVWDQFHV WKDW KDG
FRQWULEXWHG WR KLV GHDWK IURP LQWR[LFDWLRQ ,Q &RPPRQZHDOWK Y
2VDFKXNWKH0DVVDFKXVHWWV&RXUWRI$SSHDOVDSSOLHGWKHFRQWULEXWLRQ
WHVWWRDGHIHQGDQWZKRE\VXSSO\LQJWKHYLFWLPZLWKGUXJVRQPXOWLSOH
occasions, had contributed to his death from combined “cocaine, heroin,
and methadone intoxication.” $QG LQ 3HRSOH Y -HQQLQJV WKH
&DOLIRUQLD 6XSUHPH &RXUW DSSOLHG WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ WHVW WR D GHIHQGDQW

PHFKDQLVPDQG  WKDWWKHGHIHQGDnt’s contribution PLJKWKDYHEHHQGHFLVLYH-RKQVRQVXSUD
QRWHDW
  6HH%XUUDJH6&WDW– DVVHUWLQJWKDWWKHEXWfor requirement “is one of the
traditional background principles ‘against which Congress legislate>V@’” DOWHUDWLRQLQRULJLQDO 
  6HH%,6+23VXSUDQRWHVHHDOVR&/$5.VXSUDQRWH, at 129 (“It is
sufficient if [the defendant’s conduct] was a contributing cause.”)6HYHUDOFDVHVKDYHFLWHGWR
%LVKRSIRUWKLVSURSRVLWLRQ6HHHJ.HHY6WDWH$UN  6WDWHY0DWWKHZV
/D$QQ  %XUQHWWY6WDWH7HQQ  :LOOLDPVY6WDWH
7H[$SS–  
  %,6+23VXSUDQRWH
  ,G
  3G :DVK&W$SS 
  ,GDW–
  1(G 0DVV&W$SS 
  ,GDW
  3G &DO 
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ZKRVHSK\VLFDODEXVHRIWKHYLFWLPKDGFRQWULEXWHGE\ZHDNHQLQJKLP
to his death from “combined drug toxicity.”
7KH FRQWULEXWLRQ UXOH LV ILUPO\ URRWHG LQ SUHFHGHQW WKHQ ,W DOVR LV
firmly rooted in the “common understanding of cause.”$JDLQWKHEXW
for test, for all its usefulness “in ordinary causal situations,” IDLOVWR
capture the “common understanding” in cases of overdetermination or
VSXULRXV VXIILFLHQF\ 7KH FRQWULEXWLRQ WHVW FDSWXUHV WKH FRPPRQ
XQGHUVWDQGLQJLQERWKRIWKHVHVRUWVRIFDVHVDVWKLV$UWLFOHZLOOH[SODLQ
LQWKHVHFWLRQVWKDWIROORZ
%&RQWULEXWLRQDQG6SXULRXV6XIILFLHQF\
Some cases of spurious sufficiency won’t lend themselves to
UHVROXWLRQ XQGHU WKH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH 7KLV ZLOO EH WUXH LQ SDUWLFXODU
ZKHUHWKHVSXULRXVO\VXIILFLHQWFDXVDOPHFKDQLVPZRXOGKDYHFDXVHGWKH
victim’s death in the same instant as the actual causal mechanism. For
H[DPSOHVXSSRVHDKHURLQXVHU;SXUFKDVHVKHURLQIURPWZRVHSDUDWH
GHDOHUV6HOOHU$DQG6HOOHU%LQUDSLGVXFFHVVLRQWKHWZRSXUFKDVHVDUH
LGHQWLFDOLQFRQWHQWDQGDUHLGHQWLFDOO\SDFNDJHG$IWHUZDUGV;UHWXUQV
KRPHZKHUHKHLQMHFWVWKHKHURLQKHSXUFKDVHGIURP6HOOHU$. If he hadn’t
LQMHFWHGWKHKHURLQIURP6HOOHU$KHZRXOGKDYHLQMHFWHGWKHKHURLQIURP
6HOOHU % 7KH KHURLQ IURP 6HOOHU $ WRJHWKHU ZLWK WKH EDFNJURXQG
FRQGLWLRQVFDXVHV;’s death from overdose.
-XVWDERXWHYHU\ERG\ZRXOGDJUHHWKDW6HOOHU$’s actions qualify as a
IDFWXDOFDXVHRI;’s dHDWKLQWKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHV%XWQHLWKHUWKHEXW
IRUWHVWQRUWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHFDQH[SODLQWKLVUHVXOW6HOOHU$’s delivery
RIWKHKHURLQWR;doesn’t satisfy the unmodified version of the butIRU
WHVWVLQFH;VWLOOZRXOGKDYHLQMHFWHGKHURLQDQGVWLOOZRXOGKDYHGLHG
HYHQLIKHKDGQRWREWDLQHGWKHKHURLQIURP$6HOOHU$’s delivery of
WKHKHURLQWR;GRHVQRWVDWLVI\WKHDFFHOHUDWLRQWHVWHLWKHUVLQFHWKHUHLV
QRUHDVRQWRVXSSRVHWKDWWKHKHURLQIURP6HOOHU$FDXVHG;’s death any
VRRQHUWKDQWKHKHURLQIURP6HOOHU%ZRXOGKDYH
7KLV VRUW RI VSXULRXV FDXVDO VXIILFLHQF\ LV FRPPRQSODFH LQ
DFFRPSOLFHOLDELOLW\FDVHV6XSSRVHIRUH[DPSOHWKDWDQDFFRPSOLFH

  ,GDW
  &I %XUUDJH Y 8QLWHG 6WDWHV  6 &W     ILQGLQJ WKDW WKH EXWIRU
requirement “is part of the common understanding of cause”).
  :ULJKWVXSUDQRWHDW
  6HHVXSUDQRWH
  6HH0DFNLHVXSUDQRWH, at 251 (“It is true that in thisFDVHZHFDQQRWVD\ZKDWZLOO
XVXDOO\ VHUYH DV DQ LQIRUPDO VXEVWLWXWH IRU WKH IRUPDO DFFRXQW WKDW WKH FDXVH KHUH $ ZDV
QHFHVVDU\in the circumstances; for [the alternative condition] would have done just as well.”).
  'UHVVOHUVXSUDQRWHDW–FI0DVWDIDY$XVWUDOLDQ:KHDW%G/WG1R
&,9  *(/   :/  DW  6'1< 6HSW    H[SODLQLQJ WKDW D
UHTXLUHPHQWRIEXWIRUFDXVDWLRQRQSODLQWLIIVDOOHJLQJDFFHVVRULDOOLDELOLW\ “would significantly
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VXSSOLHVWKHSULQFLSDOZLWKDFULWLFDOLQVWUXPHQWDOLW\IRUWKHFULPH—DJXQ
VD\—EXW WKH SULQFLSDO LI KH KDG QRW REWDLQHG WKH JXQ IURP WKLV
DFFRPSOLFH FRXOG UHDGLO\ KDYH REWDLQHG WKH JXQ HOVHZKHUH IURP D
VXEVWLWXWHDFFRPSOLFH,QWKLVVLWXDWLRQWRRWKHEXWIRUWHVWRUGLQDULO\
ZLOO QRW EH VDWLVILHG 1RU XVXDOO\ ZLOO WKH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH EH
satisfied, since the day and time of the principal’s commission of the
FULPHXVXDOO\ZLOOQRWYDU\RUZLOOQRWYDU\SURYDEO\ZLWKWKHLGHQWLW\RI
KLVDFFRPSOLFH7KLVDFFRPSOLFHOLDELOLW\SUREOHPVKDUHVWKHVWUXFWXUH
RIWKHRWKHUVSXULRXVVXIILFLHQF\SUREOHPV WKHQ7KHDVVLVWDQFHWKDW
ZRXOGKDYHEHHQSURYLGHGE\WKHVXEVWLWXWHDFFRPSOLFHLVSDUWRIDFDXVDO
PHFKDQLVPWKDWZRXOGKDYHVXIILFHGWREULQJDERXWWKHFRPPLVVLRQRI
WKH RIIHQVH E\ WKH SULQFLSDO $V LW KDSSHQHG WKRXJK WKLV FDXVDO
PHFKDQLVPZDVSUHHPSWHGE\DQRWKHURYHUODSSLQJFDXVDOPHFKDQLVP
RIZKLFKWKHUHDOaccomplice’s conduct was a necessary component.
1RRQHVHHPVWREHLQFOLQHGWRUHOLHYHDFFRPSOLFHVRIOLDELOLW\RQWKH
JURXQGWKDWVRPHERG\HOVHZRXOGKDYHKHOSHGWKHSULQFLSDOLIWKHDFWXDO
DFFRPSOLFHKDGQRW2QWKHFRQWUDU\FRXUWVFRQVLVWHQWO\KDYHWDNHQWKH
view that an accomplice’s conduct need not be a butIRUFDXVH 1RU

XQGHUPLQH>FLYLO@DLGLQJDQGDEHWWLQJOLDELOLW\LQWKHIHGHUDOFRXUWVVLQFHLWLVRIWHQWKHFDVHWKDW
an accessorial defendant is not the ‘but for’ cause of the principal tortfeasor’s tortious acts”).
  6HH.DUSVXSUDQRWHDW
  6HH *(25*( 3 )/(7&+(5 5(7+,1.,1* &5,0,1$/ /$:   DW   
(acknowledging that “merely aiding an existing criminal plan” ordinarily does not “satisf[y] the
‘but for’ criteria of causation”); LGat 680 (“If the perpetrator is very likely to kill, regardless
RIZhether he receives the aid, the accessory’s minimal contribution does not meet the minimal
test of ‘but for’ causation, and a fortiori it fails to meet the more demanding criteria of the
‘commonsense’ view of causation.”); Karp, VXSUD QRWH , at 1279 (“>7@KH UHFLSLHQW FRXOG
HDVLO\KDYHREWDLQHGDJXQHOVHZKHUHLIWKHVXSSOLHULQTXHVWLRQKDGUHIXVHGWRJLYHKLPRQH%XW
for causation then does not exist in any straightforward sense.”).
  %XWFI'UHVVOHUVXSUDQRWHDW DUJXLQJWKDWWKHDFFHOHration rule “usually” will
accommodate these cases: “[A]ny evidence of a hypothetical alternative cause would usually
prove only that the crime would have occurred later, not when it did”).
  6HHVXSUDWH[WDFFRPSDQ\LQJQRWHV–
  *ODQYLOOH :LOOLDPV DUJXHG LPSUREDEO\ WKDW RQH FRXOG DGGUHVV WKLV GLIILFXOW\ E\
LPSRVLQJ OLPLWV RQ WKH NLQGV RI FRXQWHUIDFWXDO PDQLSXODWLRQ WKDW WKH EXWIRU WHVW SHUPLWV 6HH
:LOOLDPVVXSUDQRWH, at 72 (“[T]he imaginary subtraction of the alleged causDOIDFWPXVWQRW
EHDFFRPSDQLHGE\WKHLQYHQWLRQRIDQ\RWKHULPDJLQDU\IDFWVLQLWVSODFHKRZHYHUOLNHO\LWPD\
EHWKDWVXFKDUHSODFHPHQWZRXOGKDve occurred in reality.”); VHHDOVR0LNH&0DWHUQL5HERRWLQJ
WKH 'LVFRXUVH RQ &DXVDWLRQ LQ WKH &ULPLQDO /DZ $ 3UDJPDWLF DQG ,PSHUIHFW  $SSURDFK
&5,0 / %8//     (“[W]e FDQQRW EXLOG RXU FRXQWHUIDFWXDO RQ DOWHUQDWLYH
DQWHFHGHQWVWKDWGLGQRWRFFXU.”). Wright’s criticism of this view appears to be correct, if too mild.
6HH:ULJKWVXSUDQRWHDW
  6HHHJ6WDWHH[UHO0DUWLQv. Tally, 15 So. 722, 738 (Ala. 1894) (“The assistance
JLYHQKRZHYHUQHHGQRWFRQWULEXWHWRWKHFULPLQDOUHVXOWLQWKHVHQVHWKDWEXWIRULWWKHUHVXOW
ZRXOGQRWKDYHHQVXHG,WLVTXLWHVXIILFLHQWLILWIDFLOLWDWHGDUHVXOWWKDWZRXOGKDYHWUDQVSLUHG
Zithout it.”); People v. Franzen, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 880 (Ct. App. 2012) (“[W]hile the
defendant must ‘in fact assist[ ]’ the primary actor to commit the offense, there is no requirement
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GRHVDQ\ERG\DSSHDUWREHLQFOLQHGWRUHOLHYHKHURLQGHDOHUVRIOLDELOLW\
for a purchaser’s death on the ground that the purchaser would have
obtained heroin from somebody else if he hadn’t obtained it from the
GHIHQGDQW+RZWKHQDUHFRXUWVWRDFFRPPRGDWHFDVHVOLNHWKHVH"
7KLV $UWLFOH KDV DOUHDG\ FRQVLGHUHG DQG UHMHFWHG WZR SRVVLEOH
VROXWLRQVQHLWKHURIZKLFKKDVDQ\IROORZLQJLQFULPLQDOFDVHVDQ\ZD\
)LUVWWKLV$UWLFOHKDVUHMHFWHGWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIUHTXLULQJWKHIDFWILQGHU
WR GHFLGH ZKLFK RI WZR DSSDUHQWO\ VXIILFLHQW FDXVDO VHWV DFWXDOO\ ZDV
“instantiated” in the mRPHQW EHIRUH WKH UHVXOW RFFXUUHG 7KH
terminology of “sufficient causal sets,” whatever its value in describing
WKHXQFRQVFLRXVSURFHVVHVE\ZKLFKRUGLQDU\SHRSOHLGHQWLI\FRQGXFWDV
WKHFDXVHRIDUHVXOWLVIDUWRRFRPSOH[WREHRIDQ\UHDOXWLOLW\WROD\IDFW
ILQGHUV 6HFRQG WKLV $UWLFOH KDV FRQVLGHUHG WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI
PRGLI\LQJ WKH EXWIRU WHVW E\ UHILQLQJ WKH GHVFULSWLRQ RI WKH UHVXOW WR
LQFOXGHKRZWKHUHVXOWKDSSHQHG$VDSSOLHGLQRXUKHURLQK\SRWKHWLFDO
IRUH[DPSOHWKLVWHVWSUHVXPDEO\ZRXOGUHTXLUHWKHIDFWILQGHUWRGHFLGH
ZKHWKHU;would have died “from ingesting heroin supplied by $” but for
$’s conduct. But this reformulation makes the butIRUWHVWFLUFXODU
+RZ WKHQ GR FRXUWV KDQGOH VSXULRXV VXIILFLHQF\ RI WKH NLQG WKDW
FKDUDFWHUL]HVDFFRPSOLFHOLDELOLW\"7KHDQVZHUDSSHDUVWREHWKDWLQSODFH
RI EXWfor causation, they require only that the defendant’s conduct

WKDW KLV FRQGXFW EH D EXWIRU FDXVH RU HYHQ DQ HVVHQWLDO IDFWRU LQ bringing it about.” VHFRQG
DOWHUDWLRQLQRULJLQDO 
  6HHVXSUDQRWH
  6HHVXSUDWH[WDFFRPSDQ\LQJQRWHV–
  6HHVXSUD WH[WDFFRPSDQ\LQJQRWHV –VHHDOVR-RKQVRQ VXSUDQRWHDW
(explaining why application of the rule of “sufficient causal sets” would prove “extraordinarily
complicated”: “Imagine arguing to jurors about the ‘construction’ of a ‘sufficient causal set’
ZKRVHHOHPHQWVLQFOXGHFRXQWHUIDFWXDOV$QGWKHQLPDJLQHIXUWKHUH[SODLQLQJWKHOLPLWVRQWKH
SODXVLELOLW\RIFounterfactuals”); FI:ULJKWVXSUDQRWHDW DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDWWKHFRXUWV
in tort cases have “clearly rejected” the RestatementW\SH DSSURDFK LQ IDYRU RI UHTXLULQJ WKH
plaintiff “prove that the tortious aspect of the defendant’s conduct contributed to the plaintiff’s
injury”).
  6HHVXSUDWH[WDFFRPSDQ\LQJQRWHV––
  $PRUHUDGLFDODOWHUQDWLYHZRXOGEHWRGLVSHQVHZLWKWKHFDXVDWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWHQWLUHO\
as the Model Penal Code does in the “aiding” cases. Under 0RGHO 3HQDO &RGH VHFWLRQ
  D LL DQGDIHZVWDWHVWDWXWHVGHULYHGIURPVHFWLRQ2.06, an “attempt[] to aid,” though not
DQDWWHPSWWRVROLFLWZLOOVXIILFHWRWULJJHUDFFRPSOLFHOLDELOLW\6HHHJ'(/&2'($11WLW
  +$:5(967$7  0217&2'($11  $VWKH
0RGHO3HQDO&RGHFRPPHQWDU\DFNQRZledges, however, the imposition of liability for “attempts
to aid” represents a departure from existing law. 02'(/3(1$/&2'(FPW F DW $0
/$: ,167 3URSRVHG2IILFLDO'UDIW (acknowledging that section “may go in part beyond
the present law”)FI.LW.LQSRUWV5RVHPRQG0HQV5HDDQGWKH(OHPHQWVRI&RPSOLFLW\6$1
',(*2 / 5(9     VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW WKH 0RGHO 3HQDO &RGH UXOH LV WKH VWDQGDUG
approach: “But any voluntary act of aid or encouragement, no matter how trivial, suffices. The
SURVHFXWLRQ LV QRW UHTXLUHG WR HVWDEOLVK WKDW WKH FULPH ZRXOG QRW KDYH RFFXUUHG EXW IRU WKH
DFFHVVRU\RUWKDWWKHDFFRPSOLFHFRQWULEXWHGDVXEVWDQWLDODPRXQt of assistance”). 
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“contribute” to the result,RU—LQFDVHVRIDFFRPSOLFHOLDELOLW\—WRWKH
principal’s offense.7KHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHDFWXDODFFRPSOLFHDQG
WKH ZRXOGEH VXEVWLWXWH DFFRPSOLFH RQ WKLV DFFRXQW LV WKDW WKH DFWXDO
accomplice actually “contributed” to the commission of the offense,
ZKLOH WKH ZRXOGEH VXEVWLWXWH DFFRPSOLFH GLG QRW /LNHZLVH WKH
GLIIHUHQFHLQWKHGUXJGHDOLQJH[DPSOHEHWZHHQ6HOOHU$DQG6HOOHU%LV
WKDWWKHGUXJVVROG E\6HOOHU $XQOLNHWKRVHVROGE\6HOOHU %DFWXDOO\
“contributed” to the purchaser’s demise.
&RXUWVDQGVFKRODUVJHQHrally haven’t defined the word “contribute”
LQWKLVVHWWLQJ$QGLWVHHPVOLNHO\WKDWDQ\HIIRUWWRIRUPXODWHDULJRURXV
GHILQLWLRQ ZRXOG IRXQGHU RQ WKH VDPH GLIILFXOWLHV WKDW KDYH EHGHYLOHG
scholars’ efforts to distinguish real from spurious causal sufficLHQF\
,QVWHDG LQ DSSO\LQJ WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ UHTXLUHPHQW—LQ LGHQWLI\LQJ ZKDW
GLVWLQJXLVKHV VSXULRXV IURP DFWXDO FDXVDO VXIILFLHQF\ LQ WKHVH FDVHV—
HYHQWKHPRVWVRSKLVWLFDWHGRIVFKRODUVKDYHWHQGHGWRIDOOEDFNRQZRUGV
like “actually” and “really.” BishoSIRUH[DPSOHVDLGWKDWWKHTXHVWLRQ
in cases like these is whether the defendant’s conduct “UHDOO\FRQWULEXWHG
PHGLDWHO\ RU LPPHGLDWHO\ WR WKH GHDWK DV LW DFWXDOO\ WRRN SODFH.”

  6HHVXSUDQRWHV
  6HHHJDamato v. Hermanson, 153 F.3d 464, 470 (7th Cir. 1998) (“By definition, an
aider and abettor knowingly contributes to the principal’s violation, rather than committing an
LQGHSHQGHQW violation of its own.”); People v. Prettyman, 926 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Cal. 1996)
(“Accomplice liability is ‘derivative,’ that is, it results from an act by the perpetrator to which the
accomplice contributed.”); State v. Crowley, No. A7:/DW  1-
6XSHU&W$SS'LY-Xly 8, 2014) (“Even if defendant’VVKRWZDVQRWIDWDOLQLWVHOIWKHHYLGHQFH
VXJJHVWHGGHIHQGDQWSURPRWHGDQGSDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKHFRPPLVVLRQRIWKHPXUGHUE\VKRRWLQJWKH
YLFWLP7KHUHIRUHWKHMXU\ZDVSHUPLWWHGWRFRQYLFWKLPDVDQDFFRPSOLFHEHFDXVHKLVFRQGXFW
contributed to causing Pretlow’s death.”)State v. Davis, 356 S.E.2d 340, 343 (N.C. 1987) (“In
FDVHVZKHUHDGHIHQGDQWLVSURVHFXWHGDVDQDFFHVVRU\EHIRUHWKHIDFWWRPXUGHUWKHVWDWHPXVW
SURYHEH\RQGDUHDVRQDEOHGRXEWWKDWWKHDFWLRQVRUVWDWHPHQWVRIWKHGHIHQGDQWVRPHKRZFDXVHG
RUFRQWULEXWHGWRWKHDFWLRQVRIWKHSULQFLSDOZKLFKLQWXUQFDXVHGWKHYLFWLP’s death.”); State v.
3DWWHUVRQ1R$3:/DW  2KLR&W$SS'HF (“A person aids
RUDEHWVZKHQKHNQRZLQJO\DVVLVWVDQRWKHULQWKHFRPPLVVLRQRIWKHFULPHLIKHKDVDSXUSRVHLQ
FRPPRQZLWKWKHSULQFLSDORIIHQGHUWRFRPPLWWKHFULPHDQGWKHSULQFLSDORIIHQGHUSHUIRUPVRQH
SDUWDQGWKHSHUVRQSDUWLFLSDWHVE\SHUIRUPLQJDQRWKHURUE\GRLQJVRPHWKLQJWRFRQWULEXWHWRWKH
SULQFLSDORIIHQGHU’s committing the crime, he aids and abets the principal offender.”); State v.
0HULGD0HGLQD3GQ(Or. Ct. App. 2008) (remarking that Oregon’s accomplice
OLDELOLW\ VWDtutes “create an alternative form of criminal liability—DFFRPSOLFH OLDELOLW\—IRU
FRQWULEXWLQJWRWKHFRPPLVVLRQRIDFULPHE\DPRQJRWKHUWKLQJVDLGLQJDQGDEHWWLQJWKHSHUVRQ
who commits it”). 
  6HHVXSUDWH[WDFFRPSDQ\LQJQRWHV–
  %,6+23VXSUDQRWH HPSKDVLVDGGHG FI3(5.,16  %2<&(VXSUDQRWH
, at 773 (“Suppose, for example, an unarmed man is so completely surrounded by enemies bent
RQKLVGHVWUXFWLRQDQGDUPHGZLWKNQLYHVWKDWKHKDVQRSRVVLEOHFKDQFHWRHVFDSHEXWRQO\RQH
EORZLVVWUXFNEHFDXVHLWLVLQVWDQWO\IDWDO,WPD\EHYHU\WUXHWKDWZLWKRXWWKLVEORZKHZRXOG
KDYHEHHQNLOOHGDWDOPRVWWKHVDPHLQVWDQWE\VRPHRWKHUNQLIHEXWQRDPRXQWRIUHSHWLWLRQRI
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3URIHVVRUJoseph Beale said, likewise: “The question is not what would
KDYe happened, but what did happen.”-/0DFNLHVDLGWKHTXHVWLRQLV
whether the actor’s contribution, if not “necessary” in the sense required
E\WKHEXWIRUWHVWQHYHUWKHOHVVLV“aQHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQSRVWIDFWXP.”
7KH GLIILFXOW\ RI VD\LQJ H[DFWO\ ZKDW “contribute” PHDQV LQ WKLV
setting hasn’t deterred either courts or scholars from making use of the
FRQWULEXWLRQ WHVW KRZHYHU &ULPLQDO ODZ VFKRODUV VD\ URXWLQHO\ WKDW
accomplice liability requires mere “contribution,” as distinct from butIRU
FDXVDWLRQ&RXUWVWRRVRPHWLPHVIRUPXODWHWKHGHPDQGVRIDFFRPSOLFH
liability in terms of “contribution.” ,Q 1RUWK &DUROLQD IRU H[DPSOH
trial judges instruct juries that the prosecution must “proveEH\RQGD
UHDVRQDEOHGRXEWWKDWWKHdefendant’sDFWLRQVRUVWDWHPHQWVFDXVHGRU
FRQWULEXWHGWRWKHFRPPLVVLRQRIWKHFULPHE\>WKHSULQFLSDO@.”,QRWKHU
MXULVGLFWLRQVWKHUHTXLUHPHQWRIFRQWULEXWLRQLVWUHDWHGDVLPSOLFLWLQWKH
ODQJXDJH RI WKH DLGLQJDQGDEHWWLQJ LQVWUXFWLRQ—in words like “aid,”
“facilitate,” “instigate,” and “promote.”,QERWKVRUWVRIMXULVGLFWLRQV
KRZHYHU WKH FRXUWV DSSHDU WR DJUHH WKDW WKH HVVHQFH RI ZKDW WKH
DFFRPSOLFH GRHV LV FRQWULEXWH WR WKH FULPLQDO HQWHUSULVH $QG WKH\
DSSHDUWRNQRZLQWXLWLYHO\ZKDWthe word “contribute” PHDQV.” 
The contribution test’s utility in distinguishing genuine from spurious
FDXVDOIDFWRUVSUREDEO\H[SODLQVLQSDUWZK\FRXUWVLQYRNHWKHWHVWQRW

VXFKDUJXPHQWFDQFRQFHDOWKHIDFWWKDWWKHDFWXDOFDXVHRIGHDWKwas the blow struck.” HPSKDVLV
DGGHG 
  -RVHSK+%HDOH7KH3UR[LPDWH&RQVHTXHQFHVRIDQ$FW+$59 / 5(9
 
  0DFNLHVXSUDQRWHDW
  (J )/(7&+(5 VXSUD QRWH    at 680 (“That one can contribute to a result
without causing it lies at the foundation of accessorial liability.”); John Gardner, &RPSOLFLW\DQG
&DXVDOLW\  &5,0 /  3+,/ 127, 130 (1997) (describing an “accomplice” as “a secondary
ZURQJGRHUZKRFRQWULEuted to the commission of [the principal’s] wrongs”).
  6HHVXSUDQRWHFI3UHVE\WHULDQ&KXUFKRI6XGDQY7DOLVPDQ(QHUJ\,QF)
6XSSG– 6'1< (“The [International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda] has
VLPLODUO\KHOGWKDWWKHDFWXVUHXVof aiding and abetting is constituted by ‘all acts of assistance in
the form of either physical or moral support’ that ‘substantially contribute to the commission of
the crime.’ While the assistance must be substantial, it ‘need not constituWH DQ LQGLVSHQVDEOH
HOHPHQWWKDWLVDFRQGLWLRVLQHTXDQRQfor the acts of the principal.’” (citation omitted) (first
TXRWLQJ3URVHFXWRUY0XVHPD&DVH1R,&757-XGJPHQW -DQ DQG
WKHQTXRWLQJ3URVHFXWRUY)XUXQG]LMD&DVH1R,77-XGJPHQW 'HF 
  $LGLQJ DQG $EHWWLQJ—)HORQ\ 0LVGHPHDQRU 1257+ &$52/,1$ 3$77(51 -85<
,16758&7,21—&5,0,1$/   HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
  For example, though California’s courts long have acknowledged that accomplice
liability is grounded in “contribution,” VHH3HRSOHY3UHWW\PDQ3G &DO 
their pattern jury instructions require proof only that the defendant “does inIDFWDLGIDFLOLWDWH
SURPRWH HQFRXUDJH RU LQVWLJDWH WKH SHUSHWUDWRU’V FRPPLVVLRQ RI What crime.” $LGLQJ DQG
$EHWWLQJ,QWHQGHG&ULPHV-8',&,$/ &281&,/2) &$/,)251,$ &5,0,1$/ -85< ,16758&7,21
 
  6HHVXSUDQRWH
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RQO\ LQ DFFRPSOLFHOLDELOLW\ FDVHV EXW DOVR LQ GLUHFWOLDELOLW\ FDVHV $W
OHDVW ZKHUH FDXVDWLRQ is concerned, direct liability isn’t fundamentally
GLIIHUHQW IURP DFFRPSOLFHOLDELOLW\ ,QGLUHFWOLDELOLW\DVLQ DFFRPSOLFH
liability, the defendant’s conduct only ever is one component of the set
of “conditions SRVLWLYH DQG QHJDWLYH” that together arH VXIILFLHQW WR
SUHFLSLWDWH WKH UHVXOW ,W ZRXOG EH XQVXUSULVLQJ WKHQ LI WKH NLQG RI
VSXULRXV VXIILFLHQF\ WKDW FKDUDFWHUL]HV DFFRPSOLFH OLDELOLW\ ZHUH
VRPHWLPHVWR DULVHLQ GLUHFW OLDELOLW\—DV LQ WKH K\SRWKHWLFDO ZKHUHWKH
KHURLQ XVHU ZRXOG KDYH LQJHVWHG KHURLQ IURP 6HOOHU % LI KH KDG QRW
LQJHVWHGWKHKHURLQIURP6HOOHU$,QWKHVHGLUHFWOLDELOLW\FDVHVDVLQ
WKHDFFRPSOLFHliability cases, the word “contribute” captures intuitively
what distinguishes genuine causal factors from spurious “would be”
FDXVDOIDFWRUV
&&RQWULEXWLRQDQG2YHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
7KHFRQWULEXWLRQUXOHDOVRUHPHGLHVWKHEXWfor test’s shortcomings in
FDVHV RI RYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ 1RW DOO RYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ FDVHV UHTXLUH
UHVRUW WR WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ UXOH RI FRXUVH 7KH DFFHOHUDWLRQ UXOH RIWHQ
VXIILFHVHVSHFLDOO\ZKHQWKHRYHUGHWHUPLQHGFDXVDOFRPSRQHQWLQYROYHV
a threshold. In cases involving thresholds, the defendant’s contribution to
the causal mechanism, even if it doesn’t determine ZKHWKHUWKHWKUHVKROG
LVUHDFKHGVRPHWLPHVZLOOGHWHUPLQHZKHQWKHWKUHVKROGLVUHDFKHG7KLV
acceleration shortcut won’t work in every overdetermination case,
KRZHYHU 1RU HYHQ ZLOO LW ZRUN LQ HYHU\ RYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ FDVH WKDW
LQYROYHVDWKUHVKROG
7DNHIRUH[DPSOHDW\SLFDO GUXQNGULYLQJKRPLFLGHFDVHZKHUHDQ
intoxicated driver strikes a bicyclist who is riding legally in the driver’s
ODQHRIWUDYHO,QWKLVFDVHZKHWKHUDQDFFLGHQWRFFXUVZLOOGHSHQGLQ
SDUW RQKRZTXLFNO\WKHGULYHUQRWLFHVDQGUHDFWVWR WKHF\FOLVW ,W ZLOO
GHSHQGLQRWKHUZRUGs, on whether the defendant’s reaction time exceeds
DFHUWDLQFULWLFDOWKUHVKROG$QXPEHURIIDFWRUVZLOOFRQWULEXWHWRWKLV
threshold, including the driver’s intoxication, the weather and lighting
conditions, the degree of the driver’s attention to the URDGZD\ WKH
brightness of the cyclist’s clothing, etc. If the various contributions to the
driver’s reaction time exceed the critical threshold, the driver will strike
the cyclist. But factors that increase the driver’s reaction time IXUWKHU
EH\RQG WKLV threshold, won’t accelerate the accident. They’ll just
RYHUGHWHUPLQHLW6RWKHGUXQNGULYHURIWHQZLOOKDYHDYLDEOHDUJXPHQW

  0,//VXSUDQRWHDW
  6HH3(5.,16 %2<&(VXSUDQRWHDW
  6HHHJ6WDWHY5XPVH\1R&$&5:/DW  $UL]
&W$SS$XJ 
  -RKQVRQVXSUDQRWHDW–
  6HHLG DQDO\]LQJGUXQNGULYLQJKRPLFLGHFDVHVDVFDXVDORYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQFDVHV 

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

39

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 6 [2016], Art. 5



FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

>9RO



WKDWWKHGHDWKPLJKWKDYHRFFXUUHGZKHQLWGLGHYHQLIKHKDGQRWEHHQ
LQWR[LFDWHG
0RUHRYHUHYHQLQWKHNLQGVRIFDVHVZKHUHDGGLWLRQDOFRQWULEXWLRQV
WR WKH FDXVDO WKUHVKROG RIWHQ GR DFFHOHUDWH WKH UHVXOW—H[VDQJXLQDWLRQ
FDVHVIRUH[DPSOH—the government’s experts often will be unable to say
definitively whether the defendant’s contribution to the threshold actually
DFFHOHUDWHGWKHGHDWK7RLOOXVWUDWH,Q3HRSOHY%URZQGHIHQGDQW
&RUWH] %URZQ ZDV RQH RI WZR PHQ ZKR KDG VKRW &XUWLV 6LPV LQ WKH
PRPHQWV EHIRUH 6LPV GLHG 'XULQJ D VXEVHTXHQW DXWRSV\ WKH
SDWKRORJLVWIRXQGWKUHHEXOOHWVIURPWZRGLIIHUHQWJXQV—DFDOLEHU8]L
DQGDPLOOLPHWHUKDQGJXQ—in Sims’s body.“7KHSDWKRORJLVWFRXOG
not say which of the three wounds caused Sims’ death    .” 1RU
DSSDUHQWO\FRXOGWKHSDWKRORJLVWVD\ZKHWKHUHDFKRIWKHWKUHHZRXQGV
had accelerated Sims’ death. He was able to testify only WKDW“‘any three
RI>WKHZRXQGV@’ could haveNLOOHGKLP”
:KDWWKH,OOLQRLV6XSUHPH&RXUWVDLGLQ%URZQDQGZKDWVWDWHFRXUWV
KDYHVDLGFRQVLVWHQWO\LQFDVHVOLNH%URZQLVWKDWFRQWULEXWLRQLVHQRXJK
“[T]he defendant’s act need only contribute to the victim’s death to prove
the defendant guilty of murder.” ,Q D IHZ VWDWHV WKH OHJLVODWXUH KDV
DGRSWHG D YDULDQW RI WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ WHVW E\ VWDWXWH ,Q RWKHU VWDWHV
ZKHUHWKHOHJLVODWXUHKDVOHIWWKHODZRIFDXVDWLRQWRWKHFRXUWVWKHFRXUWV
KDYH DGRSWHG WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ WHVW DV MXGJHPDGH ODZ $V LQ WKH

  6HH67(3+(1VXSUDQRWHDW DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDWWKHHYLGHQWLDU\GLIILFXOWLHV
associated with the question of acceleration are “often very great”); Wright,VXSUDQRWHDW
(“[I]n many situations itZLOOEHLPSRVVLEOHWRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUWKHFRQGLWLRQDWLVVXHKDGDQ\
effect on the timing or location of the consequence.”). 
  1(G ,OO 
  ,GDW
  ,GDW
  ,GDW
  ,G DW – 7KH VDPH VRUW RI RYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQ IUHTXHQWO\ RFFXUV LQ DFFRPSOLFH
liability cases, particularly where the accomplice’s liability hinges on “abetting,” or
encouragement, rather than “aiding.” 
  ,GDW
  6SHFLILFDOO\WKHVHFRGHVDGRSWDPRGLILHGEXWIRUWHVWXQGHUZKLFKWKHIDFWILQGHULV
permitted to combine the defendant’s conduct with another complementary causal factor before
DSSO\LQJWKHEXWIRUWHVW6HH$/$&2'($ D   $5.&2'($11  
0(67$7WLWD  1'&(17&2'(  7(;3(1$/&2'($11
 :HVW . Maine’s statute, for example, says that “causation may be found where the
UHVXOW ZRXOG QRW KDYH RFFXUUHGEXW IRU WKH FRQGXFW RI WKH GHIHQGDQW RSHUDWLQJ HLWKHU DORQH RU
FRQFXUUHQWO\ZLWKDQRWKHUFDXVHXQOHVVWKHFRQFXUUHQWFDXVHZDVFOHDUO\VXIILFLHQWWRSURGXFHWKH
result and the conduct of the defendant was clearly insufficient.” 0( 5(9 67$7WLWD
  HPSKDVLVDGGHG 7KHVWDWHOHJLVODWXUHVPRGHOHGWKHVHVWDWXWHVFORVHO\RQ6HFWLRQRI
the Brown Commission’s 1971 draft federal criminal code. 6HH1$7’/ &200’121 5()2502)
)('&5,0,1$//$:6352326('1(:)('(5$/&5,0,1$/&2'(  
  6HH HJ 3HRSOH Y -HQQLQJV  3G   &DO   &RPPRQZHDOWK Y
2VDFKXN1(G 0DVV$SS&W 3HRSOHY%DLOH\1:G–
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VSXULRXVVXIILFLHQF\FDVHVFRXUWVLQWKHFDXVDORYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQFDVHV
RIWHQOHDYHWKLVFRQWULEXWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWXQGHILQHGDQGXQHODERUDWHG
%XW VRPH FRXUWV KDYH EHHQ VOLJKWO\ PRUH IRUWKFRPLQJ 7KH &DOLIRUQLD
6XSUHPH&RXUWIRUH[DPSOHKDVVDLGWKDWDGHIHQGDQWFRQWULEXWHVWRWKH
UHVXOWLIKLVFRQGXFW‘“was operative DWWKHWLPHRIWKH>UHVXOW@DQGDFWHG
with another cause to produce the [result].”’
This definition nicely captures what courts mean by “contribute” in
this setting. If the forces set in motion by the defendant are not “operative
LQWKHPRPHQWRIWKHUHVXlt”—if they are cut off or “preempted” at the
last moment, say, or if the various conditions on which the conduct’s
FDXVDO HIILFDF\ GHSHQGV DUH QRW SUHVHQW—then the defendant’s conduct
doesn’t really “contribute” to the result. Nor does the defendant’s
FRnduct “contribute” in the required sense unless it “acts with another
cause”—XQOHVV LW FRPSOHPHQWV WKH RWKHU HYHQWV DQG FRQGLWLRQV WKDW
together with the defendant’s conduct, overdetermine the result.7KLV
WZRIROGGHILQLWLRQZDVVDWLVILHGLQWKH%URZQFDVHIRUH[DPSOHZKHUH
WKHEORRGORVVIURPHDFKRIWKHvictim’s wounds complemented the blood
loss from the others, and where “at the very instant of death [each] wound
was contributing to the event.” ,W DOVR ZRXOG EH VDWLVILHG LQ GUXQN
GULYLQJ KRPLFLGH Fases where the driver’s impairment complements
QDWLYH “limitations on the driver’s ability to perceive and react” WR
KD]DUGV

 0LFK   6WDWH Y :RRGV 1R :&&$5&'  :/  DW 
7HQQ&ULP$SS 6WDWHY&KULVWPDQ3G :DVK&W$SS 
  For example, Illinois’s pattern jury instructions, in keeping with %URZQ UHTXLUH WKH
government simply to prove “that defendant’s acts were a contributing cause of the death.”
&DXVDWLRQLQ+RPLFLGH&DVHV([FOXGLQJ)HORQ\0XUGHU,//,12,63$77(51-85<,16758&7,21—
&5,0,1$/  
  -HQQLQJV3GDW TXRWLQJ3HRSOHY6DQFKH]3G  VHHDOVR
&RPPRQZHDOWK Y 0F/HRG  1(G   Q 0DVV   DSSURYLQJ XVH RI MXU\
Lnstruction based on California’s formulation).
  -RKQVRQVXSUDQRWHDW–
  6HHLGat 77 (discussing what it means for the defendant’s conduct to “complement”
DQRWKHUFDXVDOIDFWRU LGDW GLVFXVVLQJWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKLVFRPSOHPHQWDULW\DQG
Wright’s necessaryHOHPHQWRIDVXIILFLHQWset test: “Where this complementary relationship
H[LVWV—where, in Wright’s words, the defendant makes an ‘incremental, cumulative contribution’
WR WKH RWKHU QRQEDFNJURXQG FDXVDO IDFWRU LW ZLOO DOZD\V EH SRVVLEOH WR FRQVWUXFW D VXIILFLHQW
causal set of which the defendant’s contribution is a necessary element by varying the efficacy of
WKH RWKHU QRQbackground causal factor” IRRWQRWH RPLWWHG  5RWKPDQ VXSUD QRWH  DW 
GLVFXVVLQJFRPSOHmentarity and “synergy” among causal factors).
  3HRSOHY/HZLV3 &DO 
  -RKQVRQVXSUDQRWHDW–VHHDOVR6WDWHY%DNHU6RG /D&W
$SS  H[SODLQLQJLQGUXQNdriving homicide appeal, that “the defendant’s conduct need not
be the sole proximate cause of the victim’s death; it is sufficient for the defendant’s acts to be a
contributing cause or a substantial factor”)6WDWHY%DUWOHWW6(G– :9D
  DSSURYLQJ D MXU\ LQVWUXFWLRQ WKDW UHTXLUHG WKH JRYHUQPHQW WR SURYH DV HOHPHQW RI WKH
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By comparison, the contribution test wouldn’t be satisfied in a case
OLNH 6XPPHUV Y 7LFH 7KH IDFWV RI 6XPPHUV DUH IDPLOLDU WR PRVW
ODZ\HUV IURP WKHLU ILUVW\HDU FRXUVH RQ WRUWV 6XPPHUV 7LFH DQG
6LPRQVRQZHUHKXQWLQJTXDLOZKHQDWH[DFWO\WKHVDPHPRPHQW7LFH
and Simonson both negligently fired their shotguns in Summers’s
GLUHFWLRQ $ VKRWJXQ SHOOHW VWUXFN 6XPPHUV LQ WKH H\H %XW WKH
evidence didn’t show whose shot had struck Summers.'LG7LFHDQG
Simonson both “contribute” to Summers’s injuries, then? Of course
QRWThe pellets from Tice’s shotgun did not FRPSOHPHQWWKRVHIURP
Simonson’s; they posed a risk to Summers, to be sure, but they didn’t
LQFUHDVH WKH ULVN SRVHG E\ WKH SHOOHWV IURP WKH RWKHU VKRWJXQ
Accordingly, it wouldn’t make sense to treat the pellets from Tice’s
shotgun as somehow “acting with another cause.” $SHOOHWIURPRQHRI
WKH WZR VKRWJXQV VWUXFN 6XPPHUV 7KH SHUVRQ ZKR ILUHG WKH RWKHU
VKRWJXQ“contributed” nothing.
This sort of lawyerly elaboration of the word “contribute” probably
isn’t necessary in the usual case. The requirement that the defendant’s
FRQGXFW FRPSOHPHQW DQRWKHU FDXVDO IDFWRU LV LPSOLFLW LQ WKH ZRUG
“contribute.” 7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW LQ %XUUDJH PRUHRYHU DSSHDUV WR
have understood the word “contribute” perfectly without any
HODERUDWLRQ7KH&RXUWHYHQRIIHUHGDQLOOXVWUDWLRQRIZKDWLWPHDQVIRU

RIIHQVH GHILQHG LQ : 9$ &2'(  & WKDW WKH GHIHQGDQWdriver’s “intoxication was a
FRQWULEXWLQJFDXVHof [the victim’s] death”).
  3G &DO 
  ,GDW
  ,G
  ,G
  6HH&URFNHUVXSUDQRWHDW–69 (“[I@WZRXOGEHDUHWULEXWLYHKRUURUIRUWKHVKRRWHU
whose shot safely impacted a tree to be found criminally liable for a wounding.”). The Canada
6XSUHPH&RXUWJRWWKLVTXHVWLRQZURQJVXUSULVLQJO\LQ5HVXUILFH&RUSY+DQNH>@6&5
 &DQ The Canada Supreme Court traditionally has applied a “material contribution” test in
“special circumstances,” as an exception to the butIRU WHVW ,G DW   $PRQJ WKHVH VSHFLDO
FLUFXPVWDQFHVVDLGWKHFRXUWLQ5HVXUILFH&RUS., “is the situation where it is impossible to say
ZKLFKRIWZRWRUWLRXVVRXUFHVFDXVHGWKHLQMXU\DV ZKHUHWZRVKRWVDUHFDUHOHVVO\ ILUHGDWWKH
victim, but it is impossible to say which shot injured him.” ,GDW
  -RKQVRQVXSUDQRWHDW–VHHDOVR6WDSOHWRQVXSUDQRWH, at 40 (“[W]here
LQEUHDFKRIGXW\$DQG%FDUHOHVVO\VKRRWWRZDUGVDSHUVRQZKRLVKLWE\RQO\RQHEXOOHWZH
know that A’s breach would either have made a positive and necessary contribution to the
occurrence of the injury (i.e. it was A’s bullet that hit), or it would have been completely
uninvolved.”).
  &RQWULEXWH2;)25'(1*/,6+',&7,21$5<848 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “contribute” as
“[t]o give or pay jointly with others; to furnish to a common fund or charge”); Stapleton, VXSUD
QRWH, at 45 (“[T]he phrase ‘contributed to’DFFRPPRGDWHVWKHSRVLWLYHDOEHLWXQQHFHVVDU\
contributions being discussed here.”). 
  %XUUDJH Y 8QLWHG 6WDWHV  6 &W     (“Taken literally, [the
government’s] ‘contributingcause’ test would treat as a causeLQIDFWHYHU\DFWRURPLVVLRQWKDW
makes a positive incremental contribution, however small, to a particular result.” 
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conduct to “contribute” to an overdeteUPLQHG UHVXOW$EDVHEDOOSOD\HU
who hits “an early nondispositive home run” in a game where his team
wins by a score of 5 to 2 plays “a nonessential FRQWULEXWLQJrole” in his
team’s winning effort, said the Court, just as do all the players who score
IRU WKH ZLQQLQJ WHDP 1RU GRHV WKH &RXUW DSSHDU WR KDYH KDG DQ\
doubts about whether Burrage’s conduct would have satisfied the
FRQWULEXWLRQUHTXLUHPHQW7KHKHURLQVXSSOLHGE\%XUUDJHFRPSOHPHQWHG
the other drugs in depressing Banka’s central nervous systemDQGZDV
“operative in the moment of the result.” It contributed to Banka’s death.
7KH %XUUDJH Court’s doubts about the contribution test weren’t
DGGUHVVHGWRLWVPHDQLQJEXWWRLWVEUHDGWK. “Taken literally,” said Justice
6FDOLD LQ KLV PDMRULW\ RSLQLRQ Whe government’s “‘contributingcause’
WHVW ZRXOG WUHDW DV D FDXVHLQIDFW HYHU\ DFW RU RPLVVLRQ WKDW PDNHV D
SRVLWLYH LQFUHPHQWDO FRQWULEXWLRQ KRZHYHU VPDOO WR D SDUWLFXODU
result.”-XVWLFH6FDOLDVDLGWRRWKDWDQ\HIIRUWWROLPLWWKHEUHDGWKRI
WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ UXOH—by, say, excluding “insubstantial” or “QRW
important” contributions to the causal mechanism—ZRXOG SURYH
XQDYDLOLQJ/LPLWDWLRQVOLNHWKHVHKHVDLGZRXOGEHWRRYDJXHWRSDVV
PXVWHUXQGHUWKH'XH3URFHVV&ODXVH
Justice Scalia’s concerQVDUHRYHUVWDWHG)LUVWRIDOO, there’s nothing
novel about the idea of limiting the contribution rule’s breadth. Courts
often have excluded contributions that are “insignificant or merely
theoretical” from the scope of the rule.6RPHWLPHVFRXUWVKDYHXVHG
phrases like “substantial factor” to embody this limitation.6RPHWLPHV
WKRXJK FRXUWV DQG OHJLVODWXUHV KDYH IRUPXODWHG WKLV OLPLWDWLRQ PRUH
specifically. For example, the Brown Commission’s 1971 draft federal
criminal code provided that a defendant’VFRQWULEXWLRQZRXOGQRWTXDOLI\
as a cause if “the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the
result and the conduct of the accused clearly insufficient.”8QGHUWKLV
twofold test, a defendant’s contribution will qualify as a cause if, first, LW
PLJKW DFWXDOO\ KDYH PDGH D GLIIHUHQFH—LI WKH RWKHU FDXVDO IDFWRUV DW


  ,GDW HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
  ,GDW
  ,GDW
  ,G
  3HRSOHY-HQQLQJV3G &DO  TXRWLQJ3HRSOHY%ULVFRH&DO
5SWUG  VHHDOVR3HRSOHY:HOOV1:G 0LFK  /HYLQ-
GLVVHQWLQJ 3(5.,16 %2<&(VXSUDQRWHDW
  -HQQLQJV3GDW TXRWLQJ3HRSOHY6DQFKH]3G  
  6HH1$7’/&200’1215()2502))('&5,0,1$//$:6VXSUDQRWHDW7KRXJK
Congress never adopted the Brown Commission’s draft federal criminal code, § 305 of the%URZQ
&RPPLVVLRQGUDIWLQIOXHQFHGWKHFRGHVRIVHYHUDOVWDWHV 6HH$/$ &2'($ D   
$5.&2'($11  0(67$7WLWD  1'&(17&2'(
  7(;3(1$/&2'($11 :HVW 
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work were not “clearly sufficient” to cause the result by themselves. 
Alternatively, a defendant’s contribution will qualify as a cause if, in the
DEVHQFHRIWKHRWKHUFDXVDOIDFWRUVLWPLJKWVWLOOKDYHFDXVHGWKHUHVXOW—
if it was not “clearly insufficient” to cause the result by itself. 
Moreover, it just isn’t true that terms like “substantial” and
“important” make statutes unconstitutionally vague. Criminal statutes
URXWLQHO\XVHWerms like “substantial” and “important,” and really couldn’t
GRRWKHUZLVH,QGHHG-XVWLFH6FDOLDDFNQRZOHGJHGDVPXFKLQKLV
RSLQLRQ IRU WKH &RXUW LQ -RKQVRQ Y 8QLWHG 6WDWHV ,Q -RKQVRQ WKH
&RXUWVWUXFNGRZQDVXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\YDJXHWKHUHVLGXDOFODXVHRIWKH
Armed Career Criminal Act, under which a defendant’s prior felonies
would trigger enhanced sentencing if they involved “serious potential
risk.”:KDWPDGHWKHVWDWXWHYDJXHVDLG-XVWLFH6FDOLDZDVQRWLWVXVH
of the phrase “serious potential risk.”:KDWPDGHWKHVWDWXWHYDJXHZDV
that it required the courts to apply this standard to “an idealized ordinary
case of the [charged] crime.”Justice Scalia acknowledged that “dozens
of federal and state criminal laws use terms like ‘substantial risk,’ ‘grave
risk,’ and ‘unreasonable risk’” and that the use of phrases like these are
not constitutionally suspect: “As a general matter, we do not doubt the
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\ RI ODZV WKDW FDOO IRU WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI D TXDOLWDWLYH
VWDQGDUGVXFKas ‘substantial risk’ to realworld conduct; ‘the law is full
of instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating
ULJKWO\some matter of degree.’” 7KH WUDGLWLRQDO H[FOXVLRQ RI
“insignificant or merely theoretical” contributions from the contriEXWLRQ
rule’s scope is not really constitutionally suspect, then. 
:LWK WKLV WUDGLWLRQDO H[FOXVLRQ WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ UXOH SHUIHFWO\
FRPSOHPHQWVWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOH,WDVVLJQVUHVSRQVLELOLW\LQMXVWWKRVH
overdetermination cases where the defendant’s conWULEXWLRQWRWKHFDXVDO

  $VLWKDSSHQVWKLVWHVWFORVHO\FRUUHVSRQGVWRZKDWFRXUWVUHTXLUHE\ZD\RIFRQWULEXWLRQ
in the “lost chance” homicide cases. In the lostFKDQFHFDVHVWKHFRXUWVUHTXLUHWKHJRYHUQPHQW
to prove that the defendant’s conduct contributed to, or complemented, the cDXVDO PHFKDQLVP
behind the victim’s death. 6HH-RKQVRQVXSUDQRWHDW–%XWWKH\DOVRUHTXLUHWKH
government to prove that “the victim PLJKWQRWKDYHGLHGbut for the defendant’s conduct.” ,GDW
VHHDOVRHJ$UPVWURQJY6WDWH3G $ODVND  UHO\LQJRQHYLGHQFHWKDW
“in the absence of any one of the factors in this case, the victim might have survived”). 
  Among the many criminal law rules that make use of terms like “important” or
“substantial” are the rules that govern “proximate” or “legal” causation. 6HH3(5.,16  %2<&(
VXSUD QRWH , at 776 (“The line of demarcation between causes which will be recognized as
proximate and those which will be disregarded as remote ‘is really a flexible line.’”).
  6&W  
  ,GDW GLVFXVVLQJ86& H  % 
  ,GDW
  ,GDW2561 (“It is one thing to apply an imprecise ‘serious potential risk’ standard
WRUHDOZRUOGIDFWVLWLVTXLWHDQRWKHUWRDSSO\LWWRDMXGJHLPDJLQHGabstraction.”).
  ,GDW TXRWLQJ1DVKY8QLWHG6WDWHV86  
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PHFKDQLVPWKRXJKVXEVWDQWLDODQGSRWHQWLDOO\GHWHUPLQDWLYHVWLOOGRHV
not affect the timing of the result. And so it captures the “common
understanding of cause” in cases where the butIRUWHVWIDLOVWRGRVR
&21&/86,21
&DXVDWLRQis complicated. You wouldn’t know it from the Supreme
Court’s opinion in %XUUDJH WKRXJK ,Q %XUUDJH WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW
didn’t just say that the butIRUWHVWPDNHVWKHEHVWRIDEDGVLWXDWLRQ,W
didn’t just say that, given this subject’s extraordinary coPSOH[LW\FRXUWV
KDYHOLWWOHFKRLFHEXWWRRYHUVLPSOLI\5DWKHULWVDLGWKDWWKHEXWIRUWHVW
captures what ordinary people mean when they identify a wrongdoer’s
conduct as the “cause” of harm, period.This claim isn’t supported by
WKH DXWKRULWLHV WKH &Rurt cited; it isn’t supported by the Model Penal
&RGHIRUH[DPSOHWorse, it’s demonstrably false. In ordinary usage,
DSHUVRQZKREHDWVDFKLOGWRGHDWKDVWKHGHIHQGDQWLQ6WDWHY3KLOOLSV
GLGis a “cause” of the child’s death even if the child probably “was going
to die anyway” within a day or two.7KHEXWIRUWHVWJHWVWKLVDQGPDQ\
RWKHUVHHPLQJO\HDV\FDVHVZURQJ
%\FRQWUDVWWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQDQGFRQWULEXWLRQUXOHVDVDSSOLHGE\VWDWH
FRXUWVXVXDOO\JHWWKHVHFDVHVULJKW7KH\JHWWKHVHFDVHVULJKWPRUHRYHU
ZLWKRXW PDNLQJ XQUHDVRQDEOH GHPDQGV RI IDFW ILQGHUV—ZLWKRXW
GHPDQGLQJ VD\ WKDW IDFW ILQGHUs decide which of several “sufficient
causal sets” actually was “instantiated” in the defendant’s case. ,Q
cases where the defendant’s conduct afIHFWVWKHWLPLQJRIWKHUHVXOWWKH
DFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHXVHVDVLPSOHWLPHVHQVLWLYHYDULDQWRIWKHEXWIRUWHVW
WRVROYHHOHJDQWO\ERWK FDXVDORYHUGHWHUPLQDWLRQDQGVSXULRXVFDXVDO
VXIILFLHQF\ SUREOHPV &RQWULEXWLRQV WR WKH UHVXOW HYHQ ODUJH
FRQWULEXWLRns, won’t always affect the timing of the result, however. And
VRWKHFRXUWVFRPSOHPHQWWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHZLWKDFRQWULEXWLRQUXOH
7KRXJKLWVZHHSVPRUHEURDGO\WKHFRQWULEXWLRQUXOHVHUYHVH[DFWO\WKH
VDPH HQGV—VROYHV H[DFWO\ WKH VDPH NLQGV RI GLIILFXOWLHV—DV WKH
DFFHOHUDWLRQUXOH,WKDVEHHQDQGRXJKWVWLOOWREHQRPRUHFRQWURYHUVLDO
7KHVWDWHFRXUWVRXJKWWKHQWRUHMHFW%XUUDJHDQGWRFRQWLQXHWRDSSO\
WKHFRQWULEXWLRQDQGDFFHOHUDWLRQUXOHV
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